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This study examines the lobbying strategies employed by the German energy industries in the 
process leading up to EU's Renewable Energy Directive. The focus is on the most 
controversial part of it: Choice of support mechanisms for increasing production of renewable 
energy in Europe. The position on this issue roughly divided the energy industry into two 
sectors: the utilities, favoring green certificates and other supranational incentives and the 
renewables industry, promoting feed-in tariffs. Nine interest organizations, five German and 
four at the European level, serve as cases. Expectations based on the two theoretical 
perspectives liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) and multi-level governance (MLG) are 
formulated and tested against the empirics in a most likely case design. In addition, resources, 
mainly in terms of manpower, are assessed as a conditioning factor for choice of lobbying 
strategies. The findings show that the observations provide more support for the multi-level 
perspective, MLG, than for liberal intergovernmentalism, LI. Two findings supported the LI 
perspective: 1) All the German interest organizations put top priority at lobbying the German 
government. 2) The interest organizations provided German decision makers with crucial 
information. As envisioned by the MLG-perspective, there was a clear division of work 
between the organizations at the two political levels. Further, the lobbying activity displayed 
several multi-level characteristics. First, all the German interest organizations lobbied both at 
the national and at the European level. Second, the national interest organizations participated 
in multi-level political coalitions, in particular the renewables industry. There, they 
coordinated their political positions, pooled resources, shared information and made common 
strategies. Third, all the European-level interest organizations lobbied both the core EU 
institutions and national governments. Fourth, their information strategy matched the 
Commission's need for critical information on the complicated issues involved. It might be 
expected that interest groups loosing at home could try to “by-pass” national politics by 
lobbying extra much at the European level, but the observations are inconclusive in this 
respect. That more resources were associated with a higher number of lobbying channels was 
true at the European level, but not nationally. The number of political channels used by the 
German interest organizations rather depended on level of political mobilization and creating 
of broad coalitions.  
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[..] understanding interest groups systems remains crucial to understanding the functioning of advanced 
democracies [...] (Beyers et al 2008:1103).  
Interest groups are natural parts of all national democratic systems. These groups aggregate 
the interests of their members and voice them in political negotiations. Other important roles 
include participating in the public debate and producing information. As the European Union 
has developed more state-like features and increased its decision competencies in depth and 
scope, the amount of lobbying towards its institutions has increased vastly. In particular, this 
lobbying increased significantly after adoption of the Single European Act of 1990, which 
established a common European market (Coen and Richardson 2009). No one knows the 
exact number of lobbyists, but Coen and Richardson (2009:3) estimate that EU officials meet 
between 15 000 to 20 000 different interests during the course of a year. About 70 percent of 
these stem from business-related groups, while the rest are NGOs. In addition to meeting EU 
officials in informal occasions and making political campaigns, different interest groups have 
to a varying extent also gotten institutionalized access to EU bodies, such as through 
participation in working groups in the Commission and in comitology committees (Eising 
2007a and 2007b). Further, EU officials particularly within the Commission and interest 
groups have grown dependent of each other, because they provide each other with important 
information, which is labelled resource dependency (Hooghe and Marks 2001). Thus, interest 
groups and their lobbying are inherent parts of both national political systems, and the 
European Union.  
Measuring the exact impact of interest groups’ activity is very hard, if not impossible, as for 
example Dür (2008) points out. A basic premise in many studies of lobbyism in the EU is that 
interest groups indeed do influence legislation and political processes there. However, due to 
the political processes’ intricacy, such causality is often very hard to track. Indeed, one of 
Nilsson et al’s (2008:14) respondents described lobbying the Renewables Directive as 
“playing chess at seven boards at the same time”. Several studies on interest groups lobbying 
of EUs environmental legislation interpret the fact that when final legislation has been altered 
from its initial formulation, this shows that interest groups have influenced the legislation 
(e.g. Markussen and Svensen 2005, Gullberg 2008b). Researchers regard the Renewables 
Directive as a prime example of interest groups influence; The Commission altered the final 
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draft proposal significantly regarding its most controversial part: what kind of support 
mechanisms the member states could have to increase their production of renewable energy. 
Nilsson et al (2008, 2009) and Toke (2008:3003) partially attribute this outcome to efficient 
lobbying and large-scale political mobilization by “green” interest groups such as the interest 
groups from the renewables industry and the environmental organizations. However, the 
interest groups’ strategies and their reasons for choice of strategies in lobbying this directive 
have been scantly studied. In addition, interest groups lobbying at multiple levels in this 
political context is highly relevant, but has received little attention from researchers. Since 
Germany is regarded as a key country for the outcome of the negotiations, it is relevant to 
investigate which role interest groups for the German industries had in the political process. 
 
1.1 Research questions  
1) Which lobbying strategies have the interest organizations of the German energy industries 
used to influence the EU legislation as it is formulated in the Renewables Directive?  
2) Under what conditions do they use these strategies? Which role has resources played for 
choice of political level and the intensity of lobbying?  
These research questions will be investigated in the light of expectations based on two 
different theoretical perspectives of EU governance: liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) and 
multi-level governance (MLG). These two are theories on how the EU as a polity functions, 
and outline where the power of making decisions is centered. LI’s main assumption is that the 
states are the decisive entities in all international negotiations. In contrast, MLG states that the 
power and governance in the European Union is spread across multiple levels. Assuming this, 
lobbying to affect the content of EU legislation should follow different paths dependent on 
where they perceive the most important decision making to take place.   
Several theoretical frameworks can be used to investigate the phenomenon multi-level 
lobbyism in the European Union. In this study, however, liberal intergovernmentalism and 
multi-level governance will serve as theoretical frameworks. These frameworks are chosen 
for several reasons. First, energy is a policy domain that traditionally has been characterized 
by strong national sovereignty (Nilsson et al 2009). Thus, the liberal intergovernmentalist 
perspective which focuses on the nation states in international negotiations is indicated. 
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Second, as the European Union steadily develops more state-like features, the multi-level 
governance perspective might constitute a more appropriate tool for understanding the present 
political processes. Multi-level lobbying is expensive, and is therefore not something that all 
national interest organizations can conduct. Third, the industries that are affected by this 
legislation have billions of Euros in turnovers (BMU 2011b, Dagger 2009). Therefore, their 
interest organizations are also among the most capable of using multi-levels strategies when 
they perceive it as appropriate means to achieve their targets. Last, both theories are regarded 
as two of the most influential and relevant theories on the topic today both within research 
and within the public debate in Europe.  
 
1.2 The Renewables Directive and EU climate policy 
The Renewable Energy Directive (further: Renewables Directive) is a part of EUs climate and 
energy package (European Commission 2009). This is a coordinated strategy to achieve 
several different goals, including fulfilling EUs commitments in the Kyoto protocol1, be an 
international leader in development and innovation of renewable energy sources, and ensuring 
security of energy supply (e.g. European Commission 2010a, 2010b). The past years, 
development of renewable energy sources has become a core strategic priority (e.g. European 
Commission 2010a). A first climate package was launched by the Commission in January 
2007 and adopted in March the same year. Climate package 1 states that the EU member 
states have to achieve an average of 20 percent of the energy consumed domestically from 
renewable energy sources by 2020. Simultaneously, they are to cut emissions of greenhouse 
gases by 20 percent and reduce energy consumption by 20 percent compared to a business as 
usual-scenario in 2020. Therefore, these goals are popularly called “EU 20/20/20”. January 
2008, the Commission launched Climate package 2 (European Commission 2008). This 
legislation was agreed by the European Parliament and the Council December 2009 and 
became law June 2009 (European Commission 2010). This legislation contains different 
remedies to achieve the stated targets for 2020 (Wettestad 2009). The most renowned part is 
the EU emission trading system (EU ETS), called a “cornerstone” in EUs climate policy 
(Wettestad 2010). 
                                                 
1 The EU countries form the main bulk for countries that have to reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases 
according to the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC 1998). Germany is the country in the EU that has managed to reduce 
its greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) the most (United Nations 2008) 
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The Renewable Energy Directive, shorthand “the Renewables Directive” (Directive 
2009/28/EC) is also an important part of this package. Potentially it will contribute to large-
scale investments in renewable power production and innovation. It builds on the former 
Renewable Electricity Directive (2001/77/EC) from 2001 and the Biofuels Directive 
(2003/30/EC). The initial electricity directive set a goal of 22 percent electricity from 
renewable sources within 2010. These targets were only indicative, and not binding, and the 
member states did not succeed in reaching them (European Commission 2011d, EWEA 
2009). The new directive differs from its predecessors in several ways. First, it merges the 
former separate directives for renewable electricity and transport fuels and includes also 
renewable energy used for heating and cooling purposes. Therefore, it covers all renewable 
energy consumed inland. Second, sets legally binding individual targets for renewable energy 
production for the member states. These are based on a combination of wealth as measured 
per capita BNP and the present level of renewable energy production to make the targets as 
fair and attainable as possible2. EUs member states are very different regarding endowment 
with sources of renewable energy3 as well as economic resources. Third, all the countries are 
obliged to prepare National Action Plans (NAPs)4, showing how they would achieve the 
interim and final goals, in accordance with detailed templates drafted by the Commission. 
These should have been submitted by July 2010 and transposed by the member states by 
December 2010 (EU 2010). Finally, the directive leads to some transfer of power to EU 
bodies, including the Commission and two committees to develop detailed rules in order to 
enhance implementation (Boasson and Wettestad 2010:9).  
The member states’ main strategy for achieving their national renewables targets is enhancing 
their own production of renewable energy. In addition to increasing production of renewable 
energy sources and decreasing consumption nationally, they can also use three flexibility 
mechanisms: ‘1) statistical transfer between member states, 2) collaboration on joint projects 
between member states, 3) joint projects between member states and third countries’ 
(Directive 2009/28/EC). The directive allows the member states to decide themselves how to 
achieve their targets. The two most commonly used support mechanisms today are feed-in 
tariffs (FIT) or the more market based system called “green certificates”. Among these, feed-
                                                 
2 Therefore, they vary greatly, from 10 percent for Malta to 49 percent for Sweden (European Commission 
2011a) 
3 The supply of different energy sources is typically called “the energy mix”. 
4 Only half of the 27 member states and members of EEA had submitted the National Action Plans by July 2010, 
but all had it by January 2011. By December 2010, all the member states had implemented the Renewables 
Directive (European Commission 2011c).  
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in tariffs in combination with non-discriminatory access to the power grids is the most wide-
spread. Feed-in tariffs are technology-specific subsidies which grant that producers of 
renewable energy are ensured a specific price per unit electricity produced for a long time 
period to enhance innovation and investment in renewable energy sources (Toke 2008:3002). 
Green certificates are “guarantees that renewable energy of a particular type and quantity has 
been generated”. Already, they are used voluntarily as a part of inter-state trade, marked as 
“green electricity” (Toke 2008:3002). In the Renewables Directive, however, inter-state 
trading will only be available for countries that already have fulfilled their commitments 
about renewable energy production nationally (Directive 2009/28/EC). However, the debate 
about appropriate support mechanisms for advancement of renewable energy is far from new 
at the national and the European level. Figure 1 outlines the most important happenings in 

















Figure 1: Important developments in energy legislation and climate treaties 
 
1996: Directive 96/92/EC: Directive on internal market for electricity that enforced electricity 
liberalization. Commission Green paper “Energy for the Future, Renewable Sources of 
Energy”.    
1997: Adoption of the Kyoto Protocol. Commission white paper on “Energy for the Future” 
which includes an action plan for renewable energy. Trade of green certificates discussed. 
1998: The European Parliament presented the Linkohr report, which suggested a 
compensation system for generators of renewable energy and that member states could choose 
support mechanisms themselves.  
1999: Commission working paper, which goes through support schemes and concludes that 
feed-in tariffs violate EU treaty rules and also criticize such schemes in other ways. 
2000: The red-green German coalition government introduces The Renewable Energy Sources 
Act (Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz, EEG) with an elaborate feed-in scheme.  
2001: DG Competition wanted to force in a harmonization directive with quotas and green 
certificates by intervening in a German case in the European Court: Preussen Elektra vs. 
Schleswag. DG Competition lost, feed-in tariffs legal. Directive 2001/77/EC: The Renewable 
Electricity Directive.  
2003: The directive on the promotion and use of biofuels.  
2005: The Kyoto Protocol entered into force. 
2007: Jan: Renewable Energy Roadmap. March: Climate package 1, which includes 20 
percent energy consumed inland from renewable energy sources within 2020.   
2008: Climate package 2: EU ETS. Dec: agreement on the Renewables Directive, CCS, 
Biofuels. 
2010: June: National renewable energy action plans was to be submitted. December: the 
Renewables Directive should have been implemented (transposed).  
 
       
Sources: Lauber (2007), European Commission (2011b), European Commission (2011c), EurActiv (2007).  
 
1.3 Fierce lobbying efforts to influence support mechanisms 
December 2007, the Commission proposed a mandatory European trade-based system as a 
key part the Renewables Directive (version 9.6.1), similar to the EU ETS. This system would 
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be based on trading of green certificates, so that sale of such certificates would count against 
the country’s targets for renewable energy (Toke 2008:3002, 3003). Still, according to the 
informants of Toke (2008:3003), the Commission was internally divided upon the issue. Both 
member countries and interest groups at the European level working both for and against a 
trade-based certificate system lobbied hard to convince officials in the Commission about 
their views (Toke 2008:3003)5. The major electric utilities supported a common system of 
green certificates that first would put an end to national support mechanisms that they viewed 
as overly costly possibly and second could generate windfall profits. In contrast, the 
renewable energy interest groups feared such a system could have a devastating effect for 
many producers of renewable energy for many reasons. One was that investments 
predominantly would be made in the most mature renewables technologies. Moreover, they 
claimed that feed-in tariffs were more effective than green certificates for increasing 
production of renewable energy at the lowest price, as indicated by several studies (Mez 2007, 
Toke 2008, Mitchell et al 2006, and Nilsson et al 2009). This conflict between different 
industries was (and still is) particularly salient in Germany, home to the largest utilities 
industry and the largest renewables industry in Europe. 
After “unprecedented lobby effort from interest groups and member states”, according to 
Nilsson et al (2009:4458), the Commission changed its proposal radically, to an optional 
system where national feed-in tariffs would still be allowed. The Commission presented this 
in a new draft one month later, in January 2008. A variety of interest groups worked actively 
to influence the content of the proposal, including the European Renewable Energy Council 
(EREC), umbrella organization for the renewables industry in Europe. Also member state 
governments strongly asserted their views towards EU bodies. For example, Germany, Spain, 
Latvia and Slovenia sent a joint letter asking the Commission to change the directive to allow 
fee-in tariffs (Taylor 2008). Countries such as the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg favoured trade of green certificates. The strongest opponents of a Europe-wide 
mandatory trade-based system included The Union of the Electricity Industry 
(EURELECTRIC), The European Federation of Energy Traders (EFET) and Renewable 
Energy Certificate System (RECS) (Toke 2008, Nilsson et al 2009). The utilities industry6 in 
Europe dwarfs the renewables industry, although the renewables industry has had a large 
                                                 
5 This debate is still ongoing. For example, EUs energy commissioner Günther Öttinger proposed a market-
based system in February 2011 (interviews EPIA and EREF 2011). 
6 This includes the industries that are mainly connected to production of energy from conventional energy 
sources such as coal, oil, gas and large-scale hydroelectric power. 
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growth since the year 2000 (EREC 2010). In the making of the directive there were two main 
lines of conflict; first one between a Europe-wide market-based auctioning system (the green 
certificates) and a system which allowed feed-in tariffs, second one between a centralized EU-
wide system and a national system. The private actors with the strongest views seem roughly 
to have been the large utilities companies and the small and medium sized companies 
involved in renewable energy production. The first group argued for a Europe-wide, trade-
based system. On the opposite hand, the latter furthered freedom for the member states in 
choice of support mechanisms (Toke 2008, Boasson and Wettestad 2010).  
 
1.4 Short review of the literature on the Renewables Directive and 
indicating some gaps in the research 
Several studies have analyzed different aspects connected to the Renewables Directive. This 
literature can be roughly divided into four strands. The first group of studies discusses 
whether a system of tradable green certificates or feed-in tariffs work the best for achieving 
EUs targets of reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases, e.g. Jacobsson et al (2009), Mez 
(2007), Fouquet and Johansson (2008) and Johnston et al (2008). The second group of studies 
assesses the direct impact of the revised directive on single countries, for example Labriet et 
al (2010), Anandarajah and Strachan (2010) and Garrain et al (2010). The third group of 
studies discusses the interaction between the Renewables Directive and EU ETS, for example 
Abrell and Weight (2008), Rathmann (2007) and Böhringer and Rosendahl (2009). The fourth 
group of studies investigate and do causal analyses of the political processes leading to the 
revised Renewables Directive, for example Toke (2008), Nilsson et al (2009), and Boasson 
and Wettestad (2010). This last group of studies analyzes “the broad picture”, and explains 
the outcome of the directive, using different theoretical approaches. Toke (2008) focuses on 
the groups being for and against trading of green certificates, as well as the quality of their 
arguments. Nilsson et al (2008) use a constructivist theoretical framework and analyses why 
the trading of green electricity certificates was rejected as an EU wide system. Boasson and 
Wettestad (2010) explain the different governance outcomes of the Renewables Directive and 
the EU ETS with four different theoretical perspectives. Yet other single studies investigate 
other aspects of the revised Renewables Directive. Neuhoff (2009), for example, discusses 
quantitative indicators for authorities to achieve successful implementation of the directive. 
The present study focuses on the interest organizations for two national industries, more 
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specifically on those representing the utilities and the renewables producers. To my 
knowledge, this study is the first to investigate into “the details” in this way.  
 
1.5 Indicating some gaps in the research on lobbying 
There is a growing body of research on lobbying in general, and lobbying in the European 
Union in particular (e.g. Beyers et al 2008). Still, there remain several gaps in the literature, 
and this study seeks to fill some of these. According to Gullberg (2008b:162), “most 
empirical studies on interest group lobbying focus on single policy decisions within a limited 
period of time”. In the wake of the Single European Act of 1991, there was a large growth of 
interest group representation in EU. Simultaneously, from the 1990s onwards, interest groups 
at the European level also received an increasing amount of attention from researchers (Coen 
and Richardson 2009). Also, there is an increasing amount of research on lobbying efforts of 
interest groups towards EUs environmental policy, or related issues, such as lobbying the EU 
emissions trading system (e.g. Markussen and Svendsen 2005). Gullberg (2008b:163) notes 
that these are dominated by case studies. Most of these lobbying studies focus on the political 
representation and strategies at the European level, although lobbying towards EU can be, and 
indeed is, done at multiple levels of governance, including the local, regional and national 
levels to influence decision makers (e.g. Gullberg 2008a, Gullberg 2008b, and Nilsson et al 
2009). There are also other studies of lobbying at multiple levels within the European Union 
(e.g. Coen 2005). Still, few seem to specifically investigate multi-level lobbyism conducted 
by national and European interest organizations in tandem7. There is also a lack of theory 
testing case studies in EU lobbying on how EUs institutional structures influence interest 
groups’ choice of lobbying strategies. Further, there are seemingly few studies on how 
industries within member states with diverging interests will lobby to influence policy making 
in the EU. 
 
                                                 
7 There are, however some studies that investigate individual companies’ multi-level strategies, for example 




This study will mainly concentrate upon the lobbying processes related to the most 
controversial part of the Renewables Directive: what kind of support mechanisms the member 
states should be allowed to use for achieving their renewables targets. The focus will be on 
the German energy industries’ interest organizations in the political processes leading to the 
revised Renewables Directive, which was negotiated in 2007-2008 and agreed upon in 2009. 
This should be well-suited for a study of multi-level lobbyism because actors in Germany’s 
energy industry are large and wealthy enough to pursue such lobbying strategies. This group 
of agents can roughly be divided into two sectors: the utilities industry and the renewables 
industry. Both, and especially the utilities industry, are influential actors economically as well 
as politically (Dagger 2009). This study does not attempt to investigate the whole causal 
process to explain why the Renewables Directive ended in its present form, but rather 
investigate multi-level lobbying strategies. Thereby, the findings may provide a little brick to 
the puzzle about the political processes behind the Renewables Directive. A further 
delimitation is that the study will focus on the lobbying strategies of the two industries 
interest organizations rather than the whole industries.  
The term lobbying is defined in various ways in the literature about EU lobbying. The 
Commission defines lobbying as “activities carried out with the objective of influencing the 
policy formulation and decision-making processes of the European Institutions” (European 
Commission 2008b). Some studies distinguish between institutionalized (formal) and non-
institutionalized (informal) channels of influence. This is exemplified in participation in 
public bodies, such as working groups versus meetings with politicians and campaigns in 
media (Gullberg 2008a:2965). Here lobbying is understood as interest organizations 
utilization of both types of channels. This thesis will investigate the lobbying routes used by 
interest organizations of the German industries to influence the Renewables Directive. 
Industry is defined as “a group of productive enterprises or organizations that produce or 
supply goods, services, or sources of income” (Encyclopædia Britannica 2011). Here 
“industry” is understood as the power producers and the affiliated businesses, such as the 
producers of equipment for power production including their interest organizations. Miard 
(2010) discerns two approach components: tactics and targets. The tactic means how the 
interest organization chooses to lobby. Lobbying the European level can be practiced in 
several ways, for example: alone (directly) to the EU bodies or in alliance with one or more 
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other stakeholders at the national level. Other options include lobbying through another 
national interest organization, or through one or more European-level interest groups. 
Furthermore, it is possible to lobby through regional and national authorities as well as via 
foreign countries governments or international organizations. Last, employing consultants is 
also an opportunity for lobbying both at the national and the European level (Bouwen 2004). 
The targets of the lobbying tactics in this study are all decision makers that might have a final 
influence on the outcome of the political processes. The national authorities that are the most 
likely to be addressed are the German government and the ministries in charge of renewables 
legislation: first and foremost the Ministry of Environment, but also the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs (Dagger 2009). Since the Renewables Directive was subject to the co-decision 
procedure, this includes the Council of Ministers (implicitly: the governments and permanent 
representations in the member states), the European Parliament, and the Commission. 
Furthermore, an interest organization may choose to lobby through several routes at the same 
time to increase its political leverage.  
Bouwen and McCown (2007) divide the strategies that an agent can use to influence decision 
making in the European Union into three main categories: lobbying, litigation and indirect 
strategies such as using the press. Lobbying has been labeled a political strategy of “access”; 
the agents try to participate directly in EU-policy making. Interest groups can also use indirect 
political strategies, which are called “voice”. These for example comprise political campaigns 
and getting media attention (Bouwen and McCown 2007:423). In addition, litigation can be a 
very efficient strategy for exerting political influence because court rulings influence how 
legislation is to be interpreted. However, in this case litigation against feed-in tariffs was ruled 
out as a strategy when Preussen Elektra lost the case against Schleswag AG in the European 
Court of Justice in 2001 (Mez 2007). This study will mainly focus on lobbying, since 
litigation is unlikely and the indirect “voice” strategies are very difficult and/or expensive and 
thus likely only to be available for some of the agents. Below is an extensive table that lists 
more or less all possible strategies to influence decision making. As illustrated in table 1, 
several strategies are possible. However, this study will concentrate on lobbying at the 




Table 1: The different possible strategies for influencing EU legislation 
Main strategy Level Political bodies Channels and means 











1) Traditional lobbying, such as holding 
formal and informal meetings with 
politicians. 
2) Formal strategies such as participation 
in expert committees in DGs and other 
bodies, such as advisory groups, 
public hearings 
3) Participation in European- level 
interest organizations 
4) Having an office to be continually 
represented at the European level 
5) Cooperating with other interest 
organizations that hold similar views 
6) Via international organizations 
7) Via foreign countries 
8) Hiring consultants 







1) Traditional lobbying, such as holding 
formal and informal meetings with 
politicians 
2) Formal strategies such as participation 
in expert committees in the ministries 
and other bodies, such as advisory 
groups, public hearings 
3) Participation in other interest 
organizations at the national level. 
4) Cooperation with interest 
organizations that hold similar views 
5) Hiring consultants 
6) (Via foreign countries towards 
national politicians) 
7) (Via international organizations 
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1) Traditional lobbying 
2) Participation in regional interest 
organizations 
3) Participation in national interest 
organizations who also work 
regionally 
4) (Similar strategies to the national 
level) 
Litigation European  The European 
Court of Justice 
1) Referring a case to the court 
themselves 
2) Making a complaint to for example 
DG competition, which refers the case 
further to the European Court of 
Justice 
 National The High court of 







 Regional The regional court 







Potentially all media channels, such as the 
Brussels press, TV channels, radio, 
commercials 
 National  Potentially all media channels, such as the 
German press, TV channels, radio, 
commercials 




Sources: Lauber and Mez (2004), Agnolucci (2006), Coen (2007), Toke (2008), Broscheid and Coen (2007), 
Bouwen and McCown (2007), Andersen and Eliassen (2001:14).  
Comments to table 1: The table shows German interest groups’ different potential political 
strategies to influence decision making processes in the European Union. The table shows that an 
interest group for example can participate in another interest organization at the national level to 
influence national politicians’ political positions in EU negotiations, or lobby the EUs institutions 
directly.   
 
1.7 Research strategy 
This study enquires the German energy industries’ interest organizations lobbying strategies 
to influence the Renewables Directive. The assessments of these strategies include: 1) 
establishing lobbying routes they used, 2) determining whether or not they lobbied in a 
coalition with other interest groups and how this cooperation eventually was organized and 3) 
assessing to which extent the different interest organizations shared political positions and 
goals, as this is a precondition for choosing to ally and share resources in lobbying. By 
combining the theoretical perspectives liberal intergovernmentalism and multi-level 
governance with lobbying literature, the study will make hypotheses based on each of them. 
Under each perspective, resources such as personnel, money and expertise are also added as a 
possible conditioning factor for choice of lobbying strategy. These expectations will in turn be 
tested empirically by using a most likely case design. This means that if important theoretical 
expectations are not confirmed, the theory is less likely to explain lobbying behavior in the 
EU. A variety of methods are used to gather information and secure that the empirics are as 
valid and reliable as possible. Most of the empirics are based on ten research interviews, but 
method triangulation has been used extensively to ensure that all the facts are valid. For 
example, the interviewing is supplied with document studies.  
 
1.8 Outline of the master thesis 
The study consists of seven chapters. Chapter 2 will describe the theoretical background for 
the master thesis: Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism and multi-level governance as it 
is formulated by Hooghe and Marks. These theories will be combined with relevant lobbying 
literature to build theoretical expectations that will be further tested out. Chapter 3 describes 
the method and the methodological considerations behind is. In addition, the cases are 
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presented briefly. Further, chapter 4 gives a background for understanding the present energy 
policy in Germany by giving a review of the renewable energy policy the last two-three 
decades. Chapter 5 presents the empirics by going through the interest organizations and their 
lobbying strategies. Chapter 6 analyses the empirics in the light of the theoretical expectations 
outlined in the theory chapter. Finally, chapter 7 synthesizes the study and points towards 




















2.0 Theoretical background  
 
This chapter outlines the theoretical perspectives liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) as it is 
formulated by Moravcsik (1993, 1998) and multi-level governance (MLG) as it is described 
by Hooghe and Marks (2001). Further, these perspectives are used to make empirical 
expectations about the interest organization’s lobbying behavior to influence the Renewables 
Directive. The theoretical perspectives are combined with research literature on EU lobbying 
and other relevant sources of data. Last, under each perspective’s, resources are used as an 
independent variable for conditioning choice of lobbying strategies at the German and 
European level.  
 
2.1 Lobbying in an intergovernmental “state-centric” system 
2.1.1 The states as the ultimate decision makers 
The state-centric model of understanding EU and other international organizations has its 
roots in neo-realism, and is called intergovernmentalism or liberal intergovernmentalism 
(Moravcsik 1993, Hooghe and Marks 2001:29). There are several types of 
intergovernmentalism, and Andrew Moravcsik is regarded as one of its leading theorists. In 
his (1993:482) influential article “A Liberal Intergovernmental Approach to the EC”, and in 
the book “The Choice for Europe” (1998) he formulates LI as a mixture between two 
seemingly contradictory theories: a liberal inspired theory about how interests are formed 
domestically, and an intergovernmentalist theory about how states negotiate and found 
institutions. However, Moravcsik (1998:1) also views the former European Community as a 
“unique, multileveled, transnational political system” with semi-autonomous institutions. 
“The core claim of the state-centric model is that policy making in the EU is determined primarily by 
national governments constrained by political interests nested within autonomous national arenas” 
(Hooghe and Marks 2001:3).  
The LI-theory emphasized that the states with their governments are the predominant decision 
makers. Interest groups are then implicitly of lesser importance than politicians for political 
outcomes. The governments might give some authority to supranational institutions, but only 
in order to gain specific goals such as economic growth and prosperity. Therefore, policy-
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making in EU is not largely determined by EU institutions themselves, but should rather be 
viewed as policy co-ordination by national governments based on negotiations (Hooghe and 
Marks 2001:2, Moravcsik 1993:474, 480, Moravcsik 1998:7, 9). According to this 
perspective, states can withdraw authority from the EU institutions whenever they like, and 
the EU institutions have limited autonomy and self-determination. In this case, lobbying EU 
institutions will have limited effect because the institutions have little or no independent 
impact on decisions made there. If the interest groups have this understanding of the political 
system, they should regard lobbying European institutions as far less important than lobbying 
the member states’ governments and spend their resources thereafter. 
Expectation 1: 
The energy industries interest organizations lobbied the German government, but paid little attention to 
influencing policy-makers in the European Union, such as members of the European Parliament or the 
Commission.  
 
2.1.2 Political mobilization of national economic winners and losers 
Moravcsik (1993:480) states that liberal intergovernmentalism has three core elements: a) that 
a state’s behavior is rational, b) a liberal theory of national preference formation, and c) an 
intergovernmentalist analysis of interstate negotiation. Rationality is first and foremost based 
on national leaders’ economic evaluation of pros and cons with economic interdependence. 
Still, Moravcsik (1998:23, 24) underlines, some national preferences are “grounded in ideas”. 
A state’s preferences are not fixed, but may vary across time, countries and issues. However, 
a state’s objectives within each negotiation are stable. Assuming that a states’ rationality 
primarily is based on politic economic concerns, this necessarily implies that other factors 
such as legitimacy or security have a lesser say.  
Moravcsik (1993:483-488) argues that groups that either win or lose economically by a 
specific policy will exert the largest influence on national positions: “Groups that stand to 
gain and loose a great deal per capita tend to be the most influential”. This is because they 
more likely mobilize politically since they have more to win or lose, and more resources to 
put behind their targets to achieve them. Further, Moravcsik (1993:483, 484) states that state 
leaders must make coalitions with “influential groups with specific interests” when they make 
their foreign policy in order to maintain their place in office on the longer term. Assuming 
this, it is rational for German authorities to create a coalition with either the utilities industry 
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or the renewables industry in this case, since both had very specific interests and are 
influential8.  
“While domestic societal groups impose a basic constraint on governments, the nature and tightness of 
this constraint varies with the strength and unity from social groups” (Moravcsik 1993:484).   
Both the German utilities industry and the German renewables industry had large potential 
economic gains and losses depending on how the renewables directive would turn out. 
However, the renewables industry would probably be the most affected, as a renewables 
directive that included green certificate trade threatened its mere existence, in particular future 
investments in photovoltaics because the German feed-in tariffs would stop working as 
efficient support mechanisms (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2008). The utilities industry, 
on the other hand, would benefit from a system of green certificates. First, the grid operators 
would not have to pay the renewables producers the feed-in tariffs. In addition, the utilities 
would not suffer from the renewables industries granted grid access, which at times has 
consequences such as that utilities have to reduce or turn off power production at times when 
there is produced a lot of renewable electricity (e.g. on particularly sunny or windy days). 
Second, a trade based system could give them windfall profits by moving to “a marginal 
market where the most expensive marginal renewable certificate would set the price” (Turmes 
2008, cited by Nilsson et al 2009:4458). Third, a market based system would lead to 
allocation where electricity was the cheapest to produce. Fourth, since the large German 
utilities also invest in energy production in other countries, they favored similar regulatory 
frameworks across the borders.  
Expectation 2 
The interests with large economic gains or losses domestically will be the most influential when 
national foreign policy is formed. Therefore, both the utilities industry, and the renewables industry put 
key priority to influencing the position of the German government on the Renewables directive.  
 
                                                 
8 What counts as “influential” is disputable. Since Moravcsik (1993) bases his theory on economic interests, I 
interpret him as meaning that governments will make a coalition with an important industry, but not 
necessarily the largest one, and ensure that its positions will be backed by important domestic groups. Boasson 
and Wettestad (2010:3, 4), however, interpret him differently; First, they argue the government’s position is a 
result of “competition among national industries.” Second, they argue that “the economically strongest will 
have the greatest influence on shaping national positions.” 
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2.1.3 National policy entrepreneurs’ provision of critical information 
Liberal intergovernmentalism predicts that decision-making in the EU is largely influenced by 
the member states’ lowest common denominator (Moravcsik 1993:487). Boasson and 
Wettestad (2010:19) argue that the lowest common denominator was opposing a centralized 
EU governance scheme. Then they could keep the support mechanisms that they already had 
instead of redesigning their own systems. However, if the states pursued the same objectives 
in each negotiation, their political stances were not stable. According to the findings of 
Nilsson et al (2009), some of the EU member states changed their preferences from the 
centralized scheme proposed by the Commission to a voluntary scheme during the 
negotiations after intense lobbying by different “green” groups. Still, the member state’s main 
preferences were to decide support system themselves, which would not be the case with a 
centralized certificate based scheme. On the opposite hand, the fact that the revised 
Renewables Directive had binding targets would therefore not be a very likely outcome given 
the fact that the majority of the member states initially opposed such binding targets. 
Moravcsik (1993, 1998) argues that the states with the largest sizes and voting powers will be 
the most powerful and influential in the EU. This relationship he labels “asymmetrical 
interdependence”. According to Moravcsik (1998: 61, 66), the transaction costs are low, and 
the different governments in international negotiation possess more or less complete 
information so that the negotiating parts have the information they need for efficient 
bargaining. “The information and ideas required for efficient bargaining are plentiful and 
cheap.” The reason for this is that government officials have resources to generate all the 
information they need for different circumstances, such as technical, political and legal 
information. Therefore, the negotiating governments essentially have the information that 
they need. Both national governments and interest groups can work as catalysts in the 
political processes by initiating, and mediating different policies. Moravcsik (1998:66) argues 
that “critical information9 and ideas are introduced into negotiations by the most intensely 
interested governments or social groups.” Furthermore these aforementioned groups can act 
                                                 
9 Boasson and Wettestad (2010:4, 24) interpret Moravcsik as formulating that the provision of “superior 
information” is important for gaining bargaining leverage. However, here Moravcsik (1998) is used as a source, 
and there he clearly states that “critical information” can be supplied by the most eager participating actors. 
The world critical has several meanings. For example, Merriam Webster dictionary (2011) defines critical as a) 
of, relating to a turning point or important juncture, b) crucial, decisive, c) indispensable, vital. This study 
understands critical in as crucial, decisive.   
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as “effective policy entrepreneurs”, in contradiction to supranational theories which highlight 
that such entrepreneurs are supranational (Moravcsik 1998:55).  
Expectation 3 
Both the interest organizations for the national renewables industry and the national utilities industry 
provided the German government with critical information, since such information can be important to 
achieve political leverage in international negotiations. 
 
2.1.4 Resources decide lobbying strategies 
LI views the state as a unitary actor, but when the state bargains, its bargaining position is 
heavily influenced by what happens domestically. The governments’ policies are responses to 
what happens at the domestic arena within their state, similar to theories of “two-level games 
(see for example Putnam 1988). Governments will build coalitions with influential groups 
that are in particular affected by the outcome of the negotiations in order to secure that their 
political stances will be accepted when the legislation is implemented (Moravcsik 1993:484).  
Eising (2004:218) notes that efficient lobbying depends on organizational resources in terms 
of factors such as money, staff and time. Gullberg (2008b) describes how more wealthy 
interest groups can make use of more differentiated political channels and build relationships 
over time. This necessarily enhances their opportunities of influencing important policy 
decisions. The utilities sector dwarfs the renewables sector in terms of size and resources, 
which should enable it to build up a more extensive political network than its little brother. 
The German utilities industry has a close and long-time cooperation with the mighty German 
Ministry of Economy (Jacobsson and Lauber 2006). In addition, the leaders of the four large 
utilities have close relationships to top-level German politicians (see for example Blasberg et 
al 2011). However, the Ministry of Environment is in charge of renewables policy. The 
environmental organizations and renewables sector have built good long-time contacts with 
this ministry (Dagger 2009).  
Expectation 4 
The interest groups with the largest material resources will use all venues of access to German 
politicians, while interest groups with lesser resources will lobby fewer channels. Therefore, the interest 
organizations for the utilities industry worked towards more different political channels than the interest 




2.2 Lobbying in a multi-level governance system 
Several researchers point out that unlike liberal intergovernmentalism, multi-level governance 
is not yet a full-fledged theory about how EU functions, but more of a theoretical perspective. 
Multi-level governance is a term used for the interdependence of policy making at multiple 
levels of government, such as the global-regional in the EU, the national level, and the 
regional level within the nations (Hooghe and Marks 2001:2). Bache and Flinders (2004:3) 
point out that “governance” here describes how governments and private actors at different 
levels of government increasingly become interdependent of each other. From this theoretical 
perspective, the EU-members national governments are still the most important participants in 
policy-making in the EU, but have also given away power to the EU-institutions (Hooghe and 
Marks 2001:2,3). Therefore the EUs supranational institutions, first and foremost the 
European Parliament, the European Commission and the European Court of Justice are 
independent political actors. Hence they do not merely act on behalf of national governments 
(Hooghe and Marks 2001:3-11).  
 
2.2.1 New points of access to political decision making 
A basic premise is that the collective decision making processes in EU make national 
governments lose control over important decisions that influence them. In such a political 
system, influence goes both ways. This means that one direction goes both from the “top”, the 
European level, and down at the national, regional and local levels of government. Such 
mechanisms are investigated in different kinds of implementation studies (e.g. Knill 1998). 
However, influence also goes the other way: from the “bottom” at the local level, regional and 
national level and up to the European institutions. Such mechanisms are for example studied 
in lobbying literature. All the political levels of governance are mutually interdependent of 
each other. Multi-level governance therefore implies that sub-national actors will work on 
more political levels, such as the national, and the supranational arena (Hooghe and Marks 
2001:4). Assuming this, lobbying groups target EU institutions because they are important 
targets for lobbying in their own right.  
 
“As a result, we no longer see EU interest politics in terms of “bottom up” national interests feeding 
into the EU, or “top-down” coordination of EU lobbying, rather we see a managed multilevel process 
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with numerous feedback loops and entry points constrained by the size of the interest group, lobbying 
budgets, origin and the policy area (Coen and Richardson 2009:7)”. 
This theoretical perspective is supported by an increasing amount of empirical observations. 
For example, the last years, the Commission, EUs multipurpose executive body, has become 
increasingly independent of EUs member states. Thus, the Commission increasingly 
constitutes a higher level of governance than the national governments (Egeberg 2006:1-3). In 
addition, several treaty reforms, such as the Lisbon treaty has given the European Parliament 
increased powers. For example, more and more issues are treated under the co-decision 
procedure (Coen and Richardson 2009). Hence the reforms also give more power to the 
European institutions on behalf of national sovereignty. Consequently, the European 
institutions have also become more and more attractive and important lobbying targets. 
However, the third important European institution in decision making processes, the Council 
of Ministers, is still considered to be a rather hard target for lobbying groups (Coen and 
Richardson 2009). By the multi-level governance perspective, the interest organizations 
should lobby both the EUs institutions and the German government intensively. 
Expectation 5 
The industries’ national and European interest organizations lobbied the Commission, the European 
Parliament, the Council of Ministers and the German government intensively.  
 
2.2.2 Exploiting the opportunities of a multi-level governance system 
EU has given business interests many new points of access to the policy cycle. They can now 
conduct “political venue shopping” (Coen and Richardson 2009). This means that interest 
groups can lobby European legislation through a variety of routes, as mentioned in the 
introductory chapter. For example, more or less all large German companies and several large 
interest organizations have their own offices in Brussels. In Germany, sub-national actors 
such as interest organizations may also lobby at their federal level, the (Bundes)Länder-level. 
Federal German politicians can also participate in political processes in the EU. Another 
possible venue of influence is via foreign countries or international organizations to make 
them further their views in negotiations with EU. For example, during the last years, German 
utilities have invested heavily in renewable power production abroad (e.g. E.ON 2008a), and 
may potentially have their interests represented by foreign governments, and foreign interest 
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organizations (e.g. Miard 2010). Member state governments can use the secrecy of decision 
making in EU to come with proposals to “by-pass” the national constituency and introduce 
that are unpopular at home and blame the EU for it (Claes and Førland 2004). Callanan 
(2011:17) notes that industries that are unsuccessful at influencing national governments may 
be tempted to use other strategies such as lobbying at the European level to “by-pass” them.  
“In being one of the few actors to follow all points of the policy process, business interests are an 
important supply of information for the development and delivery of EU public policy, and a potential 
source of legitimacy to policy makers” (Coen and Richardson 2009:145). 
Assuming that the German utilities industry and their interest organizations perceive the EU 
as a multi-level system of governance, they could be expected to compensate by using other 
channels of influence in order to promote their views, since their government promoted a 
voluntary system. The Commission and the European Parliament would be the most probable 
channels to us influence to bypass national politicians in such cases. 
 
Expectation 6 
The German utilities industry’s national interest organizations and their affiliates should lobby extra 
much on the EU-level in order to attempt to “by-pass” national politicians, who supported a voluntary 
system that allowed national feed-in tariffs. 
 
2.2.3 Resource dependency between the Commission and interest groups 
The Commission in general needs knowledge for initiating policies, but often lacks the 
resources to generate the information it needs itself because of low staffing levels compared 
to its wide-ranging tasks. Therefore, the Commission frequently depends on information from 
other sources, such as member states, an extensive system of consultative bodies where public 
and private actors such as interest groups participate, and paid consultants (Nugent 1999, 
Bouwen 2009, Eising 2007a:208). This poses an eminent opportunity for interest groups to 
influence policy through providing information of high quality (Broscheid and Coen 
2007:349, 350). Thus, the officials in the European Union and the lobbyists have grown 
dependent of each other, frequently labeled resource dependency (Eising 2007a:207). Coen 
(2007:335) describes this phenomenon as an “elite trust based relationship between insider 
interest groups and EU officials”. This is labeled an elite pluralist arrangement where the 
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interest groups have to fulfill certain criteria to gain access to decision making in close arenas. 
To achieve this in the Commission, they have to build reputations of being trustworthy and 
develop long time relationships (Coen and Richardson 2009:152). Frequently, the interest 
groups make connections with special general directorates within the Commission (Eising 
2007a). The Renewables Directive was handled by DG Transport and Energy10 and the 
Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) in the European Parliament. Eising 
(2007a:207) points out that interest groups have several important roles, such as aggregating, 
defining and articulating both member states and their constituencies’ interests to EU 
institutions. Since the issue of support mechanisms is highly complex, the nature of the case 
should make it likely that Commission officials and others sought the expertise of interest 
groups to inform themselves in the law making processes.  
Expectation 7 
The energy industries’ interest organizations try to influence policymaking in EU through accumulating 
and providing knowledge that the EU officials needed, in addition to cooperating with other 
organizations for joint production of background information. 
 
2.2.4 The more resources, the more efficient lobbying 
Coen and Richardson (2009:145) regards business interests as some of the actors best 
positioned to influence the content of legislation in EU, and notes that they have developed a 
unique understanding of the multi-level governance structure as well as access to it. Most 
lobbying in the EU takes place in the Commission, as this is the body that holds exclusive 
right of initiating new policies as well as monitoring compliance. Influencing policies at an 
early stage is regarded as the most efficient for interest groups. Lobbyists mainly target the 
Commission and the European Parliament, but other European institutions are also subject to 
their political efforts, such as the Council (Coen and Richardson 2009). The European 
Parliament is known to be the “greenest” of the central EU institutions. EU has the latter years 
actively tried to support the creation of different kinds of interest groups through for example 
funding to create its own constituency and enhance its own legitimacy (Eising 2007a:203). 
Politicians in EU might also prefer talking with groups representing aggregated preferences 
rather than a host of lobbyists arguing for different policies because they represent broader 
                                                 
10 From 2010, the energy part of DG TREN was split, and called DG Energy. The rest became Directorate-
General for Mobility and Transport (DG MOVE). 
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constituencies and thus broader legitimacy. For example the Commission prefers to 
communicate with European level organizations representing common positions in the EU 
(Greenwood 2007:343). However, earlier research on European-level interest groups has 
tended to portray Euro-federations as weak groups with little influence, so-called “paper 
tigers”. This weakness has been caused by a variety of factors such as insufficient resources, 
large internal heterogeneity, little hierarchy and discipline and the Commission’s ambiguous 
attitude towards them (Pijnenburg 1998:303, 304).   
Beyers and Kerremans (2007:462) suggest that resourceful interest groups will take particular 
advantage of the new European multi-level system, while Eising (2004:237) comment that a 
multi-level governance system tends to favor stronger interests. More researchers, for 
example Bouwen and McCown (2007:425) emphasize that material resources often are 
decisive for the type and scope of political strategies that interest organizations will apply to 
influence policy making. This is for example supported by Gullberg’s (2008b) research, 
which shows that business groups make use of all channels of influence and invest in long-
time lobbying. By contrast, the lesser endowed environmental groups rather focus their efforts 
on single policy decisions. Other studies also support this finding; Eising (2005) for example 
finds that there are few general traits characterizing lobbying in the EU in a large N survey 
study: 
“EU interest intermediation displays only very few general traits – these are the division of labor among 
EU and national associations, the economic clout, the financial resources and the expertise of interest 
groups as well as their political mobilization when they face of EU regulation” (Eising 2005:2). 
Several studies show that size matters: the larger a company or organization, the more 
resources it has to make use of different channels of influence both nationally and in the EU. 
The interest organizations’ levels of resources may then also be influential in their choice of 
lobbying tactic. “Organizational resources are crucial because the pursuit of complex 
multilevel strategies requires a lot of money, time, expertise, and sustained effort” (Eising 
2004:212). For example, since meeting people is considered cheap, this will be a typical way 
of lobbying for interest organizations with little resources. In addition, due to limited 
resources the interest groups will focus their efforts where they think it is the most efficient 





The political strategies that the energy industries’ interest organizations choose are affected by their 
levels of resources. The wealthier the interest groups, the more different lobbying venues, and the more 






















3.0 Methodological considerations 
 
3.1 Theory testing case study as an appropriate research design? 
This research project addresses the following research questions: 
1) Which lobbying strategies have the interest organizations of the German energy industries used to 
influence the EU legislation as it is formulated in the Renewables Directive?  
2) Under what conditions do they use these strategies? Which role has resources played for choice of 
political level and the intensity of lobbying?  
The method chosen here to investigate the research questions is theory-testing case study. 
Case study may be defined as: “a spatially delimited phenomenon (a unit) observed at a single 
point in time or over some period of time. It comprises the type of phenomenon that an 
inference attempts to explain” (Gerring 2007:19). The cases here are nine interest 
organizations that represent German energy industries at the German and at the European 
level. In contradiction to Gerring (2007), Yin (2009) emphasizes that theory testing should be 
a goal for case studies, as the most ambitious way of employing empirics on theory. Theory 
testing case studies usually take the form of either most likely case or a least likely case 
format to give maximum leverage to the conclusions (Eckstein 1975). However, a given case 
can also be analyzed against two rival theories, which is the approach that is chosen here. To 
test the theories/theoretical perspectives, this study uses the congruence method (pattern 
matching), which proceeds by formulating a range of observable expectations from each 
theory, and then testing the degree of compliance between these expectations and observable 
outcomes (George and Bennett 2005:181, Gerring 2007:45).  
A basic criticism against the case study approach is the problem of representativeness 
(Gerring 2007). How can we know whether a limited case study is representative and what it 
is representative of? A fruitful way of resolving this could be to perceive case studies as the 
source of what Yin (2009) refers to as analytical rather than statistical generalizations. 
Analytical generalization implies that inferences are drawn to a broader universe of cases 
which is theoretically and conceptually defined. Lobbying, in this sense, could be seen as 
having a set of general characteristics; yet there are also specific forms of lobbying which a 
given theory pertains to and which thereby defines the scope for analytical generalization. In 
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the present study it is lobbying by interest organizations in a multi-level political system in 
response to certain specified policy processes that are the analytical focus. This means that the 
findings may possibly be generalized to understand lobbying in similar cases, but for example 
not lobbyism in energy policy at the global level (George and Bennett 2005). The concluding 
section of the thesis aims to make some generalizations of this sort which could be taken 
forward in further research on lobbying. When theories are tested in case studies, this is 
typically conducted to refine and nuance our understanding of them, or how “the scope 
conditions of competing theories should be expanded or narrowed” (Lijphart 1971, George 
and Bennett 2005:115). The theoretical perspectives will therefore only be strengthened or 
weakened, not ultimately refuted by the analysis which follows.   
Eising (2007a:207) underlines that, in contradiction to businesses, only few interest groups 
can create multi-level lobbying strategies in the sense of establishing contacts with political 
institutions at several political levels, such as the national and the European. The reason is 
that such lobbying is expensive, and that generally, interest groups possess rather limited 
resources. However, the interest organizations for energy businesses (especially the utilities) 
represent very resourceful industries (Dagger 2009). Therefore, they are among the 
organizations most likely to make use of all types of lobbying at different political levels. 
National and European interest groups usually divide the labor between them, but this pattern 
may be broken if the EU regulation impacts the national interest groups and their members 
severely (Eising 2004:217). The Renewables Directive is such a case, with potential large-
scale consequences for the German renewable energy support mechanisms (Toke 2008). 
Therefore, the lobbying strategies of the energy industries’ interest organizations constitute a 
most-likely case scenario for the multi-level governance perspective applied on lobbying. 
Hence, if these interest organizations do not engage in multilevel lobbying, this theoretical 
perspective is less likely to be suitable for explaining these interest organizations’ perceptions 
of EU and their actual lobbying to influence political processes that they regard as important 
there. Such a research strategy is in line with Coen’s (2007:334) and Franchino’s (2005:243) 
recommendation: As research on EU lobbying matures; research on EU lobbying should 
include more confirmatory theory testing. 
On the other hand, liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) is also very likely to carry at least some 
explanatory value, since energy policy is a domain traditionally strongly belonging to the 
national arena in Europe (see e.g. Lauber 2007, Nilsson et al 2008). Therefore, if LI has low 
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explanatory power for understanding lobbying in this field of policy, the whole theoretical 
perspective’s scope conditions should probably be narrowed. However, as George and 
Bennett (2005:116) and Lijphart (1971:693) point out, one disconfirmation in a most likely 
case study is of course (almost) never enough to discredit a whole theoretical perspective. For 
example, the case of the German interest organization’s lobbying of the Renewables Directive 
could be a deviant one. The most likely cases approach in Eckstein’s (1975) terms should 
therefore be used with some caution. 
Choosing whether to conduct a study with large or a little N is a familiar challenge in political 
research. Some large N studies have enquired multi-level lobbying by interest groups in the 
EU (for example Eising 2004). However, there are several reasons why case study is a 
suitable format for researching the actual questions. First, with a limited number of potential 
cases, statistical analysis about causal effects would generally have low power. Second, even 
when it is a feasible option, conducting a survey with a low N may be extremely vulnerable to 
a low response rate. Third, descriptive and conceptualizing work has to be done first in any 
case, and few if any researchers have to my knowledge described the German interest 
organizations’ lobbying of the Renewables Directive in particular. In addition, the only 
publicly available information on the topic is data such as press releases and annual reports. 
Thus, studying these political processes closely requires case study methods such as 
conducting in-depth interviews that provide “thick descriptions” and asking follow-up 
questions (George and Bennett 2005).  
 
3.2 Case selection 
Five interest organizations directly representing German energy industries and four interest 
organizations indirectly representing them at the European level constitute the sample to be 
enquired. Although the Renewables Directive affects more or less all German industries 
directly or indirectly11, these cases are chosen because it directly affects the economic 
conditions for their members, e.g. the energy producers and the affiliated businesses. 
Therefore, the selected organizations are also obvious candidates to lobby the European 
Union to promote and protect their interests, which makes them the most appropriate to 
investigate. This is in line with George and Bennett’s (2005:83) recommendation: cases 
                                                 
11 The support mechanisms for renewable energy affect the electricity price. 
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should be selected based on their relevance for the research’s objectives. I have chosen the 
different industries interest organizations rather than selected companies for several reasons. 
First, the staffs of interest organizations are probably more open and willing to provide 
information than energy companies because their interest organizations’ main tasks are to 
provide information, aggregate political views, promote them, and participate in political 
processes on behalf of their members12 (Eising 2007a). Second, interviewing the industries’ 
interest organizations is the only way to get comparable cases13. Third, since a multitude of 
firms of all sizes are involved in energy production in Germany, it is impossible to study them 
both broadly and in depth within a scope of the time and resource constraints given for this 
study. Fourth, due to the controversial nature of the topic, it is highly probable that some of 
the companies within each sector did not share political views with the rest14. Therefore, 
interviewing their interest organizations enables me to get information of the industry sectors’ 
aggregated interests, not only what individual companies work for. Consequently, this 
approach will probably get fairly accurate results about the interest organizations’ main views 
on the Renewables Directive, as the different companies within each sector in Germany 
roughly shared main views and preferences.  
The utilities industry is intentionally represented by three of their main interest organizations 
in Germany and in Brussels. These include Bundesverband der Energie und Wasserwirtschaft 
(BDEW), Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (BDI), and The Union of the Electricity 
Industry (EURELECTRIC). Other more specialized interest organizations like Deutsche 
Atomforum (the German “atomic lobby”) or Foratom (the European “atomic lobby”) are not 
chosen for several reasons. First, the largest utilities in Germany do produce energy from all 
conventional energy sources as well as renewable energy sources (Dagger 2009:50-53). 
Second, the German utilities and their daughter businesses are members of a host of different 
interest organizations (Dagger 2009). Thus interviewing them all would be impossible due to 
time constraints. Furthermore, there were few indications that these latter more peripheral 
                                                 
12 Indeed, I have contacted E.ON and RWE’s offices in Berlin and Brussels. All, apart from E.ON’s Brussels office 
declined to set aside time. Unfortunately, E.ON’s Brussels office did not answer my second mail.  
13 The utilities sector in Germany is dominated by four giant conglomerate companies: Energie Baden-
Württemberg AG (EnBW AG), RWE AG (until 1990 Rheinisch Westfalisches Eletrizitätswerk AG), E.ON AG and 
the daughter firm of Swedish Vattenfall, Vattenfall Europe (Dagger 2009)13. The renewables industry on the 
other hand, consists of hundreds of small- and medium sized companies. These have little chance of employing 
lobbying across more political levels, in contradiction to the aforementioned counterparts, because such 
lobbying demands resources (Bouwen 2004). 
14 This is especially likely for utility firms with a large share of renewable energy production within their energy 
portfolio, because these might prefer feed-in tariffs to a certificate based/quota system. 
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organizations were very active on the Renewables Directive. They neither were mentioned in 
earlier research articles on the Renewables Directive, nor had made particular press releases 
on the topic. The research interviews strengthened this impression (interviews BDEW, BDI 
and EURELECTRIC 2011). Therefore, interviewing some of the utilities’ interest 
organizations was both the most appropriate and the only feasible way in the scope of this 
master’s thesis.  
The renewables industry is also represented in the sample by some of their main interest 
organizations in Germany and at the European level. The organizations are elected on the 
basis of strategic choice principles in terms of the renewables technologies power output and 
investments, as well as the organizations’ lobbying capacities in terms of personnel resources. 
Thus they should be the most able of the interest organizations to carry out lobbying at more 
political levels if they regard it as an appropriate political strategy. Since the largest sources of 
renewable energy in Germany apart from hydropower are power from wind, biomass and 
photovoltaics15 (BMU 2011b), their companies’ interest organizations are also likely to be the 
largest and most capable of lobbying at more levels. These are Bundesverband Windenergie 
(BWE), Bundesverband BioEnergie (BBE) and Bundesverband Erneuerbare Energie (BEE) in 
Germany, and European Photovoltaic Industry Association (EPIA), European Wind Energy 
Association (EWEA) and European Renewable Energy Federation (EREF) at the European 
level16.  
 
3.3 Design challenges 
Choosing interest organizations as cases has several possible drawbacks. National 
associations are specialized at representing the national sectorial interest (Bouwen 2004:344). 
Thus, this approach might not pick up the political views of other important interests in the 
public debate, such as large dissenting companies or member organizations17. To rule out this 
opportunity, I therefore asked the interviewees specifically about this. With the notable 
                                                 
15 Although hydropower a significant source of renewable energy, the specialized organizations for hydropower 
are not as relevant because Germany has already built out most of its capacity for hydropower production. 
Therefore, investments are low compared to other renewable technologies. 
16 I also contacted the German solar energy association, Bundesverband Solarwirtschaft (BSW) and the 
umbrella organization for renewable energy at the European level, European Renewable Energy Council (EREC). 
BSW has never answered the requests, while EREC provided me the contact details to BEE.   
17 A minority of Eurelectric’s members favored other solutions, such as feed-in tariffs according to Toke (2008) 
and Boasson and Wettestad (2010). These did not take any dissenting positions in public documents alike.  
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exception of BDI, no representatives told about any strongly dissenting voices among their 
organizations’ members (interviews BDI, BEE, BDEW, BWE, BBE, EURELECTRIC, 
EWEA, EPIA and EREF 2011). These retorts might, of course, not reflect real lack of 
disagreement. For example, the organizations might have presented themselves as more 
united than really was the case because of the topic’s controversial nature. Such positive self-
representation is typical in elite interviews (Berry 2002:680). However, on substantial issues 
all the interviewees seemed to answer as accurately as possible. In addition, the study risks 
overstating the significance of the interests that these organizations represent. Further, 
including European level interest organizations as cases might not seem informative, because 
they represent the industries in the whole of Europe and are specialized at building consensus 
positions (Bouwen 2004:344). Indeed, previous research has portrayed aggregation of 
interests as a problem for such interest organizations or “euro groups” (see for example 
Pijnenburg 1998). Thus, these organization’s political positions might deviate from their 
German members’. However, the interviews and position papers showed that the industries 
within the two sectors at the two levels were united in their views regarding support 
mechanisms18.  
One might ask: Why include European level interest organizations when studying the German 
energy industries political views? First, three out of the four enquired European level interest 
organizations have German companies as direct members (EPIA 2011e, EWEA 2011a, and 
EREF 2011c). Henceforth, they directly fall into the category “interest organization for the 
German energy industry”. This is exemplified by the fact that these organizations have 
German board members in important positions (e.g. EWEA 2011a). Second, the European 
level interest organizations all have the German level interest organizations as members. 
Thus, they probably constitute important indirect routes for lobbying the EU. Last, when 
enquiring multi-level lobbying to influence a European directive it is natural to include the 
organizations that organizationally are the closest to the decision makers in the European 
Union, since they are the most likely to lobby the European institutions. Still, the fact that 
interest organizations operating at the European level are included here is a reason for 
                                                 
18 This finding is contrary to what Nilsson et al (2009:4457) found in their study. They comment that Eurelectric 
had problems making a strong position because of diverging interests among their member organizations. 
However, this claim was refuted by the representative from Eurelectric in (interview 2011). The only exception 
is BDI in parts of its views. However, BDI is less relevant as a representative for the utilities industry in Germany 
than BDEW, because it also represent a row of other industries. BDI mainly represents energy intensive 
industries in this context.    
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precaution when analyzing and interpreting the empirical material, and might constitute a 
weakness in the research design. Therefore, the analysis distinguishes clearly between the two 
groups of interest organizations in order to achieve analytical clarity. 
 
3.4 Choice of methods 
Since very little systematized information on the master’s thesis topic is available, 
interviewing interest organization representatives has been the main method for data 
collection. The interviews were semi-structured with open-ended questions so that the 
respondents could answer them in their own ways (Andersen 2006). On the one hand, this 
made the interviewees elaborate in detail and be open. On the other hand, I at times also had 
to stop them because talked extensively about issues that were not relevant for this study. As 
Gerring (2007) and Berry (2002) recommend, method triangulation is used to ensure that the 
reliability and internal validity of the data is as high as possible. Therefore, different methods 
were used simultaneously, such as process tracing and document studies combined with 
interviews (Gerring 2007:217, Checkel 2007). Process tracing enabled me map certain 
decision making processes. For example, I cross-checked interview data from each interview 
with written sources and other interview data, and written sources were checked against each 
other and interview data. To achieve this, a variety of different sources were scrutinized, such 
as press releases, annual reports, newspaper articles and research studies. All sources were 
critically evaluated, and first hand sources were used as much as possible to ensure 
correctness in the interpretations of the political processes (Kjeldstadli 1992, George and 
Bennett 2005:90). Further, I had studied the organizations and the research on the topic 
closely before the interviews in order to know the context and have qualified expectations 
about the answers. I also used other methods to enhance the study’s validity and reliability. 
For example, I contacted “the receivers” of the lobbying efforts, such as different members of 
the European Parliament in the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE), like the 
Belgian rapporteur Claude Turmes. Unfortunately, they either declined or did not answer 
these research interview proposals. Furthermore, all interviews were recorded and transcribed. 
In addition, I made notes about the main impressions from the interviews the same day that 
they took place. Last, the interviewees got to read through, check quotes and comment on the 
presentations of their respective organizations. This proved invaluable. A possible drawback 
with this approach is that the respondents might withdraw quotes that they realize might put 
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them in an undesirable light. On the other hand, this increased the validity because 
misunderstandings and inaccuracies were cleared up. The interview guides in German and 
English, and the original quotes in German are in the appendixes. 
The research project is notified and accepted by the Norwegian Social Sciences Data Services 
(NSD). Since the topic can be perceived as sensitive, I granted all respondents anonymity so 
that they could be more open about their lobbying strategies. On the one hand, this might have 
provided more extensive and more honest answers. On the other hand, transparency is always 
an ideal in research (Nygaard 2008). Therefore, publishing the interviewee’s names is a way 
of enhancing a study’s reliability. The representatives were contacted in January, February 
and March with a formal research proposal per mail in English (and also German in 
Germany), in line with Goldstein’s (2002) recommendations. If they did not answer, I also 
phoned them. At least one week beforehand, I sent the respondents a list of key words or the 
actual interview questions to aid them recollecting exactly what had happened, since the 
actual political processes happened 3-4 years ago. Under such circumstances, respondent’s 
memories are often weaker than with more recent incidents, which also might decrease the 
reliability of their answers (Andersen 2006). On the one hand, this enabled them to have time 
to discuss with others, look up documents and reflect upon what happened back then. On the 
other hand, they might have been influenced by people they talked with in the meantime. This 
tactic proved to be highly useful in the interviews in Germany in particular, as German is my 
third language. Under the interviews I used probing actively in order to ensure that the 
information was correctly understood, and test that the interview object provided correct 
information (Berry 2002, Andersen 2006). This was also a very useful strategy, as they all had 
to specify what they meant and I could test my understanding of the subjects.  
 
3.5 Threats to validity and reliability  
There were large differences in the amount of experience the interviewees had with the 
political processes leading to the Renewables Directive. Some were the main responsible ones 
in their organizations. These were thus key informants. Others were not, and two respondents 
were even not employed in the organization at the time. In most of the cases where I did not 
get to interview the most central person(s), these would be people placed at or near the top of 
their respective organizations. Since it was hard to get interview dates at all, I reckoned that 
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asking the organizations to provide me with another interview date when I had already had 
one would be deemed as rather inappropriate. The representatives from BDI, BEE, BBE and 
EREF were people who had major responsibility for handling the Renewables Directive 
within their organization. In BDEW, EPIA and EURELECTRIC, the interviewees had 
worked more with other topics at the time. The respondents from BWE and EWEA had been 
employed after the EU negotiations were finished. These latter groups are of course probably 
less able to provide valid and reliable information than the first, since they did not lobby 
themselves. A couple of times during the interview with EURELECTRIC’s representative, for 
example, I knew he was providing slightly inaccurate information about the political 
processes, but this does not need to be at purpose. Rather, a probable explanation is that that 
the negotiations took place 3-4 years ago, and thus the time has weakened his memory. This 
fact might also reduce the reliability and validity of the other answers in general (Andersen 
2006). This interpretation is supported by the fact that the respondent agreed with my 
perception of “the story” when I told him that previous research has told a somewhat different 
story on a couple of details (interview EURELECTRIC 2011). In two instances, to BDEW 
and BWE, I sent formal requests to people who I had not interviewed earlier, in order to 
collect more data and improve the validity and reliability of the data. The person in charge at 
the time in BWE then provided the information that I needed19. One of BDEW’s people in 
charge then also supplied additional and useful information20.  
The interviews in Brussels were conducted in English, and the interviews with German 
interest organizations were conducted in German. The reason for this is that interviewing in 
the language that was the closest to the working language or most natural for the interview 
objects would probably produce better answers. Then they logically could speak more freely. 
Therefore, this factor also possibly enhanced both the reliability and the validity of their 
answers. However, especially making interviews in German made it harder for me to 
reformulate questions when the interviewees did not understand them, and asking follow-up 
questions. Thus, I got less control over the interview situation than would be the case if all 
interviews were made in English. This might of course have had a negative effect on the 
empiric’s quality. In addition, I have used many German sources in order to get as many 
original sources as possible, which enhances the validity of the study. The interviewees can be 
                                                 
19 The interviews with BWE’s two interviewees are therefore referred to as “interview BWE 2011a” and 
“interview BDEW 2011b” respectively.  
20 The interviews with BDEW’s two interviewees are therefore referred to as “interview BDEW 2011a” and 
“interview BDEW 2011b” respectively. 
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labeled elite informants, and they all seemed to have their own political agendas by the fact 
that many of them tried to convince me about which support mechanisms were the better. 
This made me extra cautious when interpreting the findings, in line with Andersen’s (2006) 
and Berry’s (2002) recommendation. Both underline that the interview subjects are not 
obliged to tell the truth, and that it is common to exaggerate their own importance. A further 
factor that might have impaired the validity and reliability of the data is that it is always 
harder to get hold of the best quality information and understand the political contexts in 
foreign cultures, as for example Hantrais (1999:103) points out. However, the fact that 
information gathering has taken place in a foreign culture might also be an asset, because I 



















4.0 “The world’s first major renewable energy economy” 
 
This chapter will briefly go through the history of renewable energy in Germany from its 
beginning until today. Such an overview is important for understanding the political context 
in which energy policy in Germany takes place. Particular emphasis will be put on the conflict 
between the conventional power producers and the renewables producers. A figure will sum 
up the most important pieces of legislation. Further, the different sides in the conflict will be 
summarized in a table. In the end, three small sections will outline the development of the 
three largest renewable energy technologies in terms of power output. Hydropower is 
excluded here, as its potential is almost fully exploited already. 
 
4.1 The historical development of renewable energy in Germany 
Non-renewable sources, such as coal, oil/gas and nuclear power account for the largest share 
of energy production in Germany, and this has been the case since WW2. To keep up with an 
increasing demand, the German government has traditionally provided large subsidies to 
research and development of these sources of electric power (Jacobsson and Lauber 2006). As 
a large industry state and major world exporter, Germany both has a high level of energy 
consumption as well as high levels of greenhouse gas emissions. As a country with scarce 
natural energy resources, Germany is to a large extent dependent on imported fossil fuels.  
Germany started its policy on renewable energy in 1974, after the oil crisis. The first 15 years, 
it consisted mainly of funding research on renewable energy. This action was in part a result 
of environmental concerns from the political opposition parties, in particular protest against 
nuclear energy (Lauber and Mez 2004:599). In 1978, opposition against nuclear energy was at 
its height. Indeed, similar to several other European green parties, the German Green party 
was founded as a political reaction against nuclear energy and nuclear weapons (Schmidt-
Haüer 2011). Today, this party is one of the largest and most influential green parties in the 
world, and it is one of the largest German parties according to the polls, thriving not the least 
on the widespread resentment against nuclear energy21 (see for example Die Zeit 2011b). The 
                                                 
21 March 27th 2011, the Green party won a historic victory in the federal state Baden Württemberg. After 58 
years of CDU rule, the Green party together with SPD won the majority of votes, and the Green party the 
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government funding led to a host of different research programs carried out by universities, 
private firms and research institutes both within wind- and solar energy, which provided 
knowledge to base actions on. From the 1970s on, a number of different interest groups also 
started to emerge. For example, the German Solar Energy Association (Bundesverband 
Solarindustrie) and several environmental organizations were founded in the 1970s 
(Jacobsson and Lauber 2006:263). 
The 1960’s strategy, to base the security of electricity supply on nuclear reactors and coal-
fired power plants has only recently been seriously challenged. One of its results is that, the 
nuclear and coal industry has received a total of funding and tax subsidies that dwarf the 
support of renewable energy. The funding has contributed to making the German utilities 
industry a very large and influential actor both politically and economically (Jacobsson and 
Lauber 2006:262, 263). Until the European electricity directive that required unbundling, the 
utilities could exploit monopoly positions in the supply infrastructure (Eikeland 2011). 
Through a series of mergers, the market today is dominated by the aforementioned four giants 
EnBW, RWE, E.ON and Vattenfall, but other actors also produce electric energy, such as a 
host of different municipalities. From the beginning of the 1990s onwards, the utilities 
industry and their interest organizations have been largely hostile towards certain support 
mechanisms for renewable energy, such as feed-in tariffs. One of the reasons is that they have 
considered renewable energy production, which often has been produced in small and 
decentralized units, as uneconomic and not fitting into the supply system (which they to a 
large extent have owned). According to Jacobsson and Lauber (2006:261, 262) as well as 
other researchers, the utilities industries’ main ally in the Government has been and remains 
the Ministry of Economic Affairs. The utilities industry is represented through different 
interest organizations at the German and the European level.  
The Germans were highly divided on the topic of nuclear energy until the Chernobyl accident 
in 1986. Within a couple of years, a large majority became opposed to nuclear energy. After 
this enormous accident, the Social Democrats demanded that the nuclear plants should be 
phased out gradually. The Greens were even more radical, and demanded immediate 
shutdown (Lauber and Mez 2004:599). Nuclear phase out, “Atomausstieg” has been important 
issues for these parties ever since, while the majority of people in the Liberals, FDP, have 
                                                                                                                                                        
largest fraction of these two. Thus, Baden Württemberg was the first German federal state which got a Green 
President (Die Zeit 2011b).  
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traditionally been staunch supporters of nuclear energy. The Christian Democrats in 
CDU/CSU have had a position in between, being categorized as a part of the “green side” by 
several researchers22, but also giving in to demands of the nuclear industry23.  
In 1988, the Government decided to create a market for renewable energy (Jacobsson and 
Lauber 2006:260). German authorities implemented several different measures to boost 
investment in renewable energy production, such as a program that aimed at installation of 
250 megawatt of wind power. In 1991 they introduced a feed-in law which required that the 
grid operators (then, this was the utilities sector) to pay producers of certain types of 
renewable energy 80 percent of (average historical) prices for energy as feed-in tariffs. In 
addition, electricity suppliers had to accept renewable electricity fed into the grid (Jacobsson 
and Lauber 2006:264, Held et al 2010). This became the start of the massive growth of 
renewable energy that has taken place ever since. At first, the government tried to make the 
utilities commit themselves voluntarily. When this did not work, the last option was to 
introduce a bill which made these commitments compulsory. Several actors supported this 
law, such as Conservative CDU/CSU and the Green party, the Ministry of Research and the 
Ministry of Environment. In contrast, the conservatively headed Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, and the parliament were more skeptical. In the end, the bill got consensual support 
and was adopted. The large utilities companies did not make any large scaled protest at this 
time. Lauber and Mez (2004:561) explain this inaction by that the utilities were preoccupied 
with the reunification, and also underestimated the effect of the new law. The reunification of 
Germany had a deep impact on consumption and production of energy. Germany’s total 
emissions of CO2 decreased significantly because the government decided that old polluting 
industry should be taken out of business. This has been called “wall-fall profits” (Håkonsen 
Karlseng 2006). Later, this law had a cap so that regional grid operators should not be at a 
disadvantage. The grid-operators had to pay feed-in tariffs until 5 percent of the energy 
production stemmed from renewable energy sources. The fact that the feed-in tariffs were tied 
to the retail electricity prices made the renewable energy producers vulnerable to declining 
power prices, which was a consequence of liberalization of the electricity market in the 1990s 
(Held et al 2010). 
                                                 
22 See for example Dagger (2009).  
23 October 2010, the German government consisting of CDU/CSU and FDP remarkably changed the law made 
by the SPD and the Green that demanded shut down of all the German nuclear power plants by 2021. The 
moratorium gave all the power plants longer running times, Laufzeitsverlängerung (Die Zeit 2011c).  
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Figure 2 Timeline: most important renewable energy legislation in Germany 
 
 
            1991: The Electricity Feed-in Law, Stromeinspeisungsgesetz 
 
            1998: Amendment of the Electricity Feed-in Law 
             
           2000: The Renewable Energy Law, Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz (EEG) 
      
2004: Photovoltaic interim energy law, Photovoltaik-Vorschaltgesetz, amendment of 
the Renewable Energy Law    
 
             2009: Amendment of the Renewable Energy Law implemented   
  
 
Sources: Jacobsson and Lauber (2006), Dagger (2009). 
 
The combination of the programs for renewables power and the new feed-in law was 
immediately successful in boosting production of renewable energy. Both capacity for 
photovoltaic power and especially wind power were built out (Jacobsson and Lauber 
2006:264). The law was most efficient for the wind industry, because the tariffs did not 
compensate well enough for large establishment costs for new production facilities for other 
renewable power sources such as solar power (Jacobsson and Lauber 2006:260). Before the 
law was implemented, the German government asked the Commission whether or not it 
would be acceptable, and got approval. According to Lauber and Mez (2004), this had two 
reasons. First, the law was assumed to have insignificant effects. Second, it was “in line with 
the policy objectives of the Community”. As the law had large impact on the utilities, and 
burdened different regions unequally because the power companies in regions with a lot of 
wind power had to pay much more in feed-in tariffs than other companies, these power 
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companies regarded the new law as unfair. In addition, the industry wanted to avoid the 
situation the authorities made in 1975 when they introduced special subsidies to the hard coal 
industry on the cost of the utilities industry and the consumers. Therefore, they tried by both 
political and juridical measures to change this legislation (Jacobsson and Lauber 2006:265).  
The feed-in law (StrEG) was, according to Agnolucci (2006:3542, 3543) favoring wind power 
strongly on behalf of the utilities companies. These companies had to pay fixed prices for 
electricity that indirectly subsidized the wind power industry. This resulted in large-scale 
increase in wind power between 1991 and 1995, which halted between 1995 and 1996. The 
wind power plants were mostly in the northern federal states (Länder). The utilities there had 
to pay more than southern energy companies after the energy market in Germany was 
liberalized in the 1990s. In addition, the utilities lost market shares to the new renewable 
actors which they viewed as competitors. Therefore, energy companies issued law suits in 
different German courts. In 1996, both the German High Court, and the Constitutional Court 
declared that the feed-in law was constitutional (Agnolucci 2006:3543, Szarka 2007:33). 
Therefore, the utilities’ interest organization Verband der Eletrizitätswirtschaft, VDEW made 
a complaint with DG competition, claiming that the EU state-aid rules were violated 
(Jacobsson and Lauber 2006:265). At this time, the Commission also claimed that the 
minimum price for wind was too high, and that the legislation thus should be altered. 
According to Lauber and Mez (2004), their steady supporter Ministry of Economic Affairs 
was happy with the Commission’s support, and proposed to reduce the tariff rates. 
This ruling resulted in a major political battle between different interest groups, which ended 
in a massive demonstration. On the one side of the conflict was a coalition consisting of the 
metalworkers union, farmers, church groups, and environmental organizations and renewables 
associations. On the other side was the alliance of investment goods industries and the utilities 
companies (Lauber and Mez 2004:5). In the Bundestag, however, the utilities did not succeed 
in changing the feed-in law. There, the law amendment was narrowly defeated (Jacobsson and 
Lauber 2006:265). The ongoing conflict between 1996 and 1998 made investors less inclined 
to invest in wind turbines, but when the tariffs were given as before, the wind turbine industry 
grew even faster than before. In addition, now large companies entered it, and thereby 
increased its negotiating power (Lauber and Mez 2004:5). Activists and local utilities who 
worked for introducing solar power plants in their areas supported the solar industry. Through 
different means, the market for solar panels continued growing after the first measure, the 
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1000-roofs program was finished, although the authorities did not launch a follow up program 
(Lauber and Mez 2004:6, Jacobsson and Lauber 2006:265). Solar power had a high reputation 
among Germans. It was built out after local activists had political campaigns to make local 
governments have their local utilities make contracts with suppliers of renewable energy that 
ensured that the investment costs would be covered. The Länder also supported making a 
market for solar power. In addition, Greenpeace had a large campaign that resulted in many 
thousand orders for solar cell rooftops (Jacobsson and Lauber 2006:266). The solar cell 
industry intensified its lobbying. 
In 1998, a law called Energy Supply Industry Act was adopted in order to implement the 
electricity directive 96/92/EC in German law (Lauber and Mez 2004:5). Lauber and Mez 
(2004:5) point out that this law modified the previous feed-in law in several ways, first and 
foremost a new compensation mechanism that made the cost for attaching extra electricity 
suppliers to the network more evenly distributed, but the feed-in tariffs remained unchanged. 
At this point, a coalition between the Social Democrats and the Greens was in office. This 
red-green government launched several strategies to improve conditions for renewable 
energy, such as an eco-tax on energy, a 100 000 roof program for solar cells, and to negotiate 
an agreement to phase out nuclear energy. In addition, different programs offered favorable 
“soft loans” for renewables. Three years later, all the goals set were achieved (Staiss 2003, 
cited by Jacobsson and Lauber 2006:267,268, Agnolucci 2006:3539). In 1998, a large energy 
market reform was implemented by liberalizing the energy market. This led to reduction of 
electricity prices, and consequently lower incomes for the wind turbine owners (Jacobsson 
and Lauber 2006:267).  
In 1999, the Ministry of Economic Affairs wanted to reform the Feed-in law of 1990, and 
proposed a system where the utilities could pay a voluntary tax to promote renewable energy, 
and argued in favor of a quota system. This alternative was also favored by the utilities 
companies, because it would be economically beneficial for them. The parliamentary party 
groups of the coalition opposed this solution, and instead proposed a bill which was adopted 
in March 2000, the famous Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG, Erneuerbare Energien 
Gesetz). Basically, this act carried on the previous feed-in philosophy where “the polluter 
pays” principle was essential. In addition, continuing subsidizing renewables would only be 
fair, because the utilities industries had been subsidized heavily through decades. The act 
granted investors in renewable energy steady prices per unit produced for 20 years. In 
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addition, the feed-in tariffs were no longer capped according to share, but distributed evenly 
among all grid operators (Jacobsson and Lauber 2006:267, 268, Held et al 2010).  
EEG met harsh criticism from the utilities interest groups and other business organizations. 
The Federation of German Industries (BDI) maintained that this law would burden the 
German economy by destroying its competitiveness and make electricity prices higher. 
VDEW claimed that the prices would only be passed on to customers, because of price 
increases caused by lesser competition in the market (Jacobsson and Lauber 2008:268). The 
very important industrial association, German Engineering Federation (VDMA, Verband 
Deutscher Maschinen und Anlagenbau), on the other hand, supported the law24. The EU 
general directorate DG Competition was skeptical to the law in the beginning and questioned 
whether it was compatible with EU law until 2002, although the European Court of Justice 
had ruled that the German laws were compatible with EU law in the similar PreussenElektra 
vs. Schleswag case in 2001 (Lauber 2007:18). In 2001, the government consisting of the 
Social Democrats and the Greens introduced a law that obliged the utilities to shut down all 
their nuclear reactors by 2021. The same year the government effected the transfer of the 
responsibility for renewable energy from the Ministry of Economic Affairs to the Ministry of 
Environment in 2001, which favored renewable energy production (Lauber and Mez 
2004:607) 
The debate in Germany has at least since the 1990s been marked by two fronts with opposite 
views regarding funding, support mechanisms, net access and other topics connected to 
renewable energy production. Several researchers have enquired these groups of actors, for 
example Dagger (2009), who enquired how the different groupings lobbied to influence the 
revision of the renewable energy law in 2008. The patterns of alliances have seemingly 
changed little apart from one thing: increasingly; all political parties have members and 
supporters who are very positive towards renewable energy production. In addition, it seems 
that over time, the utilities are getting more positive towards renewable energy production. 
For example, they have all established daughter firms who invest heavily in renewable 
energy. The two fronts are illustrated in table 2. The groupings are based on Sabatier’s 
advocacy coalition’s theory framework (1998) to illustrate that a row of different actors 
participated and influenced policy-making on renewables support mechanisms.   
                                                 
24 VDMA still does. It represents manufacturers which among other things produce equipment for the steadily 
growing wind- and photovoltaic industries. 
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Table 2: The different fronts in the debate about renewable energy in Germany 
 The economic coalition: 
supports market based system 
The ecologic coalition: 
supports feed-in tariffs 
Ministries Bundesministerium für 
Wirtschaft und Technologie 
(BMWi, The Ministry of 
Economic Affairs)  
Bundesministerium für Umwelt, 
Naturschutz und 
Reaktorsicherhet (BMU, The 
Ministry of Environment) 
Bundesministerium für 
Ernährung, Landwirtschaft und 
Verbraucherschutz (BMELV, 
The Ministry of Food, 
Agriculture and Consumer 
Protection)  
Political parties Freien Demokraten (FDP, The 
Liberals) 
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (The 
Greens), Sozialdemokratische 
Partei (SDP, The Social 
Democrats), 
Die Linke (The Left) 
A large fraction of CDU/CSU 
(Christian Democratic Union of 
Germany and the Christian 
Democratic Union of Bavaria) 
Business 
organizations 
VDEW- Verband der 
Elektrizitätswirtschaft, (today: 
BDEW, Bundesverband der 
Energie und Wasserwirtschaft)  
Bundesverband Deutsche 
Industrie (BDI, The Federation 
Bundesverband Erneuerbare 
Energie (BEE, The German 
Renewable Energy Federation) 
BEEs members, such as 
Bundesverband Windenergie 
(BWE, The German 
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of German Industries)  
Verband der Industriellen 
Energie und Kraftwirtschaft, 
(VIK ) 
Industriegewerkschaft Bergbau, 
Chemie und Energie (IG BCE, 
Mining, Chemical and Energy 
Industrial Union) 
Windenergy Association)  
Verband Deutscher Maschinen 
und Anlagenbau e.V. (VDMA, 
The German Engineering 
Association) 
Industriegewerkschaft Metall 
(IG Metall, The metal workers‘ 
trade union) 
Deutschen Bauernverband e.V 
(DBV, The Farmers‘ Union) 
Other organizations  Environmental groups, 
Greenpeace in particular, civic 
interest groups for renewable 
energy such as Eurosolar, church 
groups  
Companies The utilities companies, RWE, 
E.ON, EnBW and Vattenfall 
 
Solar cells producers, wind 
energy manufacturers, producers 
that concentrate on renewable 
energy in general 
Sources: Jacobsson and Lauber (2006), Dagger (2009, quoting Reiche (2004), Hirschl (2008) and Evert (2005)), 
Lauber and Mez (2004). 
Comments table 2: The table illustrates how many German public and private groups that have 
participated and participate in the public debate about support mechanisms, and how broad 




4.1.1 PreussenElektra v. Schleswag in 2001 
The large utilities company PreussenElektra25 had lost to the renewables company Schleswag 
for the so called “additional costs” caused by the feed-in law of 1990 in the Regional Court of 
Kiel. The background was a claim that such indirect support would be incompatible with EU 
legislation. This court referred the case to the European Court of Justice to see whether this 
was the case, and also if it was allowed to have quantitative import restrictions. The ruling 
was made in March 2001. The European Court of Justice did not agree with PreussenElektra, 
and pointed out that the obligations could not be considered as state aid because it “did not 
involve any direct or indirect transfer of State resources” (Agnolucci 2006:3545, Szarka 
2007:33). Regarding quantitative import restrictions, the court ruled that it was acceptable 
both because of the European Communities own legislation, as well as other international 
treaties such as the Kyoto Protocol (Szarka 2007:33). This ruling has had paramount 
importance because it established guiding principles for feed-in tariffs in Europe, and led to 
new such laws both in Germany and the rest of Europe (Szarka 2007:33, Mez 2007). 
According to Szarka (2007:33), the large utilities companies like E.ON and RWE have been 
players in a battle between renewable and conventional energy providers, where the latter 
have tried to influence policy “according to their preferences”.  
 
4.2 The 2000’s: enormous growth for renewable energy 
The four large German utilities are truly giants in terms of sizes. For example in 2010, the 
world’s largest non-state owned power company E.ON AG achieved almost 93 billion in sales 
and more than 85 000 employees around the world (E.ON 2011, E.ON 2008a, RWE 2008). 
The four large utilities together had around 200 000 employees in 2010 (Blasberg et al 2011). 
Although they have close ties to top politicians and have lobbied steadily, Germany has as 
aforementioned still continued and expanded the feed-in laws, and also launched other laws 
that the utilities and their interest organization are basically opposed to the last two decades, 
from the first Stromeinspeisungsgesetz (electricity feed-in law) in 1991 to the Erneuerbare 
Energien Gesetz (EEG) (renewable energy law) in 2000, which was revised in 2004 and 2009 
(Held et al 2010).  
                                                 
25 VEBA and VIAG merged, and created the energy giant E.ON AG in year 2000, which today is the largest non-
state energy business in the world (E.ON 2011) One of its daughter firms, E.ON Energie AG, was created by the 
merger of the firms Bayernwerk and PreussenElektra  
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The utilities and their interest organization in particular criticize solar energy, which receives 
the highest rate of feed-in tariffs of the larger renewable technologies (interview BDEW 
2011a). The criticism seems to have had little effect. On the contrary, the German 
governments continue supporting renewable energy production in general and photovoltaic 
energy in particular, as exemplified by the German Government’s decision regarding 
implementation of the Renewables Directive. As aforementioned, Germany put in all their 
efforts in Brussels to defend their views about voluntary support systems during the 
negotiations that lead to the Renewables Directive (Nilsson et al 2009).  
„The Renewable Energy Law has been an incomparable success on the balance sheets. For more than 
10 years, an appropriate and flexible instrument has existed, and the share of renewable energy in the 
energy supply has risen continually and spurred innovative impulses. The Government strongly 
supports an ambitious expansion of renewable energies” (German Government 2011). 
The renewables industry in Germany has steadily created more jobs, and increased revenues, 
as well as contributing to a larger and larger share of the electricity production and total 
energy supply. Altogether, the industry more than doubled its number of employees when all 
associated businesses are included from 2004 to 2010, with a growth from 160 500 to 367 400 
(BMU 2011a, 2011b). The renewables share of electricity production increased from 6,4 
percent in 2000 to 15,1 percent in 2008 and 16,8 percent in 2010. This is more than 100 
terawatt hours (TWh) (BMU 2011a, 2011b). In addition, Germany has some of the world’s 
largest producers of renewable technologies such as equipment for wind production as well as 
solar energy production within its borders. This makes Germany “the world’s first major 
renewable economy” (Burgermeister 2009). As a consequence, the renewables industry 
becomes increasingly important economically, socially and environmentally. German 
progress has inspired many EU countries. Today 19 other EU members have similar systems 
to enhance their production of renewable energy (Lauber 2007). The massive growth in 
Germany is illustrated in figure 3. 
Germany aims to be an environmental leader both in the EU and in the world. Therefore, the 
country has set ambitious long time targets for itself. For example, fall 2010 the government 
launched new aggressive targets that included boosting the share of renewables to 80 % of the 





Figure 3: the production of renewable power in Germany from different sources 
 
Source: BMU (2011b) 
Comment figure 3: renewable energy production is marked in colors. The figure illustrates that the 
German renewable energy production has grown considerably, in particular the last decade. 
Production of wind energy declined in 2009 because there was very little wind that year. The table 
also illustrates massive investments in photovoltaics the last years. 
 
4.2.1 In the forefront in technology and innovation 
Germany has several research institutes related to renewable energy. For example, the 
Wuppertal Institute researches on renewable energy, and the large Fraunhofer Institute group 
of 60 institutes conducts research on different renewable technologies and energy efficient 
living. Öko Institute researchers into different challenges related to sustainable development, 
including renewable energy support mechanisms (see for example Mitchell et al 2006, 
Hennenberg and Fritsche 2008). The German Ministry of Environment has in-house expertise 
and is commissioning research reports. In addition, it provides several such research institutes 
base funding to conduct research on environmental and renewables issues (BMU 2011b). In 
addition, all the German political parties have personnel focusing on renewable energy 
(interviews BEE and BBE 2011). The utilities interest organizations also had research 
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institutions that argued along their lines. For example, several studies demonstrate the shorter 
term incompatibility of the Renewables Directive and the EU ETS in terms of creating a 
common European electricity market and reducing emissions of greenhouse gases.  
 
4.2.2 The front-runner: wind energy 
Wind energy has grown considerably in Germany the two last decades, and is the largest 
source of renewable electricity production. In 2007 and 2008, there was approximately 20 000 
centers for wind production across Germany, and they produced 22 347 and 23 903 Megawatt 
hours of electricity. In 2007, the wind industry employed about 90 000 people, which is more 
than the number of people currently employed in the coal industry. The number of employees 
in the industry is expected to grow strongly in the years to come similar to other renewable 
technologies. Offshore wind in particular will expand rapidly because of domestic and world-
wide demand (BWE 2011a, Die Wind Industrie in Deutschland 2011). Equipment for wind 
production is a large export article: about 80 percent of the wind energy production facilities 
and equipment that is produced in Germany is exported (BWE 2008b). The last years wind 
energy has been the renewable technology producing the cheapest power after 
hydroelectricity (BWE 2011f). The price of electricity from wind power has declined steadily 
due to improved technology, and therefore the feed-in rates have been reduced accordingly26 
(BWE 2011b). Wind power technology is fundamental in reaching the renewable goals set.  
„Without an increased building out of wind energy, the government will not reach its target of a share of 
30 percent renewable electricity within 2020. The wind energy is the cheap source in context of the 
renewable energies. An increased amount of wind electricity is the best insurance against an explosion 
in electricity prices” (Herman Albers, president of BWE, BWE 2008c).  
 
4.2.3 The work-horse: bioenergy 
Bioenergy contributes to most, around 70 percent, of renewable energy altogether when 
energy from electricity, heating and transportation is included (BMU 2010, interview BBE 
2011). According to its own estimates, the industry employed 96 100 persons in 2007 and 
95 800 in 2008, with turnovers that rose from approximately 10 billion Euro to 10,8 billion 
                                                 
26 Germany has a steeped feed-in system, which means that when a technology improves so that it provides 
electricity at a lower price, the tariff is lowered to reflect this improvement (Held et al 2010).  
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Euros from 2007 to 2008. The industry is expected to grow considerably in the years to come, 
and employ around 200 000 people and have a turnover of 20 billion Euros in 2020 (BBE 
2011d).  
“Bioenergy is really the supporting column in the renewable energy mix” (interview BBE 2011). 
 
4.2.4 The diva: photovoltaic energy 
The largest photovoltaic market in Europe is not around the Mediterranean ocean, where the 
sun shines the most, but rather in Germany. Both in Germany and at the European level, 
photovoltaics have had the largest increase in investments the last years of all the renewable 
technologies (BMU 2011b, interview EPIA 2011, EPIA 2011f). In Germany, it is in particular 
private households produce power from the sun, but there are also an increasing number of 
large installations (BMU 2011b). Consequently, the number of employees connected to the 
industry in Germany alone, but probably to some extent also in the rest of Europe, is rising 
sharply (BMU 2011b). The last years, photovoltaic technology has improved rapidly, which 
has led both to a large increase in the output of power that a panel can produce and lower 
price per Watt installed. The feed-in tariffs in Germany have accordingly been reduced 
(interview EPIA 2011). Other European countries have also put priority to photovoltaic 
energy, for example Spain.  
“I think given the maturity of the German market, they are more like setting the trend in Europe, so how 
policies are developing at the national levels. So we are very much looking at how things develop there 
to replicate or transfer the experience to other countries” (interview EPIA 2011).  
“The photovoltaics in Germany have in the last years had an incomparable development worldwide” 
(German government 2011).     
Although photovoltaic energy is still small in comparison to other renewable energies in 
Europe, it has experienced a massive growth the last two decades (EPIA 2011c). Especially 
after the Renewables Directive was introduced, the sector has experienced a boom, and has 
rather bright future prospects: within 2020, it expects more than 100 GWh of capacity to be 





5.0 The interest organizations’ lobbying strategies  
 
One of the main aims of this paper is to describe how the German industries lobbied to 
influence the Renewables Directive and the conditions for their choice of political strategies. 
In this chapter we will survey the different lobbying strategies employed by the interest 
organizations, organized as follows: a) a brief presentation of the organization, b) its political 
position, c) which routes they used to achieve their targets, including which organizations 
they cooperated with and d) through what forms they provided information. First, the 
renewables interest organizations will be presented at the German and European level. Then, 
the lobbying strategies of the utilities organizations at both levels will be presented. The 
lobbying routes of the two most important interest organizations at the national level will be 
illustrated in two figures. Finally, a concluding section presents the most important lobbying 
strategies, illustrated by a figure and summarizes the arguments and the coalitions in the 
discussion in two tables.    
 
5.1 The renewables organizations lobbying strategies 
 
The renewables interest organizations at the national level  
5.1.1 Bundesverband Erneuerbare Energie e. V. 27 
Bundesverband Erneuerbare Energie (BEE) is the umbrella organization for all the 
renewables energy technologies industrial interest organizations in Germany, which count 24 
member organizations. Thus, it represents more than 30 000 single members per May 2011. 
In addition, it has supporting members, which for example are suppliers of “Ökostrom” 
(“ecoelectricity”, i. e. electricity from renewable energy sources) and companies offering 
financial services and municipal power producers. BEE was founded in 1991 to improve the 
conditions for the renewables industry (BEE 2011c, d and e). BEE’s secretariat is placed in 
Berlin and counts 9 people. 
 
 
                                                 




BEE strongly maintained that the directive should leave the decisions about national support 
mechanisms to the member states. The argumentation was manifold, for example; if 
certificate trade was introduced, that would undermine the successful German support model.  
„It doesn’t make sense at all to establish a feed-in tariff which cannot have the desired effect, because – 
due to the equally applicable certificate trade - all cheap resources are bought out by other member 
states to comply with their targets. I could have in the feed-in law: you will get 9 cent per kilowatt hour, 
which would be a good incentive for wind power investment. But, if the same investor can get 12 cent 
per kilowatt hour from the certificate trade in Great Britain, no wind farms and even less so production 
facilities will be built in Germany” (interview BEE 2011)28. 
A certificate trading system29 would lead to lower investment in and deployment of 
renewables because of lower security for investors and would result in higher prices for the 
consumers. In addition, Europe would most likely not even come close to achieving its 
renewables target of 20 percent. Trade of certificates would create more bureaucracy, because 
every country would have to create a body to be in charge of the trading and to create a 
common European market place for it. This would be very expensive, in particular for the 
small and middle-sized producers. A certificate trading system would not increase security of 
energy supply, because Europe lacks electricity grid infrastructure to handle sending large 
amounts of electricity across borders. If energy were to be produced only where it could be 
produced most efficiently in Europe, wind power would be produced in Great Britain and 
along the coasts, photovoltaic power in Southern Europe and bio energy in Eastern Europe. 
Hence, the power would be produced mainly in peripheral places, where there is no net 
capacity to handle such amounts of electricity. In addition, it would probably be very 
unpopular among the inhabitants in these areas (BEE 2007, BEE 2008a, 2008b). BEE was 
satisfied with the outcome of the directive. Indeed, the BEE representative expressed that they 
managed to convince the German politicians about their arguments, although the utilities 
industry still dwarfs the renewables in terms of economic output.  
 
                                                 
28 The BEE representative nuanced the original translated quote, so that in reality, he thereby expressed 
himself in English here. Thus, there is of course no original quote in German in the appendix.  
29 Certificate/Quota-Systems and Feed-in tariffs are both essentially “market based” although only quota-
systems are termed market based in everyday language: Certificate/quota-systems are setting the quantity and 




BEE expects policy makers in the government to listen to them, and has good contacts within 
the Ministry of Environment in particular, which is in charge of renewable energy, but also 
contacts within all the political parties, which have their own experts on renewable energy 
(interview BEE 2011). Bundesverband Erneuerbare Energie had the German state as its main 
target for its lobbying efforts, but also worked actively to promote the industry’s interests 
directly towards the European Institutions. Its’ committee Arbeitsgruppe Europa (AG Europa) 
forged the policies on European issues such as legislation made in the European Union 
(interview BEE 2011). In addition to lobbying the two responsible ministries, the Ministry of 
Environment and Ministry of Economic Affairs directly, they also used two indirect lobbying 
channels. First by exerting pressure on the government through finding “friendly” politicians 
particularly within the two ruling parties, at that time SPD and CDU/CSU, but also the other 
parties. Second, they made an informal alliance with environmental organizations like 
Greenpeace in particular, but also others like Friends of the Earth (BUND), who lobbied the 
government actively on renewables policy because the technologies contribute to mitigation 
of greenhouse gas emissions. BEE’s goal with its lobbying/political actions was to get as 
broad a base of support as possible, also within the public so that the politicians know that 
when they make laws that are negative towards renewables, they also go against public 
opinion (interview BEE 2011). They were also supported by a majority in the German 
parliament, who voted for a resolution that the member states should decide support 
mechanisms themselves, and that there would be no Europe wide certificate trade (Dagger 
2009:99).  
“[…] that would have been a problem, because the very successful support mechanism that we have in 
Germany, the EEG, would not function properly any longer. This is where we had the first severe 
controversy with the European Commission. And this was one of the few points where we could not 
find a solution at the working level” (interview BEE 2011). 
At the European level, BEE participated in meetings and exchanged information with EREF, 
EREC and other European associations. BEE is a founding member of EREF and is closely 
cooperating with EREC in a network of national associations (BEE 2011b, interview BEE 
2011). BEE lobbied European Union services, for example the EU Commission’s unit within 
the Directorate General for Transport and Energy (DG TREN) that drafted the directive, 
particularly the Head of Unit, Hans van Steen (interview BEE 2011). The Chairman of AG 
Europa, Rainer Hinrichs-Rahlwes, is at the moment also the president of EREF, European 
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Renewable Energies Federation. From 2008, he was one of the vice-presidents, and before 
that a board member. He therefore has spent a considerable amount of his working time in 
Brussels and has good contacts within the Commission and the European Parliamentarians. 
This contributes to coordination of viewpoints, and actions towards politicians at the German 
and at the European level in BEE, EREF and EREC (BEE 2011b, EREF 2010, interview BEE 
2011).  
All renewables organizations lobbied the executives responsible for drafting the directive, DG 
TREN in the Commission, and the committee in charge in the European Parliament, ITRE. 
BEE’s focus in Brussels was in particular to talk with the German members of the European 
Parliament (MEPs) from the different political parties within the European Parliament who 
could then work further towards other parliamentarians in the European Parliament. These 
interest organizations and their coalition partners coordinated their efforts at the European 
level about who would meet who in the European Union and when these meetings were to 
take place, and also shared information to a large extent. Figure 3 illustrates the complexity of 
lobbying European legislation.  
“It was almost funny at that time to come to the Renewable Energy House. There were people 
discussing the draft directive in small groups, and quite often there were someone from Greenpeace in 
one room, and someone from the Commission in another room, are all of them together ... in other 
words a very good cooperation” (interview BEE 2011).  
On most issues, the renewable energy’s interest organizations argued rather calmly and 
patiently with the Commission experts in the drafting process. However, when it came to the 
debate about feed-in tariffs versus green certificates, they were very decisive and outspoken 
towards Commissioners and even the President of the European Commission that the 
commission would be strongly criticized if they proposed a certificate trading system instead 
of leaving the decision about support mechanisms to the member states.  
„Confrontation was sought only when it was absolutely necessary, and that was the question about 
certificate trade, which would have destroyed all successful support systems for renewables in Europe. 
At this point, we did seek confrontation, we found it and we won. Differences about all other points 





Supply of information 
Bundesverband Erneuerbare Energie provided the German politicians, journalists, and EU-
level politicians with position papers and press releases. In addition, they made and/or spread 
comparisons between countries with a feed-in tariff system and with quota systems that 
showed that the electricity price increases were far lower in the countries with a feed-in 
system, Germany and Spain, than in the countries with a quota system (e.g. UK). Their 
informal coalition partners in the environmental movement had for a long while provided 
German authorities with position papers and studies made in cooperation with research 
institutes about the future prospects of renewable energy in Germany (e.g. WWF Germany et 
al 2007).  
BEE arranged dinner debates with German MPs in Berlin, and with German MEPs in 
Brussels. Due to limited resources, they mainly concentrated on like-minded politicians who 
in turn would provide further outreach to others. This turned out to be a successful and 
productive strategy which was well received by MPs and MEPs. BEE did not have so much 
money and not that many employees, so they could for example not publish advertisements in 
the papers. Therefore, they rather had to spend their efforts where it was the most effective, 
such as on certain arguments and on some people, and make pointed position papers. By 
having informal coalitions with environmental organizations at the national and the European 
level, they indirectly increased their level of personal resources. This probably enabled them 
to increase their total amount of lobbying pressures. Both in Germany, and at the European 
level in Brussels, the respondent underlines that informal meetings in offices and meetings, 
but also were by far the most important (interview BEE 2011).   
“The main impact came from informal meetings: that we spoke with the people who worked on the 
directive, we told them what we thought was important, and we told them what we thought was quite 
bad in the drafts that we had read” (interview BEE 2011).  
It was not only the renewables lobby that asked for informal meetings with politicians, civil 
servants in the relevant ministries and the like; it was just as well the other way around 
(interviews BWE, BEE, EWEA 2011). BEE and other interest organizations steadily kept in 
contact with people both in Berlin and at the European level. This provided a flow of 
information that would not be possible through official channels. Early access to information 
provides opportunities to make suggestions about what should be changed and to mobilize 
early. The renewables industry’s interest organizations shared such legislative drafts with 
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each other and had a large scaled mobilization when a first “leaked draft” proposed a system 
which included EU-wide certificate trade for target compliance in December 2007 (Nilsson et 
al 2009). Still, this kind of interaction between interest groups and governments and 
commission services is not at all specific for dealing with the Renewables directive, but it is 
normal business in Brussels (interview BEE 2011).  In addition, press releases with BEEs 
points of views were published in order to affect public opinion and decision makers in the 






















 Figure 4: The different lobbying routes of Bundesverband Erneuerbare Energie 
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Sources: (interviews BEE, EREF, EPIA 2011, press releases) 
Comment to figure 3: The figure sums up the typical lobbying routes of the German renewables 
organizations. It illustrates several findings regarding the German renewables industry’s lobbying: 
first, it seemingly used more lobbying routes than the utilities industry’s interest organizations. 
Second, as opposed to the utilities industry, the renewables industry was supported by the 
environmental movement both in Germany and at the European level. Third, the renewables 
industry had a larger number of interest organizations working on its side at the European level, also 
here the environmental movement. Last, but not the least, the renewables industry was supported 
by key countries such as Germany and Spain. The figure is based on the interviews and other 
material. However, some lobbying channels might be left out.  
 
5.1.2 Bundesverband Windenergie30 
Bundesverband Windenergie (BWE) has around 20 000 members, and is therefore according 
to its home page the “world’s largest interest organization for renewable energy”. It organizes 
a wide range of members that stretches from the wind energy producers and their 
shareholders, planners, scientists, planners, engineers, technicians and lawyers. BWE also has 
member organizations at the regional and local levels, and emphasizes building of knowledge 
(BWE 2011a, 2011b, 2011c). Today, BWE is by far the largest German renewable industry 
interest organization in terms of manpower with 35 employees at its main office, located in 
Berlin (BWE 2011c, 2011b, 2011e).    
 
Political positions 
Bundesverband Windenergie promotes stable economic conditions so that it is safe to invest 
in wind energy in the years to come. Therefore, it advocated a system with national support 
mechanisms such as feed-in tariffs, similar to the German Erneuerbaren Energien Gesetz. 
BWE is also against a system with tradable green certificates because, according to them, that 
would lead to wind being produced almost exclusively at the coasts of Europe, far away from 
the important economic zones and where electricity is consumed. Such construction would 
not easily be accepted among the locals there. In addition, BWE pointed out that a virtual 
trade that doesn’t take energy transfer into account is the wrong way to go in Europe, where 
the electricity grid urgently needs to be built out and improved (BWE 2008b). Since the 
directive provided stable framework conditions for the wind industry and had legally binding 
                                                 
30 German Windenergy Association 
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national targets, BWE was basically satisfied with the outcome of the Renewables Directive 
(BWE 2008d and 2008e). Table 4 summarizes the different arguments in the debate. 
 
Lobbying channels and coalition partners 
The interest organization used “all the normal lobbying channels”, which included consulting 
with people in the German ministries including the Ministry of Environment (interview BWE 
2011a). In addition, they would lobby the political parties. BWE participated in Arbeitsgruppe 
Europa together with the other renewables interest organizations. Bundesverband 
Windenergie is a member of the European Wind Energy Association, which as 
aforementioned again is a member of EREC (interview BWE 2011a, interviews EWEA and 
BEE 2011). Influencing the German government’s position was a top priority, similar to 
Bundesverband Erneuerbare Energie and European Wind Energy Association. BWE 
participated when BEE arranged the information event for German parliamentarians in the 
European Parliament. In addition, it lobbied and corresponded with German MEPs and the 
Commission. All the lobbying at the European level was coordinated so that the organizations 
held compatible political positions (interview BWE 2011b). Both BWE and the German 
organization that represents the equipment producers for wind energy, Verband der 
Maschinen und Anlagenbau (VDMA) participated in the board of the European Wind Energy 
Association (EWEA). In addition, BWE was a member of EREF. First and foremost EWEA, 
but also EREF thus constituted BWEs indirect lobbying strategy at the European level. 
Further, BWE cooperated with Greenpeace, EREC and national associations. This resulted in 
efficient resource sharing. At the time, only one person in BWE worked part-time with the 
directive (EREF 2011c, interview BWE 2011b,).  
“BWE also coordinated with wind energy companies (manufacturers, project operators etc.) and these 
also took the opportunity to approach politicians/ MEPs / Commission etc. so that we were able to do 




                                                 
31 This respondent answered in English; therefore the quote is of course not in the list of translated German 
quotes in the appendix 9.1.   
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Provision of information 
BWE provided the German politicians and the German press with different kinds of 
information. For example, they produced press releases, (e.g. BWE 2008a), position papers 
(e.g. BWE 2008b) and statistics (e.g. BWE 2011d). According to EWEA, EWEA supported 
their German member organization with arguments as well as with money (interview EWEA 
2011). BWE used several means to get its’ message across. For example it arranged 
parliamentary evenings in Brussels, had personal conversations with decision makers, and 
expanded its internet site. Similar to the other German renewables interest organizations, 
BWE was aided by the fact that the Ministry of Environment, in particular, frequently hired 
research institutes to investigate into different topics related to renewable energy. In some of 
these projects, BWE participated and provided information on wind energy (interview BWE 
2011b).   
“[…] a lot of good material at the time was e.g. provided publicly by research institutes hired by the 
Ministry of the Environment […] (interview BWE 2011b)  
 
5.1.3 Bundesverband BioEnergie32 
Bundesverband BioEnergie (BBE) is an umbrella organization for the whole bioenergy 
industry in Germany, and works with all kinds of bioenergy uses, e.g. for electricity, heat and 
for fuel. Thus, it represents other organizations for bioenergy both at the national, regional 
and local level. Some of the members are also research institutes (BBE 2011a, BBE 2011c). 
Several of BEEs members mainly earn money from exporting, and thus, the Renewables 
Directive was important for the organization also because of the conditions it would set for 
European bioenergy production and consumption (interview BBE 2011). The secretariat is 
located in Bonn and today counts 7 people, but had 4 people at the time the directive was 
negotiated. One of them worked specifically with European affairs (interviews BBE 2011, 
BBE 2011e, 2011b). 
Political positions 
BBE argued for ambitious and binding renewables targets, and was against harmonized 
support for mechanisms. Rather, it underlined that the member states should have the 
opportunity to decide themselves. The organization strongly wants Germany to continue to 
                                                 
32 The German Bioenergy Federation 
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have the Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz, because they view it as “outstanding”, and by far the 
most efficient instrument to increase the renewables share of the electricity production 
(interview BBE 2011). Therefore, BEE was satisfied with the outcome of the Renewables 
Directive, in particular that there was no harmonization of support mechanisms and trade of 
green certificates. However, in line with other renewables interest organizations, the 
organization argues that the goals in the directive should have been more ambitious, as the 
German target was only what the German government already had decided to pursue.  
„ […] altogether we think that we succeeded well in getting our positions integrated because the main 
target was reached: to massively build out renewable energies in Europe. And currently there are also 
no harmonization instruments” (interview BBE 2011). 
 
Lobbying strategies   
Normally, Bundesverband BioEnergie focuses on the German market and influencing the 
political processes in Germany and German law making processes and policies. At the 
national level BBE is a member of Bundesverband Erneuerbare Energien (BEE), which made 
a common position for all the renewable power producers in Germany. However, as the 
Renewables Directive was a very important piece of legislation for the German renewables 
industry, BBE worked hard politically to influence the German government and parliament, 
as well as the political processes in EU through being an active member of AEBIOM, the 
European Biomass Association. Indirectly, it is through AEBIOM also a member of the 
European Renewable Energy Council (EREC). In addition, Bundesverband BioEnergie has 
signaled its position directly to the Commission (interviews BBE, AEBIOM 2011a, 2011b, 
EREF 2011).   
 “Naturally, we communicate our positions, both towards the German ministries, but also the members 
of the German parliament, the German members of the European Parliament, as well as to the 
Commission self, directly” (interview BBE 2011). 
These organizations at the national and the European level produced information jointly, such 
as press statements and reports, and made common political stances (interview BBE, EREF, 
and BEE 2011). Bundesverband BioEnergie also kept in contact with environmental 
organizations, and tried to convince them about bioenergy’s virtues. Therefore, the largest 
German environmental organizations such as BUND, World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) 
and Nature and Biodiversity Conservation Union (NABU) were invited to all their events 
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(interview BBE 2011). Among the renewable energy sources, bioenergy is and has been 
regarded as by far the most controversial by the environmental organizations. The 
environmentalists are skeptical towards expansion of bioenergy production because they do 
not regard some types of bioenergy as sustainable, and also point out that some of the sources 
of bioenergy are very inefficient and costly (e.g. Greenpeace Germany 2008, WWF 2011 and 
NABU 2008).33 Also at the European level, the environmental organizations were rather 
skeptical towards bioenergy, because of its possible adversary consequences on food 
production and other features. Therefore, the renewable energies’ interest organizations had to 
support a common position that bioenergy was to follow sustainability criteria to be 
accountable for the renewable energy targets. Under these conditions, the environmental 
organizations worked as an informal coalition partner (interviews BBE and BEE 2011). 
Through collaborating with other renewables interest organizations, they got better access to 
existing contacts and new political contacts. These contacts included employees in the 
ministries, parliamentarians, decision makers in other interest organizations, businesses, 
church groups, interest organizations and environmental organizations. The organization 
works continually to maintain a good long-term relationship with decision makers. Limited 
resources contributed to that BBE concentrating its resources where it perceived it to be most 
useful, and that did not include creating a formal alliance with environmental organizations 
(interview BBE 2011). 
“The renewables organizations altogether is equipped with far less resources than the conventional 
energy industry, and therefore it was a necessity that we here cooperate well and use the synergies,” 
(interview BBE 2011).   
 
Provision of information 
Bundesverband BioEnergie provided political institutions with information through in several 
different forms, such as position papers written alone and together with the other members of 
BEE, press declarations, brochures and graphics. Information was conveyed through several 
channels and means: events, conferences, parliamentary evenings and breakfasts, personal 
conversations with decision makers, information speeches, press conferences and study tours 
to producers of renewable energy. BBEs representative views the most important channels of 
                                                 
33 Greenpeace was dissatisfied with some parts of the Renewables Directive, in particular that the directive 
“encourages widespread use of biofuels” (Greenpeace Germany 2008).  
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influence to be the position papers and the personal conversations (interview BBE 2011). 
With a small secretariat of four people, the capacity to work directly towards the European 
Union was limited. Further, the representative commented that the strategy would always be 
dependent on the monetary resources as well as manpower in the organization. 
 
The renewables interest organizations at the European level 
5.1.4 European Renewable Energy Federation asbl 
European Renewable Energy Federation (EREF) represents small and middle-sized producers 
of different types of renewable energy in Europe. These members are particularly dependent 
on good and stable support mechanisms for their production. Germany is the country with the 
largest number of members, for example the aforementioned Bundesverband Erneuerbare 
Energien and Bundesverband Windenergie, but also other organizations like Bundesverband 
Deutscher Wasserkraftwerke and Fachverband Biogas. In addition, four of the German 
members are private producers. Two people are employed half time (EREF 2011a, interview 
EREF 2011). EREFs present president, Rainer Hinrichs Rahlwes, was also the leader of AG 
Europa in Bundesverband Erneuerbare Energien at the time the directive was negotiated and 
afterwards. From 2008 to 2010 he was one of the vice presidents of EREF (EREF 2010, 
EREF 2011b).  
 
Political views 
The primary function of the organization is to promote and protect the members’ interests by 
legal action both in the European Union and in the member states for example against; 
“[…]pressures to feed-in systems, grid-access discrimination, regulatory burdens, research 
money privileges to the fossil and nuclear sector, investor unfriendly multiple changing of 
regulatory frameworks for RES energy and campaigns belittling renewables as too expensive 
and not able to deliver and a nuisance to grid management[..]” (EREF 2011a). EREF 
championed the same goals as the other renewable industry’s interest organizations: a 
voluntary system regarding support mechanisms, binding targets and national templates. 





Lobbying channels and partners  
EREF did very intensive lobbying to voice their views regarding the Renewables Directive. 
This for example included participating in all formal events. Since they had rather small 
personnel resources due to few employees and little money, they had to concentrate on having 
as many personal meetings as possible. This included the key commissioners even before the 
proposal for the directive was published, people in the European Parliament, the different 
units in the Commission (DG Tren and DG Environment), and key governments like 
Germany and Spain, but also France. The organization has long time relationships with 
decision makers and public servants in the European Union, and emphasize that it is 
important to meet decision makers and public servants regularly (interviews BEE and EREF 
2011). Otherwise they depended on their national member organizations to lobby their 
respective governments.  
EREF also organized different workshops. In all large events, the European renewables 
organizations worked together. In addition, they had informal allies in the environmental 
organizations Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth Europe and the group of parliamentarians, 
EUFORES, where the second rapporteur Claude Turmes from the Greens was a very active 
member. The renewables organizations at the European level and at the national levels had a 
joint effort to make their governments protest against the draft that proposed a trade based 
scheme with harmonized support mechanisms (interview EREF 2011). They succeeded with 
their pressure, which for example led to the letter that key member states sent the Commission 
right before the directive was published, 15. January 2008. This letter strongly criticized a 
market based scheme (EurActiv 2008, Toke 2008). At the same time, EREC also sent an open 
letter with harsh criticism (EREC 2008). Three of the signatories of this letter, Germany, 
Spain and Slovenia, also cooperate in an organization called the International Feed-In 
Cooperation, which work to promote feed-in tariffs internationally and improve existing feed-
in systems (International Feed-In Cooperation 2007). 
“…we also managed to get the German and Spanish government to write a letter to the Commission that 
the Commission was not allowed, or should not come up with a harmonized green certificate scheme, 
but that it should be up to the member states” (interview EREF 2011). 
Provision of information 
EREF has for several years produced the EREF price report, which gives an overview of 
prices of renewable energies in the different states in Europe and compares the prices for the 
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different support schemes with each other (see for example EREF 2007). In addition, EREF 
made press releases which were used in the media (interview EREF 2011, see for example 
EREF 2008). The organization also covers their main opponent, EURELECTRIC’s policy in 
order to have their own opinions on the topics and “put in a counterweight”. The EREF price 
report is one such means, as the utilities industry for example has commissioned and 
produced reports with a very different starting point in terms. These argue that the present 
feed-in mechanisms are very expensive when put into practice (interview EURELECTRIC 
2011). The respondent pointed out that the majority of member states were always against 
trade of green certificates. The few countries that favored it, for example the United Kingdom 
which had trade of green certificates nationally, changed position on the topic because they 
realized that trade would have an adverse effect on their own markets for renewable energy 
(interview EREF 2011).     
“It was a good overlap between the interests of the renewable energy associations, the green 
associations and of key governments. And that made it” (interview EREF 2011). 
 
5.1.5 European Wind Energy Association 
European Wind Energy Association (EWEA) is the largest of the renewables industry’s 
interest organizations in Europe. As aforementioned, EWEA today has more than 600 
members from the whole world, and represents the manufacturers that hold the lion’s share, 
90 %, of the global wind power market. EWEAs permanent staff counts about 55 employees 
per today, and was around 20 when the Renewables Directive was negotiated. Both 
companies and interest organizations such as Bundesverband Windenergie are members, but 
in different categories. The membership fee is calculated on the basis of turnover in “wind 
energy activities”, so that the largest member companies pay by far the most. All the 
renewable daughter firms of the utilities are represented in EWEAs board of corporate 
members, such as E.ON Climate and Renewables and RWE Innogy (EWEA 2011a, 2011b, 
interview EWEA 2011). In their board group for associations, both Bundesverband 
Windenergie and VDMA hold places. Thus, the German renewables industry seems to be 






The EWEA respondent (2011) pointed out that the Renewable Electricity Directive (2001) 
was a very good starting point, because most of the contents of it were simply copied to the 
electricity part of the revised version. EWEAs main targets with its lobbying was to convince 
the policy makers about legally binding national targets and that the national action plans 
should have a template made by the Commission. Similar to the other renewables industries 
interest organizations, EWEA wanted the countries to have the opportunity to choose support 
mechanisms themselves. Their main point is that well-functioning support mechanisms 
should continue to be used to ensure stable conditions for investors. Imposing harmonized 
support mechanisms would be very difficult in Europe when the countries have so different 
base of renewable energy resources and so different economic conditions. Thus, EWEA was 
very content with the outcome of the directive negotiations (interview EWEA 2011).  
“We don’t say feed-in is better than certificates or better than tenders, we want them all to be well 
designed as a point, and if well designed, all of them can be useful, and if badly designed, all of them 
can be bad” (interview EWEA 2011). 
 
Lobbying strategies and partners 
EWEA worked with the Commission, the Parliament and almost all the permanent 
representations and visited of the countries that seemed to be negative about the directive. It 
was especially important for them to have the big countries on their side. The EWEA 
lobbyists participated in all formal public hearings and official consultations, as well as had 
contact with all relevant directorates and units. In addition, they had frequent personal 
meetings with decision makers and employees in the Commission and the European 
Parliament. EWEA followed the political processes very closely, and lobbied the people who 
they knew were positive, as well as trying to convince people who were skeptical to their 
positions. In addition, it had a political campaign targeted at policy makers, which was 
symbolized by a full-scale wind turbine that they erected in front of the Beralymont building. 
In order to be able to lobby more efficiently, EWEA raised the membership fees, which the 
members willingly paid so that it could employ more people (interview EWEA 2011).      
“..I think our engagement in this directive was total, was a hundred percent. It is one of the most far 
reaching pieces of legislation about renewable energy in the world, with all its defects and limits and 
nonetheless, you won’t find this anywhere else in the world (interview EWEA 2011)” 
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EWEA is a founding member of EREC and its biggest member before EPIA. In the crucial 
period during the negotiations, EWEA met the other members of EREC regularly to discuss, 
negotiate and forge a common strategy and common points of view. This was for example 
exemplified through common press releases where EREC represented the whole renewables 
industry in Europe. The interest organizations strategically exchanged information and 
contacts in EREC. In addition EWEA is a member of EUFORES and supports their work. 
The representative (interview 2011) underlined that on several occasions, the Commission 
interacts with EWEA as the representative for the renewables industry.     
 
Supply of information 
Information to decision makers were provided through workshops, conferences, brochures, e-
mails and meetings with representatives they regarded as being very important. These 
included parliamentarians in the European Parliament such as the German Metchild Rothe, 
Anna Podimata from Greece and Fiona Hall from the United Kingdom. EWEA produces 
different kinds of information, like reports, position papers and the magazine Wind Directions 
(interview EWEA 2011, EWEA 2007). The lobbying was targeted particularly at people in 
the ITRE committee in the European Parliament and the members of the Industry and Energy 
Committee. Where EWEA put in their lobbying efforts towards the Commission, Parliament 
and the members of the Council in the national representations depended on where in the 
policy phase the directive was. EWEA and the national renewables associations coordinated 
their views and strategies, and the national associations were the ones mainly in charge of 
lobbying the national governments (interview EWEA 2011).   
 
5.1.6 European Photovoltaic Industry Association 
European Photovoltaic Industry Association (EPIA) is an organization that represents 240 
different members from the whole photovoltaic sector in Europe and the rest of the world. 
This makes it the “world's largest industry association devoted to the solar photovoltaic (PV) 
electricity market.” EPIA has had a large increase in number of employees the last years, from 




 “We were still, as you have seen, a marginal technology. Now we are starting to be considered.” 
(Interview EPIA 2011).   
 
Political positions 
EPIA argued for binding national as well as sectorial targets for renewables. Similar to the 
rest of ERECs members, they were strongly against harmonization of support schemes. EPIA 
feared it would lead to trade of certificates, which mainly would support the most mature 
technologies such as wind power, the “low hanging fruits”. Thus it will have a devastating 
effect on renewable technologies that are not yet cost competitive, such as photovoltaic 
power. Thus, EPIA favors feed-in tariffs, or systems that work similarly, like the Spanish 
premium system. Hence, EPIA argued for a voluntary system where the member states could 
decide support mechanisms themselves. In addition, mandatory national renewable action 
plans with a template from the Commission was a key issue. Apart from that the final 
directive did not include sectorial binding targets for electricity, heat and transport, they were 
very content with the outcome of the directive (interview EPIA 2011, EPIA 2008a, 2008b and 
2008c, EREC 2007).  
 
Lobbying channels and lobbying partners 
EPIA lobbied both directly and indirectly. The most important channel was through EREC, 
but they also lobbied directly towards members of the European Parliament and the European 
Commission. EPIA put priority to meeting the members of the Parliament and Commission 
who they knew were positive towards renewables, such as the German MEP Metchild Rothe, 
Anna Podimata from Greece and the rapporteur Claude Turmes from Luxembourg. Lobbying 
was not only done to propose their views, but also to get hold of information as early as 
possible. The intensity of the lobbying depended on where in the policy phase the draft was 
(interview EPIA 2011). In addition, they cooperated a little bit with ESTIF, the European 
Solar Thermal Industry Federation. Also at the European level EPIA and the other renewables 
interest organizations were allied with NGOs such as Greenpeace Europe in particular and 
Friends of the Earth. The lobbying was done through events such as lunch meetings, debates 
in the Parliament and personal meetings with the Commission (interview EPIA 2011). In 
general EPIA cooperates closely with Bundesverband Solarwirtschaft (BSW), the German 
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solar energy association, which they support with arguments, but EPIA also learns from their 
experiences. In Germany, Bundesverband Solarwirtschaft does the industrial lobbying work 
on behalf of the photovoltaic sector. The large and internationally oriented German solar 
energy companies such as Schott AG and SolarWorld are well represented, as they have held, 
and hold several of the director posts in EPIA (EPIA 2011e). Accordingly, the German solar 
energy industry probably has a significant influence on EPIA. The only activity EPIA did at 
the national level was meeting with the most important national permanent representations in 
EU, like the German and Greek one, and the other key governments regarded as 
necessary/essential at the moment, like Spain. Otherwise, EPIA rests on its German board 
members communicate its position at the German national level (interview EPIA 2011).        
“With much more means, we would do more. So if we had money to do campaigns, we would have 
done campaigns. We have not done campaigns, not big ones. If you had money to have lobbyists in 
many national countries, we would do much more” (Interview EPIA 2011).   
As aforementioned, renewable industry’s interest organizations also cooperated with 
environmental organizations at the European level, and especially Greenpeace (interview BEE 
2011). Greenpeace European Union has for more years worked for renewable energy, which 
includes commissioning and publishing scientific reports about future scenarios for renewable 
energy and publishing press releases (see for example Greenpeace European Union 2008, 
Greenpeace European Union 2007). In addition, Greenpeace has at least since the 1990s 
promoted photovoltaic power.  
 
Provision of information 
To convince policymakers in the European Union and key member states, EPIA organized 
meetings with them such as personal meetings, but also formal events. Through a series of six 
roundtables with people from the Commission, the Parliament, an industry representative and 
the press, they informed about different topics connected to photovoltaic energy. EPIA also 
had briefing breakfasts and lunch meetings with people who are friendly towards their case, 
such as members of The European Forum for Renewable Energy Sources (EUFORES)34. The 
initiative for contact between decision makers and the interest organization was made on both 
                                                 
34 EUFORES is a cross-party group consisting of members of parliament of parliament, honorary members of 
parliament and honorary presidents. These are full members. In addition, it has supporting membership for 
non-parliamentary members such as for people from EU industry associations, non-profit organizations and 
individuals (EUFORES 2011a, 2011b). 
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sides; sometimes meetings were suggested and scheduled by EPIA, other times by people in 
the Commission (interview EPIA 2011).  
“[…] we advise them, and they also advise us on strategies to make common positions. It is an […] 
exchange relationship.” (Interview EPIA 2011).   
The decision makers were supplied with different forms of information, ranging from press 
releases and position papers to studies made together with Greenpeace. They have published 
the magazine Solar Generation since 2001 (EPIA 2011d). Information brochures such as these 
are expensive to produce, and EPIA would probably not have managed to do such a job alone. 
However, when pooling resources with Greenpeace, they have managed to conduct studies 
and thereby contribute high quality information to decision makers and the public.  
 
 
5.2 The utilities industry’s interest organizations 
 
The utilities interest organizations at the national level 
 
5.2.1 Bundesverband der Energie und Wasserwirtschaft35 
Bundesverband der Energie und Wasserwirtschaft (BDEW) has 1800 members, which 
represent in the energy sector 90 percent of Germany’s electricity sales and more than 60 
percent of the local and district heat supply, 90 percent of natural gas sales. It represents 
companies that stretch from the large German utilities, to the small public owned power 
producers in municipalities (interview BDEW 2011b). The reason why BDEW is not a 
member of Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (BDI) is that BDEW represents both 
private and public interests such as communal power producers, and BDEWs public section 
would not like to be a part of a private umbrella organization (interview BDI 2011). The 
secretariat is located in Berlin. BDEW established a European Office in Brussels as early as 
1979, which today has around 3 advisors on energy, out of these 1 on renewable energy 
(together with other dossiers like energy efficiency, climate and environmental policy) and 8 
employees altogether (BDEW 2011c, interviews BDEW 2011b). As BDEW represents the 
lion’s share of power producers as well as grid operators, the German government and other 
                                                 
35 German Association of Energy and Water Industries. 
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stakeholders consult them actively in order to ensure cooperation and appropriate 
implementation of for example the German feed-in law (interview BDEW 2011a).   
 
Political positions 
Despite the differentiated group of members, BDEW was clearly in favor of a gradual 
integration of renewables into the market, also into the European internal energy market. 
Therefore, BDEW was asking - in the mid- to long-term - for a European wide harmonized 
and market-based system. Acknowledging the need for a sufficient transition phase, BDEW 
was generally in favor of the option of tradable green certificates and promoted this view 
(BDEW 2008a and 2008b, Dagger 2009:98, Umwelt Bundesamt 2006). One of their worries 
is the most cost-efficient renewables deployment. Another consideration is that when 
renewables, especially intermittent ones, introduced into the system without any responsibility 
for system stability and outside any markets (“produce and forget”), get steadily larger market 
shares, the rest of the market will not function in the end (interview BDEW 2011a).  
„That means, one wants to get away from a support system and integrates renewables gradually into the 
market” (interview BDEW 2011a).  
When the climate and energy package was launched, the organization expressed on behalf of 
the industry that the target of 18 percent energy from renewable energy sources is very 
ambitious. The industry is prepared to contribute its part to achieve the binding target (BDEW 
2008a). It envisages that renewable energy in and outside European level should be located 
where the conditions are optimal, such as sun around the Mediterranean ocean, including for 
example North Africa (BDEW 2011b, 2011d).  
 
 “Climate protection should not become an object of fiscal policy (BDEW 2008a:15).” 
 
Strategies and partners 
BDEW’s main office in Berlin lobbied both German politicians and the government. The 
political processes within Germany are their main target. The organization also lobbied the 
Commission, Council and European Parliament through its Brussels office. In the European 
Parliament, BDEW had contact with people from all the political parties, but had closer 
contact with the friendly ones. In addition they lobbied the committee in charge there, 
72 
 
Committee on Industry, Transportation and Energy (ITRE) (interview 2011b). The 
organization has a group of partner organizations that it cooperates with on different issues, 
like the BDI. In the case of the Renewables Directive, BDEW participated in committee 
meetings with (BDI), but had no formal cooperation (interview BDI 2011). At the European 
level, BDEW is a member of EURELECTRIC. According to EURELECTRIC, BDEW is 
important in formulating their policies (interview EURELECTRIC 2011).  
“The utilities industry did similar [lobbying activities] to us, only with much more money” (interview 
BEE 2011).   
The lobbying intensity both in Germany and at the European level depended on where in the 
political process the draft was. In the drafting phase, BDEW lobbied the Commission, and 
later the European Parliament when the draft was going to be voted upon (interview BDEW 
2011a). One person in Berlin and one in Brussels worked on the Renewables Directive, but 
not full time. In addition, people in different committees worked on it (interview BDEW 
2011b). In Germany they have participated in all formal hearings on behalf of the industry. At 
the European level, EURELECTRIC normally has this role (interview BDEW 2011a, 
interview EURELECTRIC 2011). As a member, BDEW participates in different committees 
such as the one in charge of renewables policy, such as the Energy Policy and Generation 
Committee. Although BDEW represents the whole utility sector in Germany in 
EURELECTRIC, it seems that the large utilities are also very well represented indirectly 
through their membership in BDEW. For example, today’s vice president in EURELECTRIC 
is Johannes Teyssen, who is E.ON’s chief executive officer, who participates on behalf of the 
German electricity industry (EURELECTRIC 2011a, 2011b, 2011c). However, who has had 
which positions in Eurelectric have changed over time. 
 
Provision of information 
BDEW did provide the German government with information such as position papers and 
statistical data (BDEW 2008a, interview BDEW 2011a). BDEW also produces different kinds 
of studies and publications in all kinds of fields (BDEW 2011e, interview BDEW 2011a). The 
organization also provided information through arranging at least one information day, a type 
of event where BDEW hosts events with politicians, environmental organizations and others 
meet and discuss (interview BDEW 2011a). According to the representative (2011a), “BDEW 
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commissioned some general studies concerning the overall development of the energy sector 
considering climate change, renewable and energy efficiency policies.” However, BDEW did 
not perceive that further studies were needed in that specific situation because of the large 
amount of studies that had already been made by research institutes and others, and because 
such studies are expensive. These had been commissioned by the government, NGOs or the 
affected industry. (BDEW 2011a) 
BDEW participated in stakeholder consultations in Germany. In addition, they met politicians 
for personal conversations with politicians in the government, parliament and leading 
politicians in the political parties (interview 2011a). The largest members of BDEW, the four 
big utilities, have far more resources to put into lobbying than their interest organization. 
Thus, they probably also have access to more venues of lobbying. For example, they have 
sponsored large and expensive campaigns in the media the last years, such as one presenting 
nuclear power as environmentally friendly in order to affect the widespread German nuclear 
skeptical attitudes in 2007 (Die Zeit 2011a, 2011c). This is supported by Dagger (2009:98, 
quoting Hauschild 2008), who noted that the members of the “economic coalition” and the 
four big utilities worked hard to have a European certificate system. Where BDEW put in 
their efforts, both in Germany and at the European level, depended on where in the process 
the draft was. Since the government was to transpose the European legislation and implement 
it by December 2010, BDEW also continued working towards the directive after the EU 
negotiations to affect implementation (interview BDEW 2011a).  
„There is no sector that is more intertwined in politics than the electricity industry” (Blasberg et al 
2011).   
Summing up, similar to the other German interest organizations, BDEW had three main 
lobbying routes. First and foremost, it lobbied the German government. Further, it lobbied the 
EU through its membership in the European level interest organization EURELECTRIC. 








Figure 5: The lobbying routes of Bundesverband der Energie und Wasserwirtschaft 
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5.2.2 Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie36 
Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (BDI) is an umbrella organization that subsumes 
more than 30 organizations, indirectly representing 100 000 companies and more than 8 
million employees (BDI 2011a). BDI was one of the first business organizations having an 
office in Brussels (BDI 2011b). It has represented energy producers in six ways through its 
member organizations37. Verband der Maschinen und Anlagenbau (VDMA) is the largest 
member organization with more than 3000 members, and represents the producers of 
equipment to wind energy and photovoltaic energy production amongst others. Frequently 
VDMA is in conflict with BDI regarding renewables legislation because it supports the 
current system in Germany. VDMA has its own European office in Brussels (VDMA 2011a, 
VDMA 2011b, interview BDI 2011).  
 
Political views 
According to BDI, electricity customers pay about 15 billion Euros extra added to the 
electricity bills by the feed-in tariffs yearly. This leads to decreased competitiveness for 
German industrial producers in comparison to countries which have no such systems, have 
much lower feed-in rates, or cap their tariffs when they have reached a certain level of 
production (interview BDI 2011, BDI 2008). Rather, they would prefer a more “cost 
efficient” system with harmonized support mechanisms across Europe, so that for example 
the main bulk of investments in photovoltaic energy production would go to the sunny 
countries around the Mediterranean ocean. Another preferred opportunity would be that the 
state rather supported the renewables producers directly over the state budget (interview BDI 
2011, BDI 2008, 2009).   
                                                 
36 Federation of German Industry 
37The first is VdV, Verband der Deutschen Verbundswirtschaft, which organizes the large energy companies in 
Germany within both nuclear, gas and coal power (BDI 2011d). In addition, WeG is a member. That is an 
acronym for Wirtschaftverband Erdgasgewinnung, and produces the gas used for 15-16 percent of the natural 
gas consumption in Germany. The third way BDI represents the power producers is the coal power through the 
organization, VRB, Die Vereinigung Rohstoffe und Bergbau e.V. BDI represents production of natural oil through 
MWF, Mineralöwirtschaftverband, which represents the refineries. This energy source only stands for 4 
percent of the oil consumption and is therefore small. Last, BDI indirectly also represents the renewable 
energies through: a) solar power in BV Glas, Bundesverband Glasindustrie, b) wind power  through VDMA e.V, 
Verband Deutscher Maschinen und Anlagenbau e. V. (Interview BDI 2011, BDI 2011c,VDMA 2011b).      
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 “And we find that these different systems in Europe, and the lacking exchange…in other words the 
lacking trade leads the renewables to be produced where the best subsidies are paid rather than where 
the preconditions are the best. Why must so much solar energy be installed in Germany?” (Interview 
BDI 2011).  
BDI did not have the Renewables Directive as a key priority, but rather has spent their major 
efforts at influencing the German renewables legislation such as the Erneuerbare Energien 
Gesetz (EEG), which they perceive as a “catastrophe” because it is so expensive for industrial 
electricity consumers. BDI finds the German renewables targets extremely optimistic, but did 
not do much to try to influence this part of the German position, as what Germany argued for 
in the EU negotiations which also became the national target, 18 percent, was less ambitious 
than what Germany had already decided to achieve nationally (European Commission 2011a, 
interview BDI 2011).  
 
Lobbying strategies and coalition partners 
BDI cooperated with BDEW through common committee meetings about how a common 
European marked-based system could be made, but they never declared common political 
positions. These two organizations to a large extent shared views, apart from that BDEW was 
more eager to further tradable green certificates. BDI was not as positive towards tradable 
green certificates because of some of its members, e.g. the German chemical industry, which 
had negative experiences with EU Emission Trading System and therefore did not want 
another trade-based system. Rather than cooperating with BDEW, BDI cooperated informally 
with another organization in the “economic coalition”, namely the large labor union 
Industriegewerkschaft Bergbau, Chemie, Energie (IG BCE). IG BCE organizes the employees 
in the utilities and the energy intensive chemical industry (IG BCE 2011). Thus, BDI and IG 
BCE made a common position paper to show that both the industrial employers and the 
employees in the renewables industry were affected and shared views (interview BDI 2011, 
IG BCE 2008).  
BDI targeted both the German politicians and policy making at the European level to 
influence the final content of the Renewables Directive. In Germany, BDI lobbied the 
minister of environment and the minister of economics in particular. They participated in all 
public hearings alike, but did not address the German parliament, as the German Parliament 
had little to do with the directive directly. They (BDI) approached EU-level decision making 
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processes by two means: indirectly through their membership in Confederation of European 
Business (BUSINESSEUROPE), and directly on their own. BUSINESSEUROPE and BDI 
largely shared points of view in this case (interview BDI 2011, BDI 2008, 
BUSINESSEUROPE 2008). As aforementioned, BDI has a small Brussels office in main 
charge of lobbying at the European level. Thus, BDI followed the decision-making process 
and contacted the people within the Commission and the members of European Parliament 
according to where in the process the draft was. Due to lack of time and personal resources, 
they had to concentrate on the most important people at the European level, such as the 
rapporteur Claude Turmes, in addition to the German members within ITRE who were 
sympathetic towards the positions of the German industry (interview BDI 2011). The BDI 
representative thinks that the renewables industry is better represented in Brussels than both 
BDI and BUSINESSEUROPE. BDI was not successful in influencing the German politicians 
about their views. The renewables industry’s interest groups, on the other hand were very 
important for the German political position, and therefore also the outcome of the Renewables 
Directive in the European negotiations (interview BDI 2011).  
“It is first and foremost due to Germany’s influence that we have quite different support mechanisms in 
Europe… and we argue that the support mechanisms should be harmonized, or at least enable trade with 
renewable energy“(interview BDI 2011). 
The renewables industry worked with “heart and soul” and managed to convince the decision 
makers about the importance of further developing renewable energy. BDI perceives that 
many politicians tend to have a rather oversimplified perception of the different sources of 
energy production, and that they have extensive support from the public.  
“They are all enthusiastic about the renewables. It is like “renewable energy is good, and coal, and oil 
and gas and so on are all bad”,” (interview BDI 2011).    
 
Provision of information 
BDI made a press release when the green package was released. In addition, they made at 
least one position paper (BDI 2008, interview BDI 2011). Every once in a while, BDI 
arranged parliamentary evenings where they invited 10-12 members of the European 
Parliament. Then, the BDI employees in the Berlin office who had been mainly in charge of 
the German positions went to Brussels to participate. When there were formal hearings and 
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similar occasions connected to the Renewables Directive, BDIs European office always 
participated. In addition, they met people informally both at the German and European level 
to exchange information about political views and political developments. 
  
The utilities interest organizations at the European level 
 
5.2.3 The Union of the Electricity Industry  
The Union of the Electricity Industry (EURELECTRIC) is the umbrella organization for all 
the utilities national organizations in Europe with 33 full members from the 27 member states 
and other OECD countries. In addition, it has affiliates and associates on other continents. All 
together, the electricity industry that is represented, which produces the lion’s share of 
electricity in Europe, counts around 2500 different companies. Therefore, it indirectly also 
represents all the largest utilities in Europe, which have seats in their different committees. 
These committees decide EURELECTRIC’s political stances, and then it is the member’s 
responsibility to disseminate and promote the political positions within their countries. It is 
the recognized association for the electricity industry in Europe in matters regarding energy 
policy and is invited to all formal hearings alike by the different EU bodies (interview 
EURELECTRIC 2011). On their web pages, the staff listed counts 37 people. 
 
Political positions  
Following up earlier positions, EURELECTRIC strongly advocated a European market-based 
scheme that would include trade of green certificates across borders by both companies and 
governments, including non-EU countries. They were against national binding targets because 
“it would have a perverse effect on carbon price” because taking an amount of the electricity 
out of the carbon market would depress the price of carbon in EU ETS. Thus, immature 
technologies should get initial support, but not in the longer run, because “the CO2-price in 
the EU Emissions Trading Scheme should be the main driver for companies to invest in low-
carbon energy technologies” (interview EURELECTRIC 2011). According to a study the 
consultant firm Pöyry did for EURELECTRIC in 2008, having 27 different support schemes 
for renewables in Europe was rather inefficient, suboptimal, and would cost 17 billion Euros a 
year more than a market-based approach (EURELECTRIC 2008c, 2008e). Individual subsidy 
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schemes, on the other hand, would create “subsidy tourism”, where people would build 
installations for energy production where the subsidies were the largest rather than allocating 
them where the resource base was the most optimal (interview EURELECTRIC 2011).   
“Wind mills were built where the subsidies were the greatest as opposed to where the wind blew. 
Germany has enormous PV installations, and Germany is not the sunniest country in Europe. It is being 
paid for by the German electricity customers as well” (interview EURELECTRIC 2011).    
Cost efficiency is a key word in their argumentation. One part of EURELECTRIC’s 
argumentation is that feed-in schemes are not good tools for installing improved technology 
because the owners of the installations know they have support for very many years to come 
regardless about what they do with their production facilities (interview EURELECTRIC 
2011, EURELECTRIC 2007, 2008a, 2008b). Thus, EURELECTRIC was very dissatisfied 
when the directive in the end both included legally binding national targets and national 
choice of support mechanisms to achieve their targets. This could possibly lead to “distortion 
of competition” (interview EURELECTRIC 2011, e.g. EURELECTRIC 2008d).   
“We knew we had support within the Commission for our view, but, the view in the Commission was 
that we want this directive, and if it is not having a harmonized approach, so be it. So it was a 
suboptimal decision. It is called politics” (interview EURELECTRIC 2011). 
   
Lobbying routes and lobbying partners 
EURELECTRIC participated in all formal occasions during the negotiations leading to the 
Renewables Directive, and had it as a top priority. Therefore, 2- 3 people were working on it 
full time at the critical stages. The Working Group Energy Policy and working group 
Renewables and Distributing Generation were in charge of formulating EURELECTRIC’s 
political positions (EURELECTRIC 2008e). In addition, EURELECTRIC had personal 
meetings with people they regarded as important to talk with, and who would be positive to 
their views. Their efforts were mainly targeted at the European institutions such as different 
parts of the Commission, DG Tren, DG Environment, DG Climate and DG Enterprise, and 
the rapporteurs and party leaders in the European Parliament. For example, EURELECTRIC 
contacted parliamentarians who they know were friendly to them. Still, the majority in the 




“We didn’t have a lot of support in the Parliament because they were voting along country lines. The 
clear message that came to all of them was: ‘we will have national support schemes’” (interview 
EURELECTRIC 2011).   
EURELECTRIC left it to their members to lobby their national governments. Their only close 
ally when lobbying the issue about support mechanisms at the European level was Renewable 
Energy Certificate System (RECS), which they according to their activity report from 2008 
collaborated intensively with when lobbying. In addition, they cooperated to some extent with 
European Federation of Energy Traders (EFET). In 2007, EURELECTRIC made a joint press 
release with RECS and EFET (EURELECTRIC 2007, interview EURELECTRIC 2011).  
 
Provision of information 
In addition to the personal meetings with decision makers and participation in all formal 
events, EURELECTRIC communicated its views through press releases, position papers, 
reports, workshops and dinner debates. EURELECTRIC also commissioned a report made by 
the consultancy firm Pöyry on the economic consequences of feed-in schemes 
(EURELECTRIC 2008c). As with the renewables interest organizations, the initiative for the 
informal meetings could just as well be made by a Commission or Parliament employee as the 












5.3 Summing up the empirics 
All the German interest organizations had three main lobbying routes. The first and most 
important route was lobbying the German government. There, the Ministry of Environment 
and the Ministry of Economic Affairs were the main targets. Further, all these interest 
organizations also lobbied the central EU institutions directly themselves. In particular, they 
lobbied the bodies in charge of the Renewables Directive in the European Parliament and the 
Commission: the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, and DG Transport and 
Energy. Last, the German interest organizations lobbied the EU institutions through their 
European-level organizations. The European level interest organizations for the renewables 
industry had three main lobbying routes. First, they coordinated their efforts under the 
umbrella organization European Renewable Energy Council. Second, they lobbied the 
European Commission, the Parliament and the Council directly on their own. Third, they 
lobbied key member states. The utilities European-level interest organization 
EURELECTRIC also lobbied the European institutions and most likely also the key member 
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*Bundesverband Solarwirtschaft most likely also lobbied the European Union institutions directly. For example, 
EPIAs president in 2007, Winfried Hoffmann, was simultaneously the president of Bundesverband 
Solarwirtschaft (Hoffmann 2007).  
**AEBIOM might also have lobbied the German permanent representation, but since they have not been 
interviewed, I don’t know whether this is the case or not. The same goes for BUSINESSEUROPE. 
 
A precondition for lobbying in alliance is coordination of political positions at the different 
political levels and across the levels. The interest organizations of the renewables industry and 
the utilities industry to a high extent managed to do this. The arguments used by the interest 
organizations at the German and at the European level were to a large extent the same, only 
adapted so they would suit for their different institutional contexts. The only exception in the 
sample is Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (BDI), which only indirectly represents the 
utilities in Germany. On the other hand, the interest organizations of the two industries 
disagreed strongly on how to achieve enhanced production of renewable energy in the EU. 
Their arguments are summed up in table 4.  
 
Table 3: Overview of the key arguments in the debate 
 
Category The utilities industry and the rest 
of the “economic coalition” 
The renewables industry and the 
rest of the “ecologic coalition” 
Costs A harmonized system of support 
mechanisms is more cost efficient for 
the society, whereas feed in tariffs 
will cost the state and consumers 
billions of Euros more.  
Feed-in tariffs are the most efficient 
and least costly way of building out 
different forms of renewable energy 
production. Germany pays less for its 
renewable energy per unit than 
countries with market based systems 
like Great Britain. The real costs of the 
non-renewable energy production are 
not included in the price, such as the 
price of pollution. In addition, a 
market-based approach will lead to a 
much lower pace of increasing 
renewable energy production, and to a 
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higher total price. 
Allocation A market based system will lead to 
allocation where the potential for 
renewable energy production is the 
largest in Europe, rather than where 
the subsidies are the largest, such as 
locating large amounts of solar 
panels in Germany. 
A market-based approach will lead to 
energy production that is often located 
far away from people. The less cost 
efficient technologies will not be used 
even though they still can be important 
contributors.  
Fairness It is unfair that renewable energy has 
preferential access to the grid, and 
that it receives such a lot of indirect 
subsidies that are based on taxing the 
grid owners38. 
The reason why the utilities have good 
access to the grid is that there has used 
to be monopolies. In 2007, the four big 
utilities in Germany owned 100 
percent of the whole distribution net 
and exploit this fact. Historically, the 
utilities themselves have received 
enormous amounts of subsidies. 
Renewable technologies are 
developing rapidly and should 
continue getting tariffs until they are 
mature.  
The future Conventional energy production is 
important for Germany’s energy 
security and should therefore not be 
overlooked. 
In the future, Germany should be 
supported by 100 percent renewable 
energy. Continuation of the feed-in 
system will lead to more investments 
in technology and innovation, where 
Germany already is in lead in Europe. 
Employment A higher renewable energy 
production will lead to increased 
costs for the industrial consumers, 
which will threaten the 
competitiveness of the German 
industry and thus also work places 
The renewables industry is expected to 
grow vastly in the years to come, and 
steadily employ more people. In 2020 
it will amount to more than 500 000 in 
Germany alone. 
                                                 






Germany needs continuity in its 
supply, which only the conventional 
energy sources can deliver since the 
wind and sun doesn’t produce 
electricity continually. 
German should reduce its dependence 
on imported fossil fuels such as oil by 
rather producing more renewable 
energy domestically. Bioenergy can 
give base load production. Germany 
can use for example Norwegian dams 
as storage facilities. The Government 
must invest in technologies for 
efficient storage of energy. 
Investments Feed-in tariffs do not stimulate 
investments in new and improved 
technologies for production because 
the owners of the installations are 
ensured income for several years.  
Feed-in tariffs would not be useful any 
longer because people from foreign 
countries would buy the cheap 
certificates for the cheapest renewable 
technologies such as wind power. In 
other countries with higher tariffs for 
wind power, people would invest there 
rather than were the wind power is 
produced the cheapest, in Germany. 
 
Sources: BDI (2008), BDEW (2008a) and (2008b), BEE (2008a), BEE (2011a), BWE (2008b), Greenpeace 
European Union (2008), IG BCE (2008), EURELECTRIC (2008b), interviews BDI, BDEW, BEE, BBE, EURELECTRIC, 
EWEA, EPIA and EREF 2011).   
 
The interviewed European-level interest organizations only constitute “a part of the picture”. 
Also other interest organizations, private companies and not the least member states were also 
active in trying to affect the content of the Renewables Directive. The research interviews 
indicate that the other important actors first and foremost are key member states such as 
Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom, key people within the Commission and the 
European Parliament, and the environmental organization Greenpeace. However, since this 
study is primarily not concerned with issues of causality, no attempt will be made here to 
qualify which actors were most important in influencing the final content of the directive. 
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This also implies that there might have been other influential participants in the political 
processes that are not mentioned in this study. These observations are illustrated in table 4.  
Table 4: The different fronts in the debate at the European level 
 Pro a European certificate 
trading system 
Pro national choice of support 
mechanisms 
General Directorates 
in the Commission 
DG Enterprise 
DG Environment 
The leaders of DG Transport and 
Energy 
Other parts of DG Transport and 





Countries The United Kingdom (initially), 
Belgium, Denmark, Italy, 
Luxembourg, and Sweden 
Germany, Spain, Slovenia, 
Latvia, Poland, France and the 
United Kingdom (in the end) 
European Parliament The European Conservative and 
Reformist Group (ECR) , parts 
of The European Peoples Party 
(EPP) (the Christian Democrats)  
The Greens, the members of 





European Federation of Energy 
Traders (EFET) 
Renewable Energy Certificate 
System (RECS) 
Association of Issuing Bodies 
(AIB) 
Confederation of European 
European Renewable Energy 
Council (EREC) 
European Wind Energy 
Association (EWEA) 
European Photovoltaic Industry 
Association (EPIA) 




Business (BUSINESSEUROPE) European Biomass Association 
(AEBIOM) 
(the other industry associations 
that are EREC members) 
Other organizations  Environmental groups such as 
Greenpeace, Friends of the 
Earth, Climate Action Network, 
World Future Council, European 
Environment Bureau 
Companies The German utilities companies, 
RWE, E.ON, EnBW and 
Vattenfall, most other utilities in 
Europe, (companies that produce 
equipment for conventional 
power production) 
 
Iberdrola, the largest Spanish 
utility, (the large manufacturers 
of equipment for production of 
renewable energy) 
Sources: interviews EURELECTRIC, EREF, EWEA, EPIA, BEE, BWE 2011b, Nilsson et al (2009), Toke (2008), 
EURELECTRIC (2008b), Boasson and Wettestad (2010)   
Comments to table 4: The table shows that the political views on support mechanisms were divided 
both within the Commission, the European Parliament, the member states and to some extent also 
the utilities companies. At the same time, the renewables interest organizations at the European 
level had a broader base of support because it made a coalition with environmental interest 
organizations like Greenpeace. Some member states changed opinions during the negotiations, like 








6.0 The explanatory power of the theoretical perspectives 
 
This study analyzes the conditions for the interest organizations of the German energy 
industries’ choice of lobbying strategies, and which role resources have played. Eight 
theoretical expectations based on the liberal intergovernmentalist perspective and the multi-
level governance perspective will here be tested on the empirics. The theory testing will take 
the form of a congruence analysis, where I discuss to which extent the empirics on lobbying 
behavior are in line with the theoretical expectations that are stated in the theory chapter. The 
multi-level governance (MLG) perspective outlines that interest groups will lobby at multiple 
levels when the stakes are high. Such lobbying is also dependent of financial resources 
(Eising 2007b). Since the German energy industries are large and wealthy, their lobbying of 
the Renewables Directive constitutes a most likely case for lobbying in accordance with the 
MLG-perspective. If the core assumptions based on this perspective are not fulfilled, the 
explanatory power of this perspective for understanding EU industrial lobbying is weakened. 
Liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) underlines that states are the main actors on the 
international arena. Thus, interest groups should lobby almost exclusively there when they 
want to further their interests. Countries have used to exercise strong sovereignty in energy 
policy (Nilsson et al 2009). Hence, lobbying at the national level also constitutes a most likely 
case for the liberal intergovernmentalist perspective. Therefore, if the expectations based on 
this perspective are disconfirmed, LI’s explanatory value when applied on energy industries 
lobbying in the European Union is weakened. The expectations based on the two theoretical 
perspectives will be discussed sequentially. Finally, there will be a concluding discussion 
about the explanatory power of the two theoretical perspectives and the main findings in this 
study. 
 
6.1 The liberal intergovernmentalist perspective 
 
6.1.1 Expectation 1: Where did the German interest organizations lobby?  
 
The energy industries interest organizations lobbied the German government, but paid little attention to 




To make analytical sense, this hypothesis obviously has to be applied to the German interest 
organizations, since the European interest organizations per se have been founded to lobby the 
European Union’s institutions. This is the core expectation based on the liberal 
intergovernmentalist perspective. Therefore, if the empirical findings do not confirm it, the 
liberal intergovernmentalism has significantly weaker explanatory power for understanding 
lobbying in EUs energy policy. The expectation focuses on where and how they lobbied.  
The empirical observations show that the national level interest organizations clearly have 
directed their main lobbying efforts at political institutions in Germany (interviews BDI, 
BDEW, BBE, BEE and BWE 2011). This is natural, as all interest organizations normally 
focus on the political level where they are the closest. There they also enjoy the largest 
legitimacy because they represent a domestic constituency that the decision makers have to 
relate to (Eising 2007a, Mahoney 2007). The analysis is based on the assumption that the 
interest organization’s selection of political strategy depends on rational actor logic. Thus, 
lobbying strategies are chosen rationally to maximize benefit with the least possible costs 
(Simon 1976:38-41). However, the first expectation still seems to have low explanatory value 
when scrutinizing all the interest organizations’ lobbying routes.  
In contrast to the expectation, several findings indicate that the German interest organizations 
put high priority to lobbying also at the European level to exert influence. The main 
observations can be summed up as following: first, the interest groups all lobbied the EU 
institutions directly and/or together with other national interest organizations. Their targets 
were in particular the German members of the European Parliament (MEPs), the Committee 
on Transport, Energy and Research (ITRE) and the public officials in DG Transport and 
Energy. Using fellow nationals as “door openers” to the EU system is a typical finding in 
political research (e.g. Michelmann 1978). This finding also reflects that institutional reforms 
have given the European Parliament increased powers, which increasingly makes it an 
attractive lobbying target (Coen and Richardson 2009). This reflects Eising’s (2007b) 
argumentation: national interest organizations will lobby the European institutions in cases 
where the legislation strongly affects them, such as the Renewables Directive. Second, all 
German interest organizations lobbied the EU’s institutions indirectly through their own 
European level interest organizations (interviews BBE, BEE, BWE, BDI 2011, interview 
BDEW 2011a). This is the typical way national interest organizations defend their interests at 
the European level.  
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Also other factors indicate that the German interest organizations highlighted lobbying at the 
European level. Third, the German renewables interest organizations coordinated their 
political positions in Bundesverband Erneuerbare Energie (BEE) and with their European 
interest organizations. To achieve this, they arranged meetings to exchange information and 
arguments. As aforementioned, some of the interest organizations’ staffs were even employed 
in organizations at both levels (e.g. EREF 2010). This structural feature probably simplified 
aggregation of interests and making common political positions. Further, both at the national 
and at the European level, the renewables interest organizations also coordinated their 
political positions with informal coalition partners, in particular Greenpeace39 (interviews 
BEE, BBE, BWE, EPIA, EWEA and EREF 2011). The German utilities interest organizations 
coordinated their political positions in EURELECTRIC and BUSINESSEUROPE (interviews 
BDEW 2011a, BDI 2011). Such coordinated positions signal to decision makers that some 
political positions have broad support, and therefore increase their credibility (Mahoney 
2007). Since such coordination is resource demanding (Mahoney 2007), it is rather unlikely 
that these interest organizations would have put efforts into it if it they did not perceive policy 
making at the European level to be important for the directive. Fourth, the utilities’ German 
interest organizations BDEW and BDI have their own Brussels offices seem to have lobbied 
the EU institutions as much as they were capable of, sometimes aided by people from their 
headquarters (interviews BDI 2011, BDEW 2011a). Coen (2005:198) finds that complex 
multilevel advocacy coalitions and ad hoc interest groups have developed to a large extent as 
a response to the wants of the European institutions. These have asked for horizontal alliances 
between different groupings such as business and societal interests. Such simultaneous 
multichannel lobbying is sometimes necessary to maximize political leverage in EU decision 
making processes (Coen 2005:200). It seems that this was in particular the strategy of the 
German renewables interest organizations.  
 
What consequences do the findings have for the theories? 
Summing up, the interest organizations’ lobbying efforts were genuinely multilevel because 
they perceived the European Union’s institutions as important for the outcome of the 
negotiations. The liberal intergovernmentalist perspective in this case does not explain 
                                                 
39 According to Nilsson et al (2009:4458), some subunits of the environmental organizations disagreed with the 
environmental organizations political stance of arguing for national support mechanisms and feed-in tariffs, but 
the main picture was that they were negative to a Europe-wide green certificate system.  
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important parts of the observed lobbying behavior. Hence, LI is weakened as a tool for 
understanding industrial energy lobbying in the European Union. These findings support 
Eising’s (2004) conclusion in his large N study of interest organizations. His analyses 
(2004:227:230) show that more than a fifth of the national interest organizations40 in the 
sample have become multi-level players, which he defines as an interest organizations that are 
regularly represented at both the national and at the European level. About 30 percent of the 
German associations belonged to this group. Further, this study indicates that another of 
Eising’s (2004:230) findings is confirmed: multi-level players are more likely to be located at 
the top of systems of associations. Three of the interest organizations in the sample, BEE, 
BDI and BDEW probably qualify as multi-level players, and two of them are represented by 
their own Brussels offices. All of these are located at the top of the national systems of 
associations. Further, studies on EU lobbying should take into account the role of cooperation 
between lobbying at different levels of government. In addition, this kind of coordination and 
cooperation should also be investigated when studying causal processes such as why 
legislation like the Renewables Directive ended up in its present form. Still, the fact that 
multi-level lobbying has taken place is of course not enough to discredit the whole liberal 
intergovernmentalist perspective.  
 
6.1.2 Expectation 2: Was influencing the German government a key priority? 
 
The interests with large economic gains or losses domestically will be the most influential when 
national foreign policy is formed. Therefore, both the utilities industry, and the renewables industry put 
key priority to influencing the position of German government on the Renewables directive.  
 
This is also an important expectation based on the liberal intergovernmentalist perspective. 
The expectation is confirmed if the German interest organizations did their outmost to 
influence the German government’s political position. If this expectation is confirmed, the LI 
perspective will be strengthened. Since this study first and foremost enquires lobbying 
strategies and not causal effects, the emphasis in this analysis will be on the interest 
organizations’ lobbying efforts rather than conducting a causal analysis of which industry was 
the most influential in the end. This expectation focuses on the intensity of their lobbying. 
                                                 




Moravcsik (1993) argues that degree of economic gains and losses will affect interest 
organizations’ motivation for gaining influence. From such a perspective, organizations will 
act rationally and mobilize resources to ensure a tight coupling between goals, strategies and 
actual influence. The empirical findings indicate that both the utilities industry and the 
renewables industry’s interest organizations mobilized politically to influence the German 
government’s bargaining position. For example, they all arranged or participated in formal 
and informal meetings with the ministries in charge or renewables legislation, the Ministry of 
Environment and Ministry of Economic Affairs. Also, the organizations produced extensive 
position papers and published several press releases (interviews BEE, BBE, BWE, BDI 2011, 
BDEW 2011a). The utilities industry seemingly emphasized influencing the German 
government to a somewhat lesser extent (interviews BDEW 2011a, BDI 2011). However, it is 
difficult to know the exact extent of their engagement. On the one hand, they produced 
extensive position papers and press releases. As demonstrated in the chapter about Germany’s 
renewables policy, the utilities and their interest organizations have worked against the feed-
in tariffs for years. These findings are supported by Dagger (2009:98), who notes that the 
members of the “economic coalition” including the four large utilities and BDI worked very 
hard in favor of a European trade-based system with trade of green certificates. The “ecologic 
coalition”, in particular the German renewable power producers, was infuriated by the 
Commission’s proposal to introduce such a system41. On the other hand, the interviewees 
from the utilities’ interest organizations stated that the Renewables Directive was not a top 
priority for them (interviews BDEW 2011b, BDI 2011). 
Germany’s political positions and actions in the EU negotiations were very much in line with 
the renewable energy industry’s points of views. Further, the German government knew that 
it was essentially backed by large parts of the political parties, the environmental movement, 
and a majority in the parliament (cf. table 2 in chapter 4, Dagger 2009:99). All these 
supported the German feed-in law, and would be negative to an EU directive that would have 
put an end to it. Therefore, this outcome is in accordance with Moravcsik’s (1993:483,484) 
argumentation that to maintain their place in office, governments in democratic societies must 
have support from “a coalition of domestic voters, parties, interest groups and bureaucracies”. 
In addition, an industry with large gains and losses was probably the most influential.  
 
                                                 
41 For a description of the “economic coalition” and the “ecologic coalition”, see chapter 4. 
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What consequences do the findings have for the theories? 
The liberal intergovernmentalist perspective was to a certain extent correct in its prediction on 
this point: Both industries highlighted influencing the German negotiating position, and the 
state supported an industry with large gains and losses. Therefore, the findings support the 
liberal intergovernmentalist perspective, but, only with a qualified yes because of the utilities 
industries interest organization’ answers. Hence, the theory is somewhat strengthened when 
applied on industrial lobbying in EUs energy policy. There can be several reasons why the 
utilities interest organizations answered like they did. One might be that they put more efforts 
into lobbying other parts of EUs Climate and Energy Package. Another possibility is simply 
that their answers are inaccurate.  
 
Although Germany supported national feed-in tariffs and national support mechanisms, this 
does not need to be only because of large scale mobilization of the renewables industry. The 
German government’s motivation for its actions probably had many reasons. In contradiction 
to Moravcsik’s fairly simple economy-based model, many factors can be influential in 
shaping a country’s negotiating positions. Determining which factors are the most important 
requires close process tracing and careful causal analysis to avoid causal overdetermination 
(George and Bennett 2005). In this case, other causal factors probably include future 
economic prospects, previous policies, which parties that are in government and a country’s 
international role. The simplicity is one of the liberal intergovernmentalism’s assets, as a good 
theory should not be too complicated, and generate clear predictions. However, as is 
demonstrated here, this feature might also constitute a drawback, as it can be too unrefined 
when applied on the complexity of the real world. Such weaknesses have been demonstrated 
in the LI perspective several times before. For example, Sverdrup (1999:254, 265) studied the 
large intergovernmental treaty conferences. Even there, at the most intergovernmental of all 
EU negotiations, the outcome was affected by factors such as path dependency42. The 
complexity of the issues made communication costly and complicated. Further, the 
Europeanization of the nation state had made organizational factors at the European and 
national levels important. As Forster (1998) points out, LI therefore has to be complemented 
by other theories/models to fully explain how and why states act as they do in international 
negotiations.   
 
                                                 
42 Path dependency means that selection of one path may affect future paths (Krasner 1998). 
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6.1.3 Expectation 3: The provision of decisive information 
 
Both the interest organizations for the national renewables industry and the national utilities industry 
provided the German government with critical information, since such information can be important to 
achieve political leverage in international negotiations. 
“Critical information” is a vague concept, especially when, as her, decision makers are not 
included in the study and can state what kind of information that ultimately was the most 
important to guide their political actions. Here, critical information is defined as information 
that might be of decisive influence for the negotiating positions. If this expectation is 
confirmed, the explanatory power of liberal intergovernmentalism is strengthened, but only to 
a certain extent, since information plays a minor role in Moravcsik’s (1998) formulation of 
the theory. This expectation focuses on the content of the lobbying.   
The empirical findings indicate that both sectors’ German interest organizations provided 
information that might be categorized as “critical”. The renewables and the utilities interest 
organizations participated in all formal hearings on the Renewables Directive, and provided 
the German authorities with extensive information through written material and arguments. 
For example, BDEW, BDI, BEE and BWE produced elaborate and detailed position papers 
where they argued aggressively for their political views (BDEW 2008a, BEE 2008b, BDI 
2008 and BWE 2008b). In addition, informal coalition partners like the Greenpeace also 
supplied the German government with such information (e.g. Greenpeace Germany 2008, 
interview BEE 2011). In addition, they arranged dinner debates (“parlametarische Abende”), 
and met politicians and public officials on a row of formal and informal occasions (interviews 
2011). 
Such meetings can also be regarded as a strategy to get in position to provide “critical 
information” because they enable the conversation partners to ask following-up questions, 
clear up misunderstandings alike. The topic’s complicated nature probably made personal 
meetings and good communication skills especially relevant. Indeed, the BEE respondent 
(interview 2011) regarded such personal informal meetings as the most important means to 
get their messages across. The interest groups appreciated that the German Ministry of 
Environment was eager to keep updated. Much information was already available, because 
the Ministry of Environment and Ministry of Economic Affairs had commissioned a row of 
studies by research institutes. Therefore, the German government already had access to much 
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information (interviews BWE 2011, BDEW 2011a, Dagger 2009) and thus had the best 
preconditions for being knowledgeable about renewable energy and its implications in the EU 
negotiations. Along with this evidence, Boasson and Wettestad (2010:13) note that Germany 
was important in providing information to the other countries in the negotiations leading to 
the Renewables Directive and that this probably influenced its final content. Of course, 
information having an impact on the end result is per definition critical.  
There are several reasons why the renewables industry’s interest organizations seemingly 
managed to provide crucial information. They focused on some main points, some people and 
provided pointed arguments (interview BEE 2011). Their pooling of resources and 
coordinating of political positions probably enhanced the quality and impact of their 
argumentation. The same seems not to be true to the same extent about the utilities’ interest 
organizations BDI and BDEW, since they had somewhat diverging positions on green 
certificates. The renewables interest organizations were aided by the fact that they had good 
access to the Ministry of Environment (interviews BEE and BWE 2011). Thus, institutional 
factors enhanced their impact.  
 
As described in the theory chapter, Moravcsik’s model outlines that the only influential 
entrepreneurs in international negotiations are national governments and national interests. 
Still, the fact that the national renewables industry provided crucial information does not 
mean that their and Germany’s political entrepreneurship were the only that was decisive in 
the end. For example, our observations indicate that there was a lot of lobbying at the 
European level. The information that was conveyed there might have had a larger impact than 
what national organizations provided (interviews EWEA, EREF, EPIA and EURELECTRIC 
2011). Therefore, without interviewing the “targets” of the lobbying at the national and the 
European level, it is impossible to know which of the actor’s information that really was 
critical. Further, Moravcsik (1998) leaves out “supranational entrepreneurs”, like European 
level interest organizations and EU institutions like the European Parliament. Findings in this 
and other studies like Toke (2008) and Nilsson et al (2009) emphasize the importance of such 
European-level entrepreneurship. For example, the rapporteur Claude Turmes and some other 
members of the European Forum for Renewable Energy Sources (EUFORES) are regarded as 
playing key roles for the outcome (interviews BEE, EREF and EPIA 2011). Therefore, such 
European-level entrepreneurs also have to be taken into account when assessing influence and 




What consequences do the findings have for the theories? 
It seems that the liberal intergovernmentalist perspective is correct in its emphasis on 
eager/proactive governments and national interest groups’ provision of critical information in 
international negotiations. In this regard, the explanatory power of LI is somewhat 
strengthened, but it should be noted that the data are consistent with several other, competing, 
hypotheses too. The German government and the interest groups were both keen to influence 
the content of the Commission’s policy proposals. Therefore, they may both be called “policy 
entrepreneurs”. The findings indicate that agile national interest organizations contributed 
crucial information to governments participating in international negotiations. However, these 
findings are based on indications. Moravcsik’s theory is very hard to test because such 
assessments require extensive process tracing including in depth interviews (correctly 
answered) with key people in the national governments and ministries to be confirmed or 
disconfirmed. The German renewables interest organizations and the German government 
were not alone in acting as political entrepreneurs. Empirical observations and earlier research 
indicate that entrepreneurs at the European level and their provision of information were 
probably also crucial for the outcome of the Renewables Directive. In summary, therefore, the 
liberal intergovernmentalist perspective has not shown high predictive power with regards to 
which groups would be playing key roles in European negotiations.  
 
6.1.4 Expectation 4: Resources as a conditioning factor for national lobbying 
 
The interest groups with the largest material resources will be able to use all venues of access to 
German politicians, while interest groups with lesser resources will lobby fewer channels. Therefore, 
the interest organizations for the utilities industry worked towards more different political channels than 
the interest organizations for the renewables industry. 
This expectation is not directly based on the liberal-intergovernmentalist perspective. 
Therefore, a confirmation or refutation of it will neither serve to strengthen nor to weaken it. 
Resources here is first and foremost measured in terms of manpower, e.g. how many 
employees the organizations have, and further how many of these employees that have 
worked on the Renewables Directive. This expectation focuses on the number of national 
lobbying routes.   
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The two largest organizations in the sample in terms of personnel resources are BDEW and 
BDI. The findings show that the interest organizations for the utilities, BDEW and BDI 
mainly lobbied the Ministry of Environment and their longtime ally, the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs. In addition, they sent out press releases (interviews BDEW 2011a and BDI 
2011). Of course, it is possible that the interviewees from the utilities industry did not 
mention all the lobbying channels that their organizations used43. In addition, BDI (interview 
2011) did not regard the German parliament, political parties or other institutions as important 
in this case, since they were not directly involved in the political negotiations. A third factor 
that might have constrained how many lobbying channels they used was that these 
organizations probably also had much of their personnel resources tied up to the negotiations 
leading to the EU ETS directive. Both expressed that their resources for lobbying the 
Renewables Directive were limited (interviews BDI 2011, BDEW 2011b). Such 
administrative capacity influences the opportunity to exert influence in political processes. An 
organization has to put priority to some areas and overlook others (Cyert and March 
1963:124, Egeberg and Trondal 2009:674). Thus, when capacity probably at least to some 
extent was limited, this might also result in less political influence. Bouwen (2002:366) 
underlines that when lobbying groups gain access to political institutions, this does not 
necessarily imply that they also will be influential. This is demonstrated here; For example, 
the utilities interest organizations lobbied the Ministry of Environment, but with little effect 
(interview BDI 2011).  
Despite the renewable industries interest organizations’ smaller sizes in terms of personnel 
and money, they seemingly lobbied more political channels at the national level, than the 
utilities industry. For example, they also lobbied political parties, members of the German 
parliament and environmental organizations (interviews BEE, BBE, BWE and BDI 2011). 
This heavy mobilization is probably related to the fact that much was at stake for them. The 
interviews (BEE and BEE 2011) indicate that the renewables industry also had access to more 
decision makers than otherwise because it was supported by the environmental movement in 
Germany, as well as sympathizing politicians from the different parties. Thus, collaboration 
gave them new points of access to the political processes and enhanced their personnel 
resources. Informal coalitions may increase the leverage of interest groups because they signal 
to policy makers that a varied group of actors have similar interests. In addition, a coalition 
signals that the interest groups have worked out and aligned different positions (Mahoney 
                                                 
43 For further information, see chapter 3.  
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2007). Here, the renewables industry’s interest organizations had to forge a common position 
regarding political views on controversial types of bioenergy in order to achieve the 
environmental organizations’ support (interviews BEE and BBE 2011). Cooperation can 
make the individual groups more influential because of the synergetic effect of pooling 
resources, such as dividing the lobbying work among them (Mahoney 2007). This also seems 
to be the case at least to some extent for the renewables interest organizations. Weber and 
Khademian (2008) highlight the role of networks for solving complex problems44. Here, it 
seems that the Ministry of Environment, environmental organizations and renewables 
industry seemingly already had a network (interviews BEE and BWE, Jacobsson and Lauber 
2006). This probably also increased their number of access points to the political processes.  
 
What consequences do the findings have for the theories?  
It seems that in this case, the number of lobbying channels at the German level has no direct 
relationship to the amount of resources in terms of personnel and money that the interest 
organizations individually possessed. Rather, the number of channels that the interest 
organizations used at the German level was affected by the ability to make a broad coalition 
with other industry interest organizations, environmental organizations and finding allies 
within all political parties. In addition, the number of routes was directly connected to their 
level of mobilization, which again was caused by how much was at stake in the directive 
proposal. Resources still seem to have had an impact on lobbying in several ways. First, the 
cheapest ways of lobbying, personal meetings, was seemingly conducted the most frequently 
by all the industry interest organizations. Second, they clearly spent their efforts where it 
would be the most efficient, and did not lobby everywhere. The effects of pooling of 
resources and coordination of political positions were large in this study, and at least in 
similar situations, they should be taken into account in future research on interest 
organizations. In addition, networking literature might contribute to alternative analytical 
tools for understanding how governance challenges of complex cases are solved.  
 
 
                                                 
44 Networks are defined as “enduring exchange relations established between organizations, individuals, and 
groups” (Weber and Khademian 2008:334). 
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6.2 The multi-level governance perspective 
 
6.2.1 Expectation 5: Genuine multi-level lobbyism in the European Union 
 
The industries’ national and European interest organizations lobbied the Commission, the European 
Parliament, the Council of Ministers and the German government intensively.   
This expectation concerns the whole sample, since in theory all interest organizations could 
conduct multi-level lobbying. This is the most important expectation based on the multi-level 
governance perspective. Therefore, if this expectation is met, the MLG-perspective applied on 
industrial lobbying in EUs energy policy is strengthened, and if not, it is weakened.  
As aforementioned, the findings indicate that at the national level, interest organizations 
conducted multi-level lobbying regardless of size and resource base in terms of money and 
number of personnel, and whether or not they had their own European office. Both the 
German government and EUs main institutions were important lobbying targets (interviews 
BDI, BEE, BBE, BWE 2011, and BDEW 2011b). These observations are described in more 
detail under expectation 1 and 2. During the work with the directive the renewables interest 
organizations built new contacts and improved existing ones both at the European, and the 
national level. In addition, they established contacts between the different national renewables 
industry interest organizations (interviews BEE and BWE 2011b). Such multi-level 
networking may be very useful as a tool for increasing political leverage (e.g. Mahoney 
2007).  
The European-level interest organizations lobbied the European institutions intensively, as 
expected. Their targets were in particular DG Transport and Energy (DG Tren) in the 
Commission and Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) in the European 
Parliament. They were closely monitoring the political processes and arranged meetings with 
people at different political levels, ranging from the Commission’s leader Barroso to the 
public servants who drafted the directive proposals (interviews BEE, EREF, EPIA, EWEA 
and EURELECTRIC 2011). As expected, (see e.g. Coen 2007), the Commission and the 
European Parliament were the European institutions most frequently targeted by all interest 
groups in the sample. Their relations to these institutions were far from new, which probably 
enhanced their access to the political processes. In particular, the renewables industry has a 
good long-time relationship to the European Forum for Renewable Energy Sources 
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(EUFORES). The lobbying of the European Parliament reflects its increased authorities and 
that it is regarded as EUs “greenest institution”. The Council, on the other hand, is known to 
be harder to access (e.g. Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006). This also seems to be reflected 
here. Some of the interviewees mentioned the Council as a lobbying target, but the interest 
organizations seem to have put more efforts into influencing the two other major political 
institutions (interviews EWEA, EREF, EPIA 2011). However, this does of course not indicate 
that they did not lobby the Council, only that they told more about, and possibly focused more 
on, lobbying other European institutions. This lobbying strategy and its execution 
demonstrates good insight into EUs political processes, similar to what Coen and Richardson 
(2009) describes as typical for industrial lobbyists in the European Union.   
The multilevel governance perspective does theoretically not only outline “uploading” of 
influence and targeted lobbying behavior at different political levels, but also “downloading” 
to lower levels of governance. For example, the Commission can potentially use national-
level interest organizations to introduce and legitimize policies within the member states (e.g. 
Eikeland 2008). The observations indicate such “downloading” in three cases. First, the 
European interest organizations lobbied at the national level by meeting governments and 
permanent representations they regarded as important, like the German, Spanish and French 
(interviews EURELECTRIC, EPIA, EWEA and EREF 2011). In addition, coalition partner 
Greenpeace lobbied member states’ governments (e.g. House of Lords 2008). Second, the 
European Wind Energy Association (EWEA) assisted the Bundesverband Windenergie 
(BWE) both economically and through knowledge transfer (interview EWEA 2011). Third, 
EURELECTRIC depends on its members to disseminate the common political positions that 
are agreed upon within its committees (interview EURELECTRIC 2011).  
 
What consequences do the findings have for the theories?  
Hooghe and Mark’s theoretical perspective seems to fit well with the observed lobbying 
behavior. The explanatory potential of this theoretical perspective when applied on industrial 
lobbying in EUs energy policy is therefore confirmed. The observations unequivocally 
confirm the expectations both regarding the lobbying behavior of the national interest 
organizations and the European level interest organizations. Clearly, the interest organizations 
do perceive, and more importantly relate to, the European Union as a genuine multilevel 
system. Consequently they lobby both at the national and at the European level in order to 
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achieve their lobbying targets when much is at stake. One finding in this context regards a 
phenomenon that has been little commented upon in EU lobbying literature: National interest 
organizations can create networks with each other to enhance political leverage and create 
trust. Such networks should be further explored in future research.   
 
6.2.2 Expectation 6: By-passing the German government? 
 
The German utilities industry’s national interest organizations and its affiliates should lobby extra 
much on the European-level in order to attempt to bypass national politicians, who supported a system 
that would allow national feed-in tariffs.    
This expectation only applies to BDI and BDEW since they are the national representatives of 
the German utilities in the sample. BDEW is the most important organization of the two, 
since it is the energy industry’s main interest organization. On the other hand, BDI had 
important reasons for lobbying, since it also represents the industrial customers of the energy 
producers and net owners. Therefore, their members are very affected by the electricity prices. 
If the expectation is not clearly confirmed, this does not necessarily mean that the explanatory 
value of MLG-perspective is weakened, because according to the perspective it is likely, not a 
necessity that interest groups who have lost domestically will lobby more at the European 
level. Here I use lobbying more than normally as a simple operationalization of “lobbying 
extra much”. 
Both BDEW and BDI participated in European-level interest organizations in addition to 
having their own offices in Brussels to handle European affairs. Similar to the renewables 
industry’s interest organizations, they met decision makers and public officials on several 
formal and informal occasions. Neither the BDEW nor BDI representatives expressed that 
they lobbied to by-pass national political positions. Rather they gave the impression that their 
political work with the Renewables directive was a part of the “normal lobbying procedures” 
(interviews BDI 2011, BDEW 2011b). However, since the topic is sensitive for them, it might 
be that they did not want to tell about such strategies. Still, both produced long and detailed 
position papers. Production such material demands personnel resources. Therefore, despite 
the fact that both BDI and BDEW qualify as multi-level players, they seemingly did not 
exploit this fact here. These organizations maintained that the resources available for such 
lobbying were rather limited (interviews BDI 2011, BDEW 2011b). Unfortunately, these 
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observations do not constitute unambiguous findings because the information about the 
intensity of lobbying at the European level is incomplete. The organizations’ largest members, 
the utilities, at least lobbied intensively at the European level (E.ON 2008b, Toke 2008, 
Nilsson et al 2009).   
In contrast, BDEWs umbrella organization EURELECTRIC did everything it possibly could 
to influence the content of the Renewables Directive, and had about three people working full 
time on it in the critical phases (interview EURELECTRIC 2011). According to Toke (2008), 
EURELECTRIC’s continual push for a trade-based scheme with certificates was a 
contributing factor to the Commission’s initial proposal for a trade-based system both in 2001 
and in 2007. Thus, there is a chance that BDEW exerted pressure on the European level 
through its umbrella organization. However, the only indication that this might have been the 
case is that BDEW was very important in formulating EURELECTRIC’s policies45 , but this 
should be expected from a major member in any case (interview EURELECTRIC 2011).    
 
What consequences to the findings have for the theories?  
The study lacks enough observations to disconfirm the expectation that multilevel strategies 
were employed directly by the German interest organizations specifically to bypass national 
politicians, although the multi-level governance perspective outlines that this a likely and 
rational strategy for wealthy interest groups in particular. Therefore, the MLG-perspective is 
neither strengthened nor weakened. Lack of evidence to support the expectation does not 
preclude the use of such strategies by interest groups to increase their influence in matters 
where they “have lost” at the national level. In fact, the employment of such strategies might 
very well be considered a sensitive theme by the actual interest organizations, making explicit 
confirmations harder to obtain. Furthermore, such strategies could well have been used by the 
large German utilities, such as E.ON and RWE as elements in concerted action. 
Consequently, these observations cannot be generalized to industrial lobbying in EUs energy 
policy in general.    
                                                 
45 A comparison of data about frequency of meetings, levels of resources employed, meeting documents 
where and possible extra funding of its European level umbrella organizations where political activity to 
influence the Renewables Directive is compared to other important pieces of EU legislation could possibly 
reveal if more lobbying at the EU level was done in this case than on other issues. Unfortunately, I have no 




6.2.3 Expectation 7: influencing EU through provision of information 
 
The energy industries’ interest organizations tried to influence policymaking in EU through 
accumulating and providing knowledge that the EU officials needed, in addition to cooperating with 
other organizations for joint production of background information.  
 
The multi-level governance perspective highlights how a row of different actors participate in 
decision making processes at different levels of government. One way of relevant 
participation at the European level is through providing necessary information. Since EU 
decision makers are not interviewed in this study, “information needed” will rather be 
interpreted as information that would enable the policy makers to make qualified decisions 
such as well-founded discussions of the different support mechanisms. If the interest groups 
not actively have accumulated and provided knowledge, this theoretical perspective is 
weakened. The expectation applies to all organizations in the sample.  
Both the renewables industry’s interest organizations and the utilities industry’s interest 
organizations clearly provided the relevant bodies in the Commission, the European 
Parliament and the Council with different types of potentially critical information. Also 
coalition partners like Greenpeace provided such information (Greenpeace/EREC 2007 and 
2008). Examples of this are the EREF price report and the Pöyry study commissioned by 
EURELECTRIC (interviews EREF, EURELECTRIC 2011). The information was conveyed 
through channels such as personal conversations, workshops, dinner debates, and different 
types of written material. On the other hand, the interest organizations also needed the EU 
officials and politicians, for example to keep track of the recent political developments, get 
recommendations and not the least influence the draft proposals. Similar to the situation at the 
national level, the initiative for these personal meetings could be made both by the EU 
officials and the interest organizations. This illustrates how keen EUs public officials can be 
to keep updated in key political issues (interviews BEE, EREF, EWEA, EPIA and 
EURELECTRIC 2011). Such interaction has already been commented on in earlier research. 
As Bouwen (2004: 339) notes: “It needs to be recognized that the EU institutions are eager to 
interact because they need close contacts with the private sector in order to fulfill their 




The topics’ pronounced complexity and salience made politicians and decision makers turn 
towards interest organizations to get knowledge on the field (interviews BEE, EWEA 2011, 
Nilsson et al 2009). This is in line with earlier findings about the Commission, such as Coen 
(2007). He notes that the Commission emphasizes building long-time relationships with 
interest groups “based on consistency for information exchanges, wide consultation and 
conciliatory actions” (Coen 2007:335). Much lobbying literature describes the salient 
resource dependency between the Commission and interests such as interest organizations. 
For example Eising (2007b) found that the Commission treats businesses and their interest 
groups as regulatory interlocutors. This also seems to be the case here, which implies that the 
findings are in line with earlier research. For example, the main goal of the information 
provision was to convince policy makers, and therefore they had to give them good arguments 
(interview BEE 2011).  
 
A significant part of the information was produced jointly. At the national level, the 
renewables interest organizations cooperated in Arbeitsgruppe Europa in Bundesverband 
Erneuerbare Energie (BEE), where they produced joint papers. These were also given to the 
decision makers in the European Parliament and the Commission. At the European level, the 
renewables interest organizations cooperated in EREC, where they for example produced 
common position papers and press releases in addition to coordinating their strategies. 
Informal coalition partners like Greenpeace in particular also provided information 
(interviews BEE, EREF, EWEA and EPIA 2011). It seems that this pooling of resources 
enabled the renewables interest organizations in particular to provide more and better 
information to decision makers than what otherwise would be the case. BDEW and BDI both 
provided the relevant European bodies information (interviews BDEW 2011b, BDI 2011). At 
the European level, EURELECTRIC supplied the EU institutions with different kinds of 
information, and produced a common position paper with Renewable Energy Certificate 
System (RECS) and European Federation of Electricity Traders (EFET). However, this was 
no formal alliance (interview EURELECTRIC 2011).  
  
Which consequences does this have for the theories? 
Expectation 7 is confirmed to the fullest. All the interest organizations put priority to 
providing high quality information alone and together with other organizations that the 
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European institutions needed. Therefore, the MLG-perspective is strengthened, but also in this 
case, several competing hypotheses could yield the same expectations. Public officials in the 
Commission were eager to meet the interest organizations. This confirms the general insights 
about the resource dependency of the Commission in particular when drafting proposals for 
legislation. The fact that all German interest organizations also were active in providing this 
kind of information at the European level offers unambiguous support of the multi-level 
governance perspective. The European level interest organizations for both the renewables 
and the utilities industry clearly had strong political stances and coordinated their political 
positions with their allies. Thus, earlier research portraying Euro federations as weak “paper 
tigers” who have problems aggregating political views because of their heterogeneous 
membership (see for example Pijnenburg 1998 and Eising 2007b) does not seem to be 
applicable to this case. On the other hand, provision of information in itself does of course not 
say something about the impact of this knowledge. As noted in 6.1.3, such assessments 
require more elaborate methodology, for instance in depth interviews of the “receivers”, the 
relevant decision makers.  
 
 
6.2.4 Expectation 8: Resources decide in the European Union 
 
The political strategies that the energy industries’ interest organizations choose are affected by their 
levels of resources. The wealthier the interest groups, the more different lobbying venues, and the more 
intense lobbying they will pursue at the European level. 
This expectation applies to the whole sample, since all interest organizations directly or 
indirectly represent the German industries. This expectation is not directly based on the multi-
level governance perspective. Therefore, the findings will neither strengthen nor weaken the 
MLG perspective when it is applied on industrial lobbying. In this context, resources are 
mostly measured in terms of manpower, e.g. how many employees the organizations have, 
and how many of them were occupied/involved with the Renewables Directive.    
The German interest organizations for the utilities industry, BDI and BDEW, both have their 
own European offices in Brussels. At least in theory, this should improve their capability of 
lobbying the European institutions directly, and therefore also increase their number of 
available lobbying routes. As aforementioned, I unfortunately obtained relatively little 
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information about the operations in these offices, apart from them doing the “normal lobbying 
work” such as making parliamentary evenings, and meeting people in the Commission, the 
European Parliament and the Council. Since BDI only had two employees on the renewables 
topic in Brussels, they concentrated their efforts on the decision makers who were the most 
likely to support their case. BDEW had one person working on renewable energy in Brussels 
and one working on it part time in Berlin. Despite their smaller sizes, the German renewables 
interest organizations lobbied the same channels at the European level as the utilities’. As 
expected, however, to a certain extent they lobbied different people, since all tended to have 
more contact with the people who were friendly to their political views (interviews BDEW 
2011a, 2011b, BDI, BEE, BBE, and BWE 2011). This feature is typical; when interest 
organizations have limited resources, then they have to concentrate their efforts on the places 
where the chance of success is the highest.   
Resources were important for the European level organizations both for lobbying intensity 
and number of political channels. The largest renewables interest organization in terms of 
staff, EWEA, followed the political processes very closely and met with more people than for 
example the smaller EPIA. While EPIA concentrated on friendly-minded people for example 
within the European Parliament, EWEA lobbied both their “friends and foes”. In addition, 
EWEA was the only organization which also had a political campaign aimed at decision 
makers to influence the content of the renewables directive (interviews EWEA, EPIA, EREF 
and EURELECTRIC 2011). The European renewables interest organizations managed to 
enhance their level of personnel resources efficiently by coordinating their actions with 
environmental interest organizations such as Greenpeace and private companies such as wind 
energy equipment manufacturers (interview BWE 2011b). Greenpeace had at least one person 
who worked on campaigning for renewable energy (e.g. House of Lords 2008, Greenpeace 
European Union 2008b). The findings are in line with the theoretical expectation as well as 
earlier research. For example Eising (2007c:356) underlines that “Well-endowed associations 
have much better access than poor associations, underscoring that EU lobbying needs 
substantial material backing”.  
The empirics on lobbying at the European level also show another clear pattern; Number of 
political channels employed was not only influenced by level of resources, but also by degree 
of political mobilization and political skills and knowledge in the organization. The more 
important the Renewables Directive was for the organizations, the more they mobilized. For 
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example, even EREF with only two employees lobbied a variety of different actors at the 
European and national level (interview EREF 2011). EPIA underlined that its political skills 
had been vastly enhanced the last years (interview EPIA 2011). One of the ways the interest 
organizations enhance their level of political insight is employing people with background 
from politics, such assistants of parliamentarians in the German Parliament and the European 
Parliament (interviews BWE and EPIA 2011). Through their coalition partners, like 
Greenpeace, the European renewables interest organizations probably got access to more 
channels and could conduct more intensive lobbying. This might also have been the case for 
EURELECTRIC, but here the findings are more uncertain. Mahoney (2007) notes that 
European federations might prefer lobbying alone rather than finding coalition partners 
because they already represent a large group of actors. These findings are in line with Eising’s 
(2005:2) comment, that “economic clout, the financial resources and the expertise of interest 
groups as well as their political mobilization when they face of EU regulation” is typical for 
EU interest mediation.   
Eising (2007a:210) also notes: “generally, EU associations have fewer resources than their 
national members, and as a consequence their sizes are much smaller”. In contrast, this does 
not seem to be the case here. For example, EWEA in fact empowered its national members 
with arguments and money. This finding is example of a development where growing 
industries dependent on stable and predictable conditions set up increasingly larger interest 
organizations both at the national and at the European level. The difference in sizes and 
personnel resources between national interest organizations and their Euro groups might be 
decreasing. At least, this seems to be the case for the energy industries.  
 
What consequences to the findings have for the theories?  
The observations confirm the resources’ role for number of lobbying channels and lobbying 
intensity. It seems that there was an association between available resources and the amount 
of lobbying channels used both by the utilities industry’s interest organizations and the 
renewable industry’s at the European level. In addition, level of mobilization and political 
skill and knowledge influenced the lobbying activity. The renewables interest organizations in 
particular managed to enhance its level of resources considerably by cooperating with 
environmental interest organizations like Greenpeace and private businesses. This is quite in 
line with what Eising (2005) found in his large N study of interest groups at the European 
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level. There was however, not a clear connection between the national interest organizations’ 
level of resources and their number of lobbying channels at the European level. The 
difference between the energy industries national and European interest groups in terms of 
sizes and resources seems to be decreasing,  
 
 
6.3 Discussion about the two theoretical perspectives’ explanatory value 
 
From the preceding discussion, it should be clear that while both perspectives have 
explanatory value. However, the liberal intergovernmentalist (LI) perspective fails in 
capturing essential features in the dynamics of functioning of the EU system in the 
renewables directive case. This can by no means be attributed to the theme being unsuited for 
this perspective. On the contrary, the renewables development in EU has in several important 
respects morphed into a portfolio of rather diverse national projects: An eminent example of 
policies for a “Europe of the national states”. Arguably, the directive ended up making the 
states the ultimate decision makers, seemingly fitting perfectly in Moravcsik’s conceptual 
framework. But as we have seen, the process of getting there, which is the focus of this study, 
is not that well described by LI. 
The multi-level governance (MLG) perspective seems to capture many aspects of the 
dynamics of the situation fairly well. There is a kind of asymmetry between the perspectives 
in that, while LI doesn't have much to say about internal relationships on the EU level, MLG 
easily copes with situations where power is transferred upwards and downwards in the 
hierarchy. One may say that if the national states choose to give up power to union level 
organs, like the European Central Bank, the LI perspective might not be able to easily follow 
suit to account for the new dynamics created. While MLG, on the other hand, has not built in 
any assumptions about power transfer having any preferred direction. 
A theory testing case study will normally only strengthen or weaken the explanatory power of 
a theory, or specify its scope conditions. Here, the empirical findings strengthen the MLG-
perspective because its main assumption gets full support. In contrast, the LI-perspective is 
weakened because its main theoretical expectation low explanatory power on understanding 
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the German interest organizations’ lobbying behavior. As expected by both theoretical 
perspectives, the German interest organizations focused most on the German level.   
 
6.3.1 The liberal intergovernmentalist perspective  
Some of the basic assumptions about the functioning of national states underlying the LI 
perspective seem to be confirmed in this study, and therefore it is still to some extent useful. 
For example, the national interest groups still mainly focused on lobbying their own 
government. But whenever the initiatives of the Commission and the autonomous and 
expanding competence of the European Parliament play decisive roles, LI seems less relevant. 
For example, it maintains that the only important political entrepreneurs in international 
negotiations are governments and national interest groups. The empirical findings here, in 
contrast, point out the importance of European entrepreneurship, such as that conducted by 
the second rapporteur Claude Turmes and other members of EUFORES, as well as European 
interest organizations.  
 
6.3.2 The multi-level governance perspective 
What are the main limitations the multi-level governance (MLG) perspective has shown in the 
confrontation with the current data? We have seen that on the whole, the perspective fits quite 
well. In particular, the perspective is confirmed by the fact that the national interest 
organizations emphasized lobbying the European institutions, and that they created informal 
multi-level coalitions. Being a less developed theory than LI while encompassing an arguably 
larger field, it is only to be expected that it is not able to capture some of the dynamics 
between the different levels. As illustrated by expectation 6, it may have a tendency to default 









7.1 Summing up the study 
This study has aimed at enquiring lobbyism in relation to the EU conducted by the German 
energy industries’ interest organizations. It scrutinizes the institutional conditions for choice 
of choice of lobbying strategies, where the independent variables are the institutional 
structures according to Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism or Hooghe and Marks’ 
multi-level governance perspective. In addition, the study investigates the role of resources 
for choice of lobbying strategy. Few studies have enquired multi-level lobbying in EU in a 
theory testing case study before. Further, few studies have scrutinized the political processes 
leading to the Renewables Directive, and no studies to my knowledge have enquired the 
reasons for choice of lobbying strategies and the role of the German interest organizations in 
this European legislation46. The design is a theory testing most likely case design. The study 
outlines altogether eight expectations based on the two theoretical perspectives and literature 
about European Union lobbying. Further, these expectations are tested on how the German 
energy industries’ interest organizations have lobbied at the national and at the European level 
to influence the Renewables Directive. The congruence method/pattern matching has been 
used to evaluate to which extent the findings accord with the theoretical expectations. 
Moreover, the study discusses these results and which theoretical implications that has. The 
research questions are: 
1) Which lobbying strategies have the interest organizations of the German energy industries used to 
influence EU legislation as it is formulated in the Renewables Directive?  
2) Under what conditions do they use these strategies? Which role has resources played for choice of 
political level and the intensity of lobbying?  
Several methods have been used to obtain as accurate empirics as possible, such as in depth 
research interviews, and using available material from several written sources in order to 
conduct process tracing. To enhance validity, as much of the data as possible was tested 
against other data such as research articles. In addition, the interviews were taped and 
                                                 
46 The role of German interest organizations’ lobbying on German renewable energy legislation has on the 
other hand been enquired several times before, for example by Dagger (2009), Lauber and Mez (2004) and 
Jacobsson and Lauber (2006).  
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transcribed. Moreover, the respondents read through the presentations of their organizations 
afterwards and commented on them.  
 
7.2 The explanatory power of the liberal intergovernmentalist perspective  
The liberal intergovernmentalist perspective was only supported by some of the findings. 
Altogether, this perspective seems rather insufficient to explain interest organizations’ actual 
lobbying behavior in the European Union as well as their understanding of decision making 
processes there. First of all, all the interviewed interest organizations showed by a variety of 
means that they emphasized lobbying the European institutions. For example, all of the 
national level interest organizations lobbied the European Commission and the European 
Parliament directly themselves. Furthermore, the investigated interest organizations at both 
political levels cooperated and coordinated their political positions and strategies to increase 
their political leverage. Hence, the findings unequivocally indicate that they regard decision 
making in the European Union as something more than decisions based on negotiations by 
sovereign states in the Council of minister or the European Council. Rather, they lobby in a 
multi-level governance system when EU decisions are very important for them. Otherwise, 
only lobbying towards decision makers at the national level(s) would be rational. This finding 
is in line with earlier research, such as Eising (2004:212), who finds that “the concept of 
multi-level governance captures the essence of interest intermediation in EU best.”  
On the other hand, another prediction was fulfilled, that the interest organizations would all 
put top priority to influencing the position of the German government. Moravcsik has 
emphasized provision of crucial information as a means of exerting political influence in 
international negotiations. Both industries at least to some extent provided such information. 
Still, it is hard to estimate the real effect of this information, as the German authorities had 
access to very much information already. For example, the fact that department in charge of 
renewables policy, the Ministry of Environment was much more eager to listen to the 
renewables industry than the utilities industry, provided the renewables industry better access 
to decision makers and public officials. The expectation about resources is not directly 
connected to the liberal intergovernmentalist perspective. At the national level, there was no 
clear link between how many personnel resources each organization possessed and their 
number of lobbying routes. The number of lobbying routes rather seemed to depend on other 
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factors such as ability to create coalitions and pool resources with other organizations. 
Summing up, the liberal intergovernmentalist perspective only carried some explanatory 
power in predicting the interest groups lobbying behavior. 
 
7.3 The explanatory power of the multi-level governance perspective 
The multi-level governance perspective was supported by most of the empirical findings. 
First, as aforementioned, all interest organizations, regardless of which political level they 
mainly operated at, put priority to influencing the European Institutions. There was a clear 
sharing of work between the organizations at the two levels, as expected in the multi-level 
governance perspective and also typically seen in lobbying literature (Eising 2004). Still, 
national level organizations lobbied at the European level and European level organizations 
lobbied at the national levels. The German interest organizations had three main lobbying 
routes: either towards their own government alone or in coalition, directly voicing their views 
in the European institutions, or through a European level interest organization.  
However, one likely theoretical opportunity, that the utilities interest organizations would 
lobby extra much at the European level was neither confirmed nor disconfirmed because of 
lacking data. As expected, resource dependency constituted an opportunity for the interest 
organizations to meet public officials in the Commission. Thus, the interest organizations 
created and accumulated information that the decision makers and public servants could use, 
and had frequent meetings with them. The European Parliament was also in need for 
information in this case, whereas the interest organizations needed political support. 
Therefore, resource dependency also seems to be an appropriate way of understanding contact 
between the European Parliament and the interest organizations. At the European level, there 
was a clearer link between level of resources, lobbying routes and intensity of lobbying. In 
particular, the largest interest organization conduced more intensive lobbying by using more 
channels and meeting more people than the smallest interest organization in the sample. Also 
here, degree of political mobilization and ability to create coalitions with other interest groups 
seems to be influential for their total amount of political leverage. Summing up, the multi-
level governance perspective, although somewhat vaguely formulated, have produced the 
most accurate predictions about how lobbying behavior would take place.   
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7.4 Analytical implications 
The results in this study have more analytical implications. The interest organizations clearly 
perceive the European Union as a multi-level system and act thereafter when EU legislation is 
important for them. Therefore, they lobby accordingly by creating the most appropriate multi-
level strategies and participating in coalitions that span over more political levels. Work-
sharing between national and European associations here simply describes where they put in 
their main efforts. In this case, all the national associations lobbied at the European level and 
vice versa: the European associations lobbied the national levels (the permanent 
representations in particular). Thus, research on industrial lobbying in the future should take 
this into account and enquire multi-level lobbying strategies where it is reasonable to expect 
that this happens, rather than focusing on either the national or the international level.  
By pooling resources, especially the renewables industry’s interest organizations shared and 
coordinated information, contacts and political positions efficiently. In addition, they 
managed to create broad coalitions. Further, this enabled them to lobby more intensively and 
make use of more lobbying channels than otherwise would be the case. Therefore the decision 
makers both in Germany and at the European level met a unified and coordinated group of 
lobbyists. The benefits of such networking has been investigated and underlined several times 
before (see for example Mahoney 2007 and Sabatier 1988). Still, as the European Union 
develops steadily more state like features, such coordinated lobbying should be the subject to 
more research attention, as it probably happens to an increasing extent. In contradiction to the 
findings of for example Mahoney (2007), the empirics do not indicate that the smallest 
organizations rather choose to lobby alone than participating in coalitions because such 
cooperation demands resources.   
The lobbying strategies that have been investigated reflect that the European institutions to an 
increasing extent have an independent role in the policy making processes. However, the 
member states have been and are still important, as Hooghe and Marks (2001) also underline. 
For example, in this case the renewables organizations’ lobbying probably had not been as 
efficient had they not been joined by key member states such as Germany and Spain. This 
study underlines the importance of the interest organization’s expert knowledge: they 
contributed with high quality information in this highly complex case both in Germany and at 
the European level. Thus, the emphasis on expert/critical knowledge in itself is nothing that is 
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particular for either of the two theoretical perspectives. Such knowledge might play a key role 
when policies are formulated in very complex issues at all political levels.  
  
7.5 Proposals for further research 
 
I would like to formulate proposals for further research, and I focus on three topics:  
 
A first research topic may be connected to The Renewables Directive and Sabatier’s advocacy 
coalition theory. Relevant research questions may be these: Is it possible to identify long time 
cooperation patterns between the actors that cooperated here? If so, in how does this affect 
policy outcomes over time? How are these coalitions organized? Previous studies have only 
investigated which coalitions that were made in connection to this directive. However, for 
example Greenpeace has cooperated with the renewables industry’s interest organizations for 
long while. 
 
A second research topic may be connected to multi-level lobbing strategies. Relevant research 
questions may be these: How often is this made, what is the reason for why they choose or not 
choose to lobby at multiple levels? To which extent is it normal that national and European 
level interest organizations coordinate their political positions and lobbying strategies?  
 
A third research topic may be connected to success or failure of various interest organizations. 
Relevant research questions may be these: Often, European level interest organizations have 
been portrayed as weak, and not being able to aggregate positions in a good way. Why do 
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9.1 List of translated quotes 
 
Interview with Bundesverband BioEnergie  
“[…] Bioenergie ist eigentlich die tragende Säule im Mix der erneuerbaren Energien.“ 
 
Interview with Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie  
“Und wir finden dass diese unterschiedlichen Systeme in Europa und der mangelnde Austausch… also 
der fehlende Handel führt dazu dass die erneuerbaren Energien dort produzieren, dort herstellen wo die 
meisten Subventionen gezahlt wird, und nicht dort wo die besten Voraussetzungen sind. Also, warum 
muss in Deutschland so viel Sonnenenergie installiert werden?“     
“Also, es ist in erster Linie auf den Einfluss Deutschlands zurück zu führen dass wir die Fördersystemen 
völlig unterschiedlich in Europa…und wir plädieren dafür dass man die Fördersysteme harmonisiert, 
oder dass man zumindest einen Handel mit erneuerbaren Energien zulässt.“  
“Sie sind alle begeistert von den Erneuerbaren. Das ist…eine „erneuerbare Energie ist gut, und Kohle 
und Öl und Gas und so was ist alles schlecht““. 
„Also, es ist in erster Linie auf den Einfluss Deutschlands zurück zu führen dass wir die Fördersystemen 
völlig unterschiedlich in Europa…“  
 
Interview with Bundesverband Erneuerbare Energie 
“[…] das wäre ein Problem, weil die ganz erfolgreiche Förderinstrumente die wir im Deutschland 
hatten nicht mehr funktionieren wurden. Deswegen haben wir die erste große Auseinandersetzung mit 
der Kommission gehabt. Das war eine von der wenige Punkte wo wir auf der Arbeitsebene nicht weiter 
kamen.“  
“Es war fast witzig, aber man sagte: hier kommt der Renewable Energy House. Dann war immer von 
Greenpeace in nächsten Raum das, in nächsten Raum saß zwei Leute von der EU Kommission, zwei 




“Die Konfrontation wurde nur an die Punkten gesucht, wo es unabdingbar war, und das war die Frage 
Zertifikate Handel und drüber, dass der. dann alles kaputt gemacht hätte. Und an dieser Stelle haben wir 
die Konfrontation gesucht und gefunden und gewonnen. Alles andere waren Dinge die man über reden 
konnte.“  
 
“Die eigentliche Rolle war eine sehr viel informellere: das man dann mit die Menschen die arbeiten an 
die Richtlinie gesprochen hat, das man ihm gesagt hat was man wichtig findet, das man ihm gesagt hat 
in die Entwürfen die man gesehen hat ganz schlecht findet.“  
“Die haben ähnliches getan wie wir, nur mit noch viel mehr Geld.“  
 
Bundesverband der Energie und Wasserwirtschaft 
“Das heißt, man will eigentlich weg von einem Fördersystem zu einem Marktbasierten System. Das ist 
eben kompatibler mit eigenen Geschäftsprozessen“ (interview BDEW 2011a). 
“Klimaschutz darf nicht zum Objekt der Fiskalpolitik werden” (BDEW 2008a:15). 
 
Bundesverband Windenergie 
“Ohne einen verstärkten Ausbau der Windenergie wird die Bundesregierung die Zielmarke von 30 
Prozent Ökostrom-Anteil 2020 nicht erreichen. Dabei ist die Windenergie der Billigmacher im Konzert 
der erneuerbaren Energien. Ein steigender Anteil von Windstrom ist eine der besten Versicherungen 
gegen die Strompreis-Explosion“ (Herman Albers, BWE 2008c).   
 
Die Zeit 
“Es gibt keine Branche, die enger mit der Politik verflochten ist als die Stromwirtschaft“.  
 
The German Government 
“Das Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz (EEG) kann eine beispiellose Erfolgsbilanz vorweisen. Seit über 
zehn Jahren besteht ein geeignetes und flexibles Instrument, um den Anteil der Erneuerbaren Energien 
an der Energieversorgung kontinuierlich zu steigern und Innovationsimpulse zu setzen. Der Bundesrat 
setzt sich nachdrücklich für einen ambitionierten Ausbau der Erneuerbaren Energien ein.“ (Bundesrat 
18/3 2011).   




9.2 Interview guide in English 
 
- Which formal roles did your organization have in Germany and/or the EU in the 
negotiations leading to the revised Renewables Directive? Participation in public 
hearings? Advisory bodies? EUFORES?  
 
- What did you want that the Renewables Directive to look like? 
 
- And to what degree has this been the case? 
 
- What has been your organizations’ political positions regarding the Renewables 
Directive? (Could you also give me access to press statements, and other kind of 
formal documentation of your political positions? Strategic documents?). 
 
- Is this view shared by every member of your organization? Do all the members of 
your organizations agree upon these political positions, or are there internal 
differences in opinion regarding the renewables directive. If so, what are these? The 
German members? 
 
- Which political strategies have your organization used to assert your views? (Formal 
and informal meetings with politicians? Litigation? Political campaigns? All of them?)  
 
- Which political channels have you used in Germany and at the EU-level? (make a list- 
Bundestag, The European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, different types of 
committees, both formal and informal, participation in other organizations like EREC 
and EURELECTRIC). 
 
- How has the intensity of interest representation/lobbying been in these different 
channels? 
 
- What exactly did you try to achieve with these strategies?  
 
- Why did you choose them? (resources, real influence of the EU, different degrees of 
access, bypass national politicians, “friends and foes”) What has been the logic behind 
the different strategies? 
 
 
- Have you made coalitions with other interest groups or for example politicians? (Die 




- If you have participated in coalitions, have you then shared resources when 
campaigning? If you have participated in a coalition, has this provided you access to 
new venues of political influence? 
 
- What has the role of European level of European-level interest organizations been in 
this case? 
 
- Which venues of influence have been the most important? Why? How have your 
political strategies differed from one venue to another? 
 
- Are there venues that you have used, but not have used? If so, why? 
 
- Have there been competitors with opposing views, like BDI and BDEW in Germany 
and EURELECTRIC in Brussels? If so, how has this influenced your political 
strategies? Have you also tried to convince them? 
 
- To which degree would you say that your strategies have succeeded? What is the 
reason for this? 
 
- Long-term relationship? Have you or your organization developed a particular 
relationship to people within the Commission, the Council and the European 
Parliament? EUFORES? / The German government, Bundestag, other political 
bodies?  
 
- If so, why is this important? 
 
- How have you achieved this?  
 
- What kind of information does your organization provide for political bodies, like the 
German government, or the Commission? (Facts, expertise demands?) 
 
- Which role would you say that this provision of information has had for your 
organization’s success? 
 
- Why would you say that the revised Renewables Directive ended up being in its 
present form regarding feed-in tariffs versus GO-certificates? (Successful lobbying 







9.3 Interview guide in German 
 
- Welche formalen Rollen hatte Ihre Organisation in Deutschland und / oder in der 
EU bei den Verhandlungen, die zu den überarbeiteten Renewables Directive 
geführt haben? Teilnahme an öffentlichen Verhandlungen? 
Beratungsinstitutionen?  
 
- Welche Ausgestaltung der Renewables Directive wäre für Sie wünschenswert? 
 
- Und zu welchem Grade ist das geschehen? 
 
- Was ist die politische Position Ihrer Organisation im Bezug auf die Renewables 
Directive? (Pressmeldungen?) 
 
- Sind alle Mitglieder mit diesen Position einverstanden, oder gibt es interne 
Meinungsunterscheide bezüglich der Renewables Directive? 
 
- Welche politischen Strategien hat ihre Organisation benutzt, um ihre Meinungen 
auszudrücken? (Treffen mit Politikern, Kampanien usw.?) 
 
- Welche politischen Kanäle (Wege) haben Sie in Deutschland und in der EU 
benutzt?  
 
- Wie hat die Intensität der Repräsentation von Interessen und des Lobbying in 
diesen Kanälen variiert? 
 
- Was genau wollten Sie mit diesen Strategien erreichen? 
 
- Warum haben Sie diese unterschiedlichen Strategien gewählt? (Ressourcen? EU 
Einfluss? Zugang? Keine/viele Unterstützung von nationalen Politikern?) Was war 
die Logik hinter diesen verschiedenen Strategien? 
 
- Sind Sie in Koalitionen mit anderen Interessenorganisationen oder Politikern 
eingegangen? (Die Grüne, SPD, Bundesverband Erneuerbare Energien, 
Bundesverband Solarwirtschaft, Umweltorganisationen, EREC) 
 
- Haben sie beim Lobbying Ressourcen geteilt, falls Sie Koalitionen eingegangen 
sind? Falls Sie Koalitionen eingegangen sind, hat dies Ihnen Zugang zu neuen 
Kanälen politischen Einflusses verschafft? 
 
- Was war die Rolle des europäischen Levels bei Interessenorganisationen auf 
europäischem Level in diesem Fall? 
 
- Welche Kanäle von Einfluss sind am wichtigsten gewesen? Warum? 
 
- Wie haben die Strategien von einen bis einen anderen Kanal variiert? Welche sind 




- Gibt es Kanäle, die Sie benutzen hätten können, jedoch nicht genutzt haben? Falls 
ja, warum? 
 
- Gibt es Konkurrenten mit anderen / gegensätzlichen Meinungen, (wie BDEW und 
BDI/BEE) in Deutschland, und (EURELECTRIC/EWEA) in Brüssel? Falls ja, wie 
hat das Ihre politische Strategien beeinflusst? Haben Sie auch mit solchen 
Gruppen gearbeitet, um diese zu überzeugen? 
 
- Zu welchen Grad sind diese Strategien gelungen? Warum ist dies so? 
 
- Langzeitbeziehung? Haben Sie oder Ihre Organisation eine besondere Beziehung 
zu Menschen innerhalb der Kommission, des Europaparlamentes und des 
Ministerrates aufbauen können? 
 
- Warum ist das wichtig? 
 
- Wie haben Sie dies erreicht? 
 
- Welche Art von Information stellt Ihre Organisation den politischen Institutionen, 
wie die Deutsche Regierung oder die Kommission, zur Verfügung? 
 
- Welche Rolle hatte Ihrer Meinung nach diese Bereitstellung von Informationen für 
den Erfolg Ihrer Organisation 
 
- Warum hat die überarbeitete Renewables Directive Ihrer Meinung nach zu dem 
momentanen Ergebnis geführt bezüglich Feed-in Tarifen vs. Harmonisierung. 
 
 
9.4 List of organizations where representatives have been interviewed 
 
Germany: 
Bundesverband Erneuerbare Energie (BEE) 
Bundesverband BioEnergie (BBE) 
Bundesverband Windenergie (BWE) (2 interviewees) 
Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (BDI) 
Bundesverband der Energie und Wasserwirtschaft (BDEW) (2 interviewees) 
  
The European Union: 
European Photovoltaic Industry Association (EPIA) 
European Wind Energy Association (EWEA) 
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European Renewable Energy Federation (EREF) 
Union of the Electricity Industry (EURELECTRIC) 
 
 
 
